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‘Into the Ocean flows hundreds of rivers and streams; capaciousness is its virtue.’ 
海纳百川，有容乃大。 
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Abstract 
 
The EU’s approach towards China on human rights has often been criticised for its 
conflicting interests, and coordination problems between EU institutions and national 
member states. However, simply renouncing its efforts in the name of realism or neo-
liberalism does not fully explain the EU’s commitment to principles of international law, 
nor does it provide us with understanding as to why its policy has proven so weak and 
what ‘ought’ to be done.  
 
This thesis proposes a normative power approach to the study of EU human rights policy 
towards China between 1989 and 2009. Central to it is the assumption that the EU has been 
and should be a normative power towards China in the field of human rights. To verify this 
assumption, I adopt a tri-partite analytical framework drawn from existing ‘Normative 
Power Europe’ (NPE) literature in order to make sense of the EU’s adherence to human 
rights norms and its linkage with its external identity, illustrate how norms are diffused 
through a discursive form of power, and how impact should be evaluated normatively in 
the case of China.   
 
In so doing, I seek to achieve two central objectives: 1) to add to the empirical richness of 
NPE literature by analysing the Chinese case; 2) to apply a normative power perspective to 
the human rights dimension of EU-China relations. To address the first goal, I apply the 
NPE approach to two selected cases – the death penalty and the Tibet question, which are 
both high on the EU’s human rights agenda and yet are predicted to produce contrasting 
results. The second aim is met by operationalising the notion of NPE and developing its 
analytical and empirical relevance. To that end, I intend to make a contribution to the 
literature by presenting primary findings in the case-studies and a conceptual refinement of 
NPE as applied to the Chinese case.  
  
X 
 
List of Abbreviations 
AI Amnesty International 
CCP Chinese Communist Party 
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy 
COE Council of Europe 
COHOM Working Party on Human Rights 
ECHR European Convention of Human Rights 
ECJ European Court of Justice 
ECOSOC Economic and Social Council of the United Nations 
EESC European Economic and Social Committee 
EIDHR European Instruments for Democracy and Human Rights 
EP European Parliament 
EU European Union 
FIDH International Federation for Human Rights 
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
HRIC Human Rights in China 
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
ICESCR International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights 
ICJ International Commission of Jurists 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisations 
NGO Non-governmental organisations 
NPC National People’s Congress  
NPE Normative Power Europe 
SEA Single European Act 
SPC Supreme People’s Court (China) 
TEU Treaty of European Union 
TGIE Tibetan Government in Exile 
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
UN United Nations 
UNCHR United Nations Commission on Human Rights 
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
 
Chapter One 
 
1 
 
Chapter One 
 
Introduction  
 
 
 
Introduction 
Until recently, scholarly attention on EU promotion of human rights in its external policies 
has been mainly approached by rationalists who are interested in explaining what decisions 
are made and actions taken. In this vein, some focus on the discrepancies between the EU’s 
commitments and actions which has undermined the EU’s credibility (Alston 1999; King 
1999; Williams 2004); others either see EU promotion of human rights as being triggered 
by strategic, self-interested thinking (Youngs 2004); or simply being dismal and incoherent 
at best (AI 2008c: 6-8, Smith 2003: 116-20, Nicolaidis and Lacroix 2002: 143-6), and 
guilty of double standards at worst (Jurado 2006: 119; Gowan and Brantner 2008: 46; AI 
2004: 2). These perspectives often regard normative behaviour as a mere cover for more 
powerful material motives, and they are too rigid insofar as they exclude non-material 
dimensions from their understanding of state interests. As constructivism has gained 
significant weight in the study of International Relations and its sub-field European foreign 
policy, there is an emerging sense that EU promotion of human rights norms in external 
policies is not solely derived from a desire to promote its own interests, but can be justified 
though value-based arguments (Schimmelfennig 2001; Smith 2001; Sjursen 2002; Matlary 
2004). Within this paradigm, the student of European foreign policy can better appreciate 
the importance of non-materialistic objectives, such as the promotion of human rights 
which has come to represent one of the major foreign policy objectives pursued by the EU 
and its member states. Moreover, simply renouncing the EU’s efforts in the name of 
realism or neo-liberalism (Nathan 1994; Möller 1996; Wan 2001; Baker 2002; Holslag 
2006) does not fully explain the EU’s commitment to the principles of international law, 
nor provide us with explanations as to why the EU has proven so weak in projecting its 
human rights agenda. Hence, to further this alternative way of understanding and judging 
the EU’s normative influence in the field of human rights, this thesis considers that the 
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notion of “Normative Power Europe’ (NPE) can advance our understanding of why the EU 
does so, how we should judge its efforts and what ought to be done in the case of China.    
 
1.1 Research Aims 
In this thesis, I study the issue of the EU’s promotion of human rights in its external 
relations. Central to it is the assumption that the EU has been a normative power in China 
in the field of human rights. To verify this assumption, the proposed perspective focuses on 
the way in which we understand EU promotion of human rights through a discursive form 
of power, and how we judge such efforts through normative ethics.  
 
In so doing, I establish a theoretical framework built on the existing literature on 
‘Normative Power Europe’ (NPE), and analyse its empirical relevance through a case-
study on China by detecting the normative tendency in EU human rights policy from its 
principle, action and impact. Where EU normative power is manifested, I ask basic 
questions about China’s socialization and norm internalisation – to what extent it absorbs 
the norms the EU has promoted through constructive engagement and bilateral dialogue; to 
what extent China merely adapts itself instrumentally to gain EU economic cooperation, 
and vice versa. Where EU normative power is not apparent, I ask to what extent EU 
normative power is challenged by China’s views, beliefs and differing priorities; and to 
what extent the EU’s strategic and economic interests prevail over its normative concern. 
 
The notion of NPE is characterised as producing a scholarship with a special focus on the 
EU’s normative difference, and the independent power of norms through which the EU 
seeks to advance to the wider world because of their presumed universality (Diez 2005: 
615; Tocci 2008: 4). With a constructivist approach to norms, it is suggested that the EU is 
ontologically different because of the norms it stands for (Manners 2002: 252; Aggestam 
2009: 26). Consequently, this ontological position has several implications for its 
adaptation to the empirical investigation on China, that is to say, the ways in which I 
approach the EU, human rights norms and China.  
 
First of all, I conceptualise the EU as being guided by a general sense in NPE literature that 
the EU is constructed on a normative basis, therefore the EU is treated as one normative 
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entity and global actor in the international system. This external image is thus made up of 
EU actors and a selective range of member states, assuming they are all upholding the 
same human rights standards and sharing the same normative ethos. Unsurprisingly, this 
picture is far more complex in political realities. When EU actors and individual member 
states pursue their own agenda or conduct bilateral relations with China in different 
directions, my attention to these internal divisions is intended to illustrate the sources of 
influence driven by material interests and normative concerns, rather than concentrating on 
the institutional dimension, that is – how the various actors and member states of the EU 
have operated in concert or discord. To that end, the relative absence of European member 
states in this concept is sufficiently recognised, and is replaced by an emphasis on the 
power of human rights norms, and how the EU has actively pursued them both internally 
and externally.  
 
Secondly, central to the notion of NPE is the assumption that European interpretation of 
universal principles holds power. In this thesis, I define normativity based on the highest 
level of the international human rights law such as the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR), which suggests that I approach human rights norms rather objectively 
between two different normative systems represented by the EU and China. For 
constructivists, international human rights norms resonate with basic humanistic ideas of 
empathy and dignity shared in many cultures and societies in the world (Boli and Thomas 
1999; Keck and Sikkink 1998). Despite their Western origins, these norms have 
universalistic qualities which should provide guidance to the fundamental purpose of 
statehood (Finnemore 1996b: 343). However, human rights norms might be agreed upon 
within the UN framework; their precise interpretations are subject to specific cultural and 
institutional settings. To that end, I concur with Donnelly (2007, 1998) that universal 
human rights, despite their conceptual validity, remain ‘relative’ and therefore limited by 
historical contingency and cultural particularity of states. The approach to human rights 
norms as undertaken in this thesis thus situates itself in the middle ground between 
objectivist ontology to norm compliance and subjectivist ontology to norms contestation, 
which allows considerable space to recognise China’s social conditions and moral 
understandings on a case-by-case basis.  
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Finally, standing for a normative system in its own right, China has mounted a formidable 
challenge to the normative identity represented by the EU, reinforced by China’s 
expanding economic clout and presence around the world. Therefore, China in this context 
represents a source of contesting interpretations of norms in the empirical investigation, 
and a test ground to evaluate the validity of an NPE perspective. Today, human rights 
issues still highlight the existence of strong sensitivity among the Chinese elites towards 
Western attitudes that are perceived as threatening or disrespectful of China’s national 
sovereignty. This case study is therefore particularly salient in understanding the 
challenges faced by the liberal West against the backdrop of the rise of China. Although 
what I present in this thesis as ‘the Chinese view’ of human rights is only the Chinese 
official discourse, including academic officialdom, the alternative views of China’s human 
rights situations from Chinese dissidents, independent scholars, lawyers and other alike 
serve as a source of references, through which universal values and norms can be better 
justified.  
 
Since the Tiananmen Square events of 1989, there have been numerous studies on China 
and international human right regimes, including books and articles encompassing China-
US relations and China-UN, and China-Europe relations to a lesser extent (Nathan 1994, 
1999; Kent 1995, 1999, 2007; Foot 2001). The body of literature on EU-China human 
rights relations is modest compared to the much larger quantity of research that has been 
done on trade relations or geopolitics (Yahuda 1995; Wan 2001; Edmonds 2002; Wong 
2005a; Holslag 2006; Shambaugh, Sandschneider and Zhou 2007; Balme 2008a, 2008b, 
Wiessala, Wilson and Taneja, 2009). Moreover, the human rights dimension of EU-China 
relations has been traditionally approached from a positivist/institutionalist perspective 
(Möller 2002; Baker 2002; Algeri 2007) with very few exceptions asking normative 
questions with substantive discussion (Panebianco 2006; Balme 2008a, 2008b; Mattlin 
2010). Therefore, a case study on China using the NPE approach fills in a theoretical gap 
of normatively theorising EU-China relations and brings new interpretation to bear on this 
issue. Moreover, the use of three normative ethics prescribes three different ways of 
arguing and justifying what ought to be done by the EU, which has not been adopted 
before in any empirical investigation on NPE. Furthermore, European scholars have not 
systematically tapped into Chinese publications on the study of EU’s international role and 
human rights in such a way as to illuminate the other side of perceptions and mis-
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perceptions on specific human rights issues. By comparing these two sub-cases, the thesis 
reflects on the general pattern of the Chinese case and the extent to which the notion of 
NPE captures the EU’s human rights policy on China. To that end, this thesis adds to the 
richness of NPE literature in terms of its application to two case-studies on the death 
penalty and Tibet, as well as a conceptual refinement of NPE to the Chinese case by 
operationalising this concept and developing its analytical and empirical relevance.  
 
1.2  Research Hypotheses 
In this thesis, a tripartite analytical framework is drawn from Manners (2008, 2009a), 
Tocci (2008) and Forsberg (2009) which have sought to integrate empirical investigation 
and theoretical understanding of NPE. I follow these examples and address similar 
questions which are both relevant and applicable to the case of China. This analytical 
framework involves interpreting the construction of principles, actions and impacts of EU 
human rights policies that are developed and changed through interaction with China. 
Within each stage of analysis, I apply NPE critiques which are developed from rival 
propositions/alternative explanations reflecting on the conflicts between norm and interest, 
principle and engagement, and other material types of ‘power’ in the NPE debates. I then 
apply this framework to two sub-cases which have been both high on the EU’s human 
rights agenda on China over the last two decades.  
 
While adopting NPE as an interpretive approach, I formulate research hypotheses which 
guide data collection and analysis for a case study (Yin 1994:35; King, Keohane and Verba, 
1994: 37). In other words, I seek to both explain and understand the EU’s normative power 
through this empirical investigation. The formulation of the hypotheses relies on the 
existing NPE literature and preliminary empirical knowledge on the human rights 
dimension of EU-China relations. Guided by the main hypothesis, each of the three sub-
hypotheses deal with the ways in which EU normative identity is constructed, norms are 
diffused, and normative impacts are interpreted. Each case study is an analogous 
deployment of the tripartite framework which assesses evidence for and against the three 
sub-hypotheses.  
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Main Hypothesis: The EU has been a normative power towards China in the field of 
human rights since 1989. 
 
The main hypothesis clarifies the boundaries of this thesis with regard to the major actors 
involved, the issue area in which data shall be collected, and the time period covered by 
this research. It also reflects on those ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions this thesis aims to address: 
1) how and why do human rights become aims and objectives in EU foreign policy? 2) 
How does the EU act to change norms? 3) How should the impacts of EU normative power 
be evaluated? These questions therefore lead to three sub-hypotheses which are elaborated 
below regarding their theoretical meanings and empirical implications. 
 
Sub-hypothesis 1: Human rights norms are constitutive principles of the EU and they have 
been aims and objectives of European foreign policy towards China. 
 
The first sub-hypothesis concerns the constitutive principles of the EU’s promotion of 
human rights in its external relations. According to one of Manners’ basic claims about 
NPE, the EU is a normative power because of its sui generis nature, and ‘its normative 
identity predisposes the EU to act in a normative way’ (2002:252). In this vein, this 
hypothesis should be understood in a three-fold manner. Firstly, EU external promotion of 
human rights should stem from its own experience and internal practices. Secondly, human 
rights should be the principled beliefs of the EU which have constitutive effects on the 
EU’s identity formation (Finnemore 1996a). Thirdly, it reflects that human rights are aims 
and objectives of EU foreign policy towards China. To that end, human rights are not only 
principles of the EU identity and objectives for internal practice; they are also among EU 
collective agenda in its external relations. This hypothesis therefore reflects one of my 
central research questions regarding the EU’s adherence to human rights norms and its 
links with its external identity, interests and behaviour. 
 
In view of virtue ethics rooted in the work of Plato and Aristotle, the character or traits are 
important in terms of ethical thinking and moral judgement in Western philosophical 
tradition (Foot 1978, Hursthouse 1999, cited in Manners 2008: 56). This application of 
virtue ethics in the context of the EU implies that if the EU is a normative power, it should 
have the virtue or moral character which guides itself in pursuit of external actions.  In the 
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context of EU human rights policy, virtue ethics indicates the EU should ‘live by example’ 
in the sense that the EU’s internal or external human rights policy should be coherent and 
consistent (Alston 1999; Coombes 1998; Manners 2008).     
 
To make this assumption empirically accountable, I look for relevant evidence among the 
EU’s founding documents, and examine the extent to which human rights norms are 
regarded as a motivating factor in EU foreign policy. Such empirical data encompasses 
primary legal sources, EU official policy documents and secondary resources drawn from 
academic discussions. For instance, the Lisbon Treaty {Article III-193(1), Article 1-2 and 
1-3}, legal sources embedded in the Preamble of the SEA, the Amsterdam and Nice 
Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, human rights declarations and resolutions 
issued by EU institutions, are part of the general principles of the EU, amongst which the 
UDHR serves as the normative foundation of the EU’s action (Brandtner and Rosas 1998: 
469). Analysis of empirical data within a constructivist paradigm then requires 
explanations regarding the EU’s normative identity, interest and self-binding behaviour, 
and understanding the construction of principled foreign policy.  
 
Within each sub-case study, I ask how the EU has constructed the specific human rights 
policy towards China and whether this issue is at a central or marginal position in the EU’s 
China policy. On normative interests, I ask if and how the EU can be normative while 
having selfish interests. In so doing, I investigate how a specific normative concern 
interacts with and is constrained by materialistic interests. On self-binding behaviour, I ask 
to what extent the human rights policy under investigation is coherent and consistent, in 
other words, how the EU promotes this norm internally, in comparison to those in its 
external policies.  Through this analysis, I aim to understand the role which human rights 
norms play in the EU’s China policy formation. 
  
Sub-hypothesis 2: The EU’s promotion of human rights in China is based on the reasoning 
of legitimated human rights principles which are diffused mainly 
through the process of persuasion and engagement as opposed to 
sanction and conditionality.   
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Merely having normative identity does not make the EU a normative power (Manners 
2002: 244). Thus, this second sub-hypothesis addresses the ways in which human rights 
norms are diffused through a discursive form of power (Diez and Manners 2007: 187). 
This stage of analysis goes on looking at normative actions taken by the EU to promote its 
principled beliefs. Such actions include persuasion, argumentation, or conferral of shame 
or prestige, rather than coercion or material motivations.  This sub-hypothesis thus reflects 
the nature of NPE at work with emphasis on both the normative power mechanisms and 
the normative character of EU foreign policy instruments. 
 
In view of deontological ethics drawn from the Kantian notion of public reasoning, the 
character of the action itself is an important process in terms of reaching valid moral 
judgements (O’Neil 2000, in Manners 2008: 57). Compared to virtue ethics, deontological 
ethics does not seem to take good values for granted, but establishes them through practice 
of reasoning and law-making. The application of deontological ethics to NPE implies that 
the EU works to activate commitment and persuade by ‘being reasonable’; in other words, 
by referring to the general rules and practices, or cooperating with the third countries in 
form of engagement and dialogue (Manners 2008: 57-8; Forsberg 2009: 13). 
 
In order to verify this hypothesis empirically, I begin with identifying whether human 
rights norms that the EU promotes in its external relations are indeed universal norms. 
From an NPE perspective, the EU’s activities should be, first and foremost, based on 
general principles of the highest level of International Human Rights Law which are 
binding on all subjects of international law, including the EU itself.  
 
Moreover, the nature of norm diffusion also matters, especially when normative power is 
conceptualised alongside, and coexists with, military and economic power as an 
ontologically different concept (Diez and Manners 2007). Normative power as ‘ideological 
power’ or ‘power of opinion’ can be detached from, but not necessarily incompatible with, 
military and economic power (Diez and Manners 2007: 167). As opposed to other less or 
non-normative means, such as extensive use of material incentives including 
positive/negative conditionality, sanctions and military actions, the normative nature of the 
diffusion mechanisms is crucial to the understanding of NPE (Manners 2009a:13).  
 
Chapter One 
 
9 
 
Regarding how norms are diffused normatively, Foot (2001: 9) suggests that, in the 
absence of a direct enforcement mechanism, one has to rely on moral persuasion, 
argumentation, shaming to invoke voluntary compliance in circumstances in which norms 
are well-established international standards. For Tocci (2008: 9), methods based on 
dialogue, cooperation and engagement are normative because they reduce the risks of 
‘imposing allegedly “universal” norms through sheer power and against the needs and 
desires of local populations in third countries’. The use of persuasion, through constructive 
engagement and conferral of shame or prestige, is thus important if the EU is to be seen to 
‘be reasonable’ in human rights policy (Manners 2009b: 795).  
 
Drawn from Manners (2002, 2008, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c), and his critics (Forsberg 2009, 
Aggestam 2009), I identify five norm diffusion mechanisms underlying policy approaches 
adopted by the EU towards China between 1989 and 2009, and evaluate their normativity 
through two case studies (Forsberg 2009: 20; Tocci 2008: 10). These five mechanisms 
include persuasion, invoking norms, shaping the discourse, power of example and 
conferral of prestige or shame.  For instance, I seek to identify and evaluate the EU-China 
human rights dialogue as a form of persuasion that was intended to create opportunities to 
gain engagement, critical discussion and further cooperation with China on human rights 
issues (Baker 2002; Panebianco 2006: 140). 
 
Sub-hypothesis 3: The normative impact of EU human rights policy in China includes 
transformation of Chinese official discourse, increasing cooperation 
with the EU, domestic policy reform and local ownership. 
 
The final stage of analysis examines the impact of the normative principles and actions. 
The role of socialisation, partnership, and local ownership is important from a normative 
power perspective if the EU is seen to be ‘doing least harm’ and achieving ideational 
impact through its foreign policy (Manners 2008: 57).  This hypothesis thus reflects on the 
third research question with regard to what constitutes normative impact. For Manners 
(2002: 238), NPE has a particular emphasis on achieving ideational impact as compared to 
other discourses, such as soft power (Nye 2002; 2005), however, NPE has been criticised 
for not having specific means to evaluate it (Toje 2008, Forsberg 2009).   
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In view of consequentialist ethics rooted in utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham and John 
Stuart Mill, the consequences of a particular action form the basis for moral judgement 
about that action and its implications for others (Anscombe 1958, in Manners 2008: 58). 
Applying this ethical thinking to NPE, Manners (2008: 59) suggests that the EU should ‘do 
least harm’; therefore, the EU should think reflexively, encourage local ownership and 
empower the others. Socialisation, in this case, refers to the process by which international 
norms are internalised and implemented domestically (Risse and Skkink 1999:5). 
 
In the Chinese context, I seek to apply a constructivist perspective to socialisation and 
consequentialist ethics to local ownership as the ‘right’ consequence to trace and evaluate 
EU normative impact. However, the difficulty in identifying the socialisation process and 
the EU’s impact lie in the lack of transparency in EU-China human rights dialogue and 
cooperation programmes, as well as problems with the effectiveness of EU human rights 
agenda towards a strong authoritarian regime with weak civil society in which Western 
human rights policies are often viewed as an intervening variable as opposed to 
autonomous variable such as sovereignty or the need for internal stability (Kent 1999:13, 
Peerenboom 2002: 191). Moreover, without developing precise causal variables accounting 
for norm compliance, a normative approach has a methodological problem of isolating the 
EU’s normative impact from that of other actors and norm entrepreneurs, such as the UN 
and the US. 
 
To address these problems, I suggest assessing the normative impact on a case-by-case 
basis through a ‘longitudinal interpretation’ (Manners 2009a: 19).  Thus, an in-depth 
analysis of interaction between the EU policy and the Chinese socialisation process is 
likely to establish a traceable path between the EU’s action/inaction and delineating results 
(Tocci 2008: 11-2).   
 
1.3  Methodology 
The examination of EU human rights policy in the case of China through a normative 
perspective indicates an interpretive/constructivist approach to the EU’s world view and 
the normative justification of EU norms in the eyes of the Chinese. Thus, a qualitative 
methodology is more suited to answer research questions that are to do with the EU’s self-
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perception/international role, power of norms and Chinese perceptions. I therefore 
approach the complex normative dimension of EU-China relations through an in-depth 
case-study method and draw cross-case synthesis of the findings.  For Yin (2004:2), the 
case study method is uniquely suited for making sense of complex social phenomena, it 
also sits well with the elements of understanding and explanation underlying the NPE 
analytical framework developed in this thesis (Yin 2009: 6-9; Manners 2006c, 2009a). This 
section elaborates on the rationale behind the choice of this research method.  
 
1.3.1 China as a ‘Least-Likely’ Case 
According to Eckstein (1975:118), a least-likely case is ‘especially tailored to confirmation’ 
of a theory, despite being a ‘tough test’ case in which the theory in question is unlikely to 
provide a good explanation. Since a theory that fits even a case in which it is least likely to 
gain confidence, it is recognised as being more robust than previously expected (Eckstein 
1975: 119).  
 
In discussing the prospect of empirical study on NPE, Manners predicts that China 
represents a country of ‘axis of ego’ (2008: 60) which could be a ‘black hole’ of the EU’s 
normative power (2006b: 411). I select China as ‘a least likely case study’ by virtue of its 
history, cultural traditions, and power status, which is likely to provide both the concept of 
normative power and the EU as a normative power a rigorous test. Because of its ascribed 
power status, its growing economic and strategic muscles, its position as a Permanent 
Member of the Security Council, and that it has signed the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural rights (ICESCR) but has not ratified the former, China is a special if not crucial 
case in international human rights regime. When it comes to EU promotion of human 
rights towards third countries, it is argued that there is no country like China with which 
the EU’s ambition and leverage are so mismatched (Fox and Godement 2009: 63 ). Chris 
Patten notices that China has been ‘the most embarrassing indication of the gulf between 
European rhetoric and reality’ (Pattern 1998: 303). For these precise reasons, China as a 
least-likely case is of importance, not just by being a litmus test of NPE as an empirically 
valid and logically coherent analytical tool, but also providing an enriched and deeper 
understanding of the EU’s global influence in the face of material interests and strategic 
considerations. 
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1.3.2   Sub-Case Studies: a Multiple-Case Design 
Due to the complexity of this topic, a single-case design could not adequately represent the 
key human rights issues in contemporary EU-China relations.  Following ‘the theoretical 
replication logic’ (Yin 1984, 1994, 2009), I formulate a multiple-case study design to 
ensure a robust testing of NPE propositions within the Chinese case. For Yin (1984, 1994, 
2009), the underlying logic of replication is to treat multiple cases as a series of 
experiments, with each case either confirming or disconfirming the hypotheses. Cases that 
confirm the research hypotheses reassure the validity of the theory; whereas those which 
disconfirm the hypotheses might provide an opportunity to refine or expand the theory 
(Yin 1984, 2009; Eisenhardt 1989). 
 
Under this design, I examine two cases: the death penalty and the Tibet question. 
Following a set of rationales derived from NPE literature review and preliminary empirical 
investigation, these two sub-cases are anticipated to offer contrasting conditions. If the 
findings support this anticipatable contrast, the result should indicate the robustness of the 
theory, as the NPE analytical framework in this case (Yin 2009: 61).  
 
The rationale for selecting these two cases is guided by the relevance of their 
characteristics to the research objectives and their representativeness of key issues in a 
complementary manner (George and Bennett 2004: 83). A number of arguments can be 
expanded on the selection criteria. First of all, these two cases are among the key issues on 
EU normative agenda as indicated in official documents, NGO reports and numerous 
journalistic accounts. They are selected not only because they attract attention, but also on 
the basis that they fit in the requirements of NPE propositions. The abolishment of the 
death penalty, protection of minority rights, and religious freedom are matters of principles 
to many Europeans. Moreover, the ways in which these issues are addressed by the EU are 
subject to the general guideline of using the dialogue approach and constructive 
engagement, rather than coercive measures which are central to the NPE analysis. 
Furthermore, they are also the subject of active debates in China both in official and 
academic discourses, which allow the aspect of norm contestation to be sufficiently 
addressed in the case-studies. Lastly, the case selection is further justified in the way that 
these cases’ characteristics and findings supplement those of one another. In the following 
section, I elaborate on this by illustrating how the data from one case might fill the gaps 
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left by the other; and why the findings from such a ‘two-tailed’ case design are compelling 
and potentially respond well to critiques and shortcomings of NPE. 
 
1.3.2.1 The Death Penalty Case 
The death penalty issue makes perhaps the most compelling argument on NPE (Manners 
2002, Lerch and Schwellnes 2006). Empirically, this norm has been unanimously 
internalised and implemented within all EU member states, which makes the EU’s external 
promotion of this norm more coherent and potentially more effective. In the human rights 
dimension of EU-China relations, the death penalty issue has been one of the central 
themes (Schabas 2009: 8). On the surface, it seems that the two sides are still at polar 
opposites. While the EU is a ‘death penalty – free zone’, China’s annual executions 
outnumber those of the rest of the world combined, and China has not ratified any 
international treaty concerning capital punishment, hence is under no legal obligation to 
commit to this issue (AI 2008b). However, China’s death penalty rhetoric has changed over 
the years and the annual number of executions is expected to drop according to Chinese 
state media and some NGO sources (HRIC and FIDH 2004).
1 
Therefore, the death penalty 
issue is likely to make a strong case for the normative power of the EU, whose normative 
impacts on China can be isolated from those of the US or other international human rights 
regime.   
 
1.3.2.2 The Issue of Tibet 
While the death penalty case is most likely to confirm NPE hypotheses, the Tibetan case is 
mostly likely to disconfirm them, given that China has not fundamentally changed its 
official discourse regarding Tibet’s status quo, nor has Chinese domestic policy towards 
Tibet given in to any external pressure which China had always bitterly opposed as 
interference of its internal affairs.2  On the empirical ground, the death penalty might be an 
‘easy’ case for NPE; however, it risks the danger of overestimating the EU’s normative 
identity and interests which imply the EU acts with a single collective principle of 
promoting universal norms for the common good of the world. As observed by King (1999: 
335-7), the EU’s promotion of human rights in its external relations has often been 
                                                          
1  
Xinhua News Agency, China changes law to limit death penalty, 31 October 2006. 
2 
Xinhua News Agency, The Chinese
 
Side Express Strong Dissatisfaction at the EU Foreign Ministers 
Council’s Unofficial Discussion and Comments on the Situation in Tibet, 30 March 2008 
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constrained by the nature of its institutional settings, different national interests and visions 
for foreign policy, and divergence in Member States’ own bilateral relations with third 
countries. Thus, the Tibetan case serves to capture the strong and weak normative 
behaviour among different EU institutions and some Member States, despite a similar 
rhetoric being adopted to confirm their official positions on China’s sovereignty and the 
human rights situation in Tibet. From a positivist and rationalist account, the Tibet case 
might hardly be a successful story as the EU has little leverage to influence China’s Tibet 
policy, including ‘minority’ rights as part of the larger human rights rubric. Therefore, it 
merits a close examination as to why it has been difficult for the EU to project is normative 
agenda, through which NPE could offer us some nuances in understanding and judging 
policy effectiveness. 
 
1.3.3   Sources of Empirical Data 
Aligned with a normative/constructivist approach, the empirical findings in this thesis are 
exclusively qualitative. This section presents a description of the source of empirical 
evidence. In the following chapters, I use the Chicago referencing system for policy 
documents and journalistic reports in order to highlight these findings, whilst other 
secondary literature remains cited in the Harvard style. 
 
Documentation 
Concerning the EU’s human rights policy making in each case study, I conduct a 
comprehensive analysis of documentation regarding legal provisions, institutional 
arrangements and major actors. By extensively reviewing EU legal and policy documents 
from the European Documentation Centre at the University of Bath, the ECLAS (the 
European Commission’s library database), and information online, I first draw 
chronological reports for the narrative chapter (chpt.3) and two sub-cases (chpt.3&4) on 
the development of EU human rights agenda and activities, and how the EU responded to 
key events. I then present these findings in narrative structures within each analytical 
section (Silverman 2006:164). During this process, I apply qualitative content analysis in 
an interpretive fashion (Esterberg 2002: 172), while looking into the ways in which certain 
human rights concerns are expressed, and the underlying meanings in the change of words 
or in tone of language on key issues in EU documents on China.   
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Legal framework 
In viewing the EU’s definitions on human rights in each individual case, I look at the 
extent to which these definitions are in tune with international standards. In so doing, I 
review human rights provisions in the EU’s legal framework, and seek to identify the legal 
bases for assessing human rights as constitutive and legitimated principles of EU foreign 
policy. The basis for data selection is centred on NPE hypotheses and guided by virtue 
ethics and deontological ethics. In operational terms, it refers to a set of questions for 
collecting data from documents produced by major EU institutions: 1) whether the EU’s 
primary references are European or indeed international standards in defining human rights; 
2) whether those international standards are accepted by all the member states; 3) whether 
they are still evolving; 4) how human rights promotion has become an issue for foreign 
policy cooperation.  
 
The Council 
The Council has become the institution most capable of dealing with human rights issues 
for both foreign and domestic policies of member states, particularly after the Amsterdam 
Treaty. In order to identify the Council’s activities in dealing with China and human rights, 
I analyse the Council’s regulations, statements, declarations by the Presidency, conclusions, 
and the Annual Reports on Human Rights (1998-2009).  The Council’s conclusions and 
reports by its Working Party on Human Rights (COHOM) are key materials in forming the 
basis of analysis on the implementation of practical measures in terms of achieving 
specific policy objectives. Throughout this process I trace how particular human rights 
concerns have been coordinated among Member States in dealing with China. In particular, 
I ask to what extent the Council has had a top-down effect in harmonising divergent views 
among member states; to what extent certain member states, such as France and Germany, 
have been able to project their own interests through a bottom-up approach in shaping the 
Council’s collective stance, as well as the role of the rotating Presidency in influencing the 
way in which the Council’s position on China’s human rights issues. 
 
The Commission 
The Commission is responsible for the coordination and implementation of policies (Art. 
J.8, TEU); therefore it plays a constructive role in supporting human rights initiatives in 
third countries. I therefore review the Commission’s Communications (1995; 1998; 2001; 
2006) to the Council and the Parliament on China, archival records from the Commission’s 
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delegation in Beijing, including China strategy papers (2002; 2007a). In so doing, I map 
out all the Commission’s activities in the area of human rights concerning the case in 
question between 1989 and 2009, and seek to identify strategies and instruments set out in 
the Communications aiming at enhancing the consistency and effectiveness of the EU’s 
human rights policy. Attention is also given to cooperation programmes funded by the 
Commission that have been linked to human rights. In particular, I look into two areas: 
strengthening the rule of law and promoting legal reforms; and training and academic 
exchanges in which issues of the death penalty and Tibet have been addressed. To find out 
all the relevant projects that have been initiated, including those which are proposed, 
ongoing and ended, I use the Commission’s China strategy papers, national indicative 
programmes, press releases and a list of projects on co-operation and partnership available 
online or obtained through European Commission library catalogue (ECLAS). Detail of 
these projects includes budget, objectives and approaches, participants, time frame, stage 
of implementation, and results. To evaluate the results of the Commission’s cooperation 
and partnership initiatives, I look for the insights from Commission’s own evaluations, and 
those by NGOs or academics. The basis for data selection is guided by two questions: 
whether cooperation is a better alternative to the coercive and confrontational measures in 
the past; and what constitutes ‘concrete’ progress in the Chinese context.  During these 
investigations, the Chinese government’s coordination and consultation with EU initiated 
programmes, including official participation, signed agreements and Chinese budgetary 
contribution, are the key indicators for evaluating the EU’s capacity to achieve normative 
impact through partnership and local-ownership. 
 
The Parliament 
The European Parliament (EP) has played the most proactive role concerning both case 
studies in this thesis. Major instruments and activities developed by the EP regarding 
human rights include resolutions, delegations and public hearings. I first look at EP 
resolutions upon which the death penalty and Tibet are concerned. I also examine EP 
reports on the inter-parliamentary delegation through which the EU has established ties 
with China’s National People’s Congress, and meetings reports with NGOs and press 
releases. Furthermore, I examine recordings and transcripts of public hearings organised by 
the Subcommittee on Human Rights (DROI), and the meeting reports of the Parliament’s 
Tibet Intergroup. In addition, the EU’s Sakharov Prize and the Annual Report on Human 
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Rights as the EP’s own initiative provide an indication of the EP’s priorities. Reviewing 
documentation on these EP instruments is particularly useful in evaluating NPE in terms of 
conflicting interests and norms, verbal persuasion and shaming as mechanisms of norm 
diffusion. 
 
The Council of Europe 
The Council of Europe (CoE) has played an important role in both ensuring the abolition 
of capital punishment to become a norm in Western Europe and developing regional 
human rights mechanisms to address minority rights. Thus, the CoE’s publications on the 
abolition of capital punishment in Europe and minority rights are important secondary data 
in terms of understanding the common cultural, legal and political basis of the EU.  
 
Other Sources 
Academic journals and published books by Chinese top thinkers of international relations 
and EU studies are used as complimentary materials, formulating the body of literature that 
sketches out the landscape of perceptions amongst Chinese scholarly elites engaging in EU 
studies.
3 
The selection criteria is particularly concerning how the EU’s international role in 
the field of human rights is perceived by China’s EU experts and think-tanks studying EU-
China relations.  
 
Due to the lack of official data in some policy instruments, such as the EU-China human 
rights dialogue, the data collection requires not only drawing extensively on EU official 
source, but also using materials from newspaper archives, media interviews with political 
elites. These materials concerns the analytical timeframe between 1989 and 2009, however, 
my attention is primarily centred around major events in which we have seen a surge in 
public inquiry into the EU’s human rights policy on China. For instance, in the year 2008 
                                                          
3
 The Chinese Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) has been the single institution and 
think tank that drafted 2003 China’s Europe Policy Paper. It has a full-scale research institute specialising 
in the study of EU. It publishes a bi-monthly journal Contemporary International Relations, which is one of 
the most important Chinese journals for European studies and international studies in general. 
The other think tank is China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) which is a research office on 
European studies with research fellows experienced in China-Europe diplomatic careers. Affiliated with the 
Foreign Ministry, the Institute is closer to foreign policy-making than most other institute. The bi-monthly 
International Studies edited by the Institute is also among the leading Chinese journals, which publishes 
quite a number of papers on European studies. Its European section has a handful of five top researchers.   
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when China was to hold the Olympic Games in Beijing, human rights, especially the Tibet 
question once again received intensive media attention from both sides. 
 
Additionally, Amnesty International, International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) 
and Human Rights in China (HRIC) are leading human rights NGOs who have produced 
extensive and regular reports and evaluations on the EU and Member States’ human rights 
policy towards China, especially on bilateral dialogues and aid programmes which make 
up of an important external reference for establishing benchmarks for assessing NPE.  
 
The importance of combining official sources, media accounts, NGO perspectives and 
academic writings for the data source is two-fold. Firstly, they are important materials in 
terms of establishing chains of events for each individual case. Secondly, presenting how 
officials, academics and NGOs’ views on each particular issue differ from one another 
enables us to avoid selective data usage in favour of NPE hypotheses.    
 
Managing Data 
In the process of analysing data, I begin with compiling chronological events for the 
narrative/background chapter (chapter 3) and two sub-cases (chapter 4&5). This procedure 
has an important analytic purpose in which the trend of data can be delineated within each 
chapter to either confirm or disconfirm the trend presumed by NPE that the EU has 
become an emerging foreign policy actor driven by normative principles (Yin 2003: 122-
127). In each sub-case, I seek to place the chronological events and descriptive summaries 
within which the meanings of policy change become explicable within the NPE framework 
of analysis (King et al., 1994: 36). 
 
For Chapter Three, I draw a historical narrative from primary and secondary source which 
serves as an ‘umbrella’ for the sub-cases. By building a descriptive account of 
chronological events, I seek to provide a general explanation of the trend in the EU’s China 
policy on human rights.  
 
For the death penalty case in Chapter Four, Chinese history, law and practice on the death 
penalty are given a descriptive summary, which I seek to compare with the state of the 
global abolitionist movement and the relevant cultural, moral and legal traditions in Europe. 
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This relies on both primary and secondary data on evidence and citations from legal studies 
and policy documentation on EU law, international law and Chinese domestic law. To 
verify normative action, I look at the EU’s means of influence by reviewing the 
Presidency’s declarations, the Council’s press releases on the EU-China human rights 
dialogue, documentation regarding legal & judicial training and cooperation programmes 
funded by the EU, NGO accounts on individual cases and events. Data collection on the 
normative impact involves reviewing a combination of Chinese official statements, NGO 
reports, academic writings, and media reporting on Chinese reform in criminal judiciary 
procedures and Chinese participants’ accounts on EU sponsored legal seminars and 
training programmes particularly since 1998. 
 
For the Tibetan case in Chapter Five, two sides have subscribed to completely different 
paradigms in understanding the issue of Tibet. In order to interpret this gulf in perception, I 
first summarise the history and politics of the Tibet question, and identify international 
legal principles which provide guidance for the EU’s response, and then compare them to 
those rendered in Chinese official discourse on Tibet. For normative action, I look at how 
EU institutions and member states respond to major events and individual cases. Regarding 
impact, I examine the EU’s policy impact on individual cases, the EU-China relations and 
international visibility of the Tibetan cause. In so doing, I rely on a combination of primary 
source of official documents including statements and declarations from both sides and 
secondary data by Western and Chinese historians on Tibet, media and NGO reports. In 
this way, I seek to give an account of reasons for or meanings of the EU’s human rights 
concerns over Tibet as well as China’s sensitivity on this issue. 
 
1.3.4   Analytical Timeframe 
The decision to focus on the post-1989 era to 2009 is justified in twofold. Firstly, the year 
1989 is undoubtedly significant in the Chinese case. The issue of human rights had not 
been a major concern between the EC member states and China before the events of 
Tiananmen in 1989 (Baker 2002: 47). This is not unique to Western Europe but the 
international community in general. Not until the post-Cold War period, in particular after 
the shock of the Tiananmen crackdown did human rights issues in China have been 
attached greater importance and attention in international politics (Cohen 1987; Kent 1995). 
Secondly, Manners (2009a:2) suggests that ‘normative power works like “water on stone”, 
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not like “napalm in the morning”’, by which he suggest the use of a ‘longitudinal 
interpretation’ to address the issue of change in the perception of normality (Manner 
2009a:19; Ruane 2006: 94). In this thesis, the types of human rights norms in the EU’s 
China policy are subject to change through its interaction with China, the proposed 
research timescale allows me to adopt the longest possible timeframe at the time of the 
research design, so as to avoid falsification due to ‘momentary fluctuation’ (Manners 
2009a: 19).   
1.4  Summary of Chapters 
This thesis consists of six chapters. This introductory chapter is followed by a presentation 
of the theoretical framework in Chapter Two. The aim is to develop a conceptual 
framework based on the existing NPE literature that establishes linkage between NPE 
hypothesis developed within the Chinese case and empirical data to verify these 
propositions.  It is structured in three main parts that details a review of current NPE 
literature, clarification on the condition of norm contestation in the Chinese case, and a 
tripartite analytical framework. 
 
Chapter Three presents an analytical account on the evolution of EU-China relations in the 
field of human rights from 1989 to 2009. It does so by situating this historical narrative 
alongside the EU’s search for its global role. The first section is divided into two main 
phases based on the different nature of policy instruments the EU had adopted to promote 
human rights in China. It then asks whether this change is driven by normative concerns; 
whether member states’ approaches towards China have converged, diverged or 
harmonised as the European integration processes has gone further towards formulating a 
value-driven international identity. The second section looks at how China has responded 
towards the EU’s emerging global role as a normative power and its role in the field of 
human rights.  It aims to understand how the Chinese official discourse perceives the EU 
as an international actor, and the role of human rights in EU-China relations by Chinese 
officials and academic elite. Therefore, this chapter not only sets the scene for the 
subsequent case-studies, it also lays the basis for evaluating the question of legitimacy of 
normative power by looking at the source of normative justification and legitimacy of the 
EU’s promotion of human rights in the eyes of the Chinese . 
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Following a theoretical replication logic (Yin 1984, 1994), Chapter Four and Five apply 
two case studies to the framework of analysis developed in Chapter Two. Chapter Four 
applies the NPE perspective to a case-study on the death penalty. The first section looks at 
the EU’s regional/global leadership in making the abolition of the death penalty a foreign 
policy objective and precondition for its membership. The second section discusses EU 
normative means of influence on China’s death penalty stance, including human rights 
dialogue, EU-China legal/judicial cooperation and judicial programs for lawyers and 
judges. The third section analyses empirical findings by building an explanation regarding 
causal connections between EU-China human rights dialogue/accompanying activities, and 
any improvements in the area of capital punishment compared to China’s situation since 
the EU adopted Guidelines to EU policy towards Third Countries on the Death Penalty in 
1998. 
 
Chapter Five uses the same analytical framework to look at the Tibet question. The first 
section identifies the scope of norms involved in the EU-China debates on the issue of 
Tibet, and assesses the degree of norm contestation. In order to signify how EU actors are 
divided in their approaches in this case, the second section focuses on policy behaviour of 
three EU actors – the European Parliament, the Council of the EU and the European 
Commission. On the national level, member states’ attitudes towards the Tibet issue are 
categorised into groups of approximation in order to understand the conflicts of interests 
that weaken the EU’s human rights agenda. It then concludes with a range of policy 
instruments that the EU has adopted to influence China on the issue of Tibet, and compares 
them based on their normative characters, and seeks for systematic explanations as to why 
the EU has proven ineffective in projecting its normative agenda on this issue. 
 
Chapter Six draws on the empirical chapters, assesses the overall pattern of the Chinese 
case and reflects upon the meaningfulness of NPE as an analytical approach. First, it 
evaluates the significance of each independent variable - principles, actions and impacts – 
by incorporating the findings from two case-studies. It then assesses the value and 
deficiencies of the NPE approach, and the validity of a multi-dimensional understanding of 
power and effectiveness in normative theorising. Finally, it opens up the discussion on how 
this research project may develop in the future.  
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Chapter Two 
 
Normative Power Europe as a Theoretical Perspective 
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter proposes the ‘Normative Power Europe’ (NPE) perspective to the study of EU 
promotion of human rights towards China. The theoretical goal is to identify an analytical 
framework that examines the extent to which the EU is a normative power for empirical 
investigation in the following chapters. Central to this chapter is the way in which we use 
this EU self-perception and discourse of political rhetoric, to evaluate empirically how 
normative the EU has been through the case study on China.   
 
The framework comprises three sections: the notion of NPE, conditions of norm 
contestation in the case of China, and a tripartite analytical framework. Section one 
justifies how normative theorizing can contribute to our understanding of the subject. By 
critically reviewing the current literature, it demonstrates the usefulness and underlying 
problems of the notion of NPE as an analytical tool. Section Two introduces the particular 
challenges that the Chinese case has posed to the notion of NPE by summarising Chinese 
perceptions of the EU’s international role. In order to link universal human rights to the 
NPE concept, I then look at how the human rights dimension in EU-China relations is 
approached by both sides, and clarify the conditions of contestation on universal human 
rights in the case of China. Section Three develops a three-stage analytical framework 
which details the construction of EU normative principles, normative power in action and 
the way in which EU policy impact on China should be identified and judged normatively.  
It then details how this framework is applied in operational terms by specifying data 
requirements, analytical strategy and techniques. 
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2.1 European foreign policy and Normative Power Concept 
In this section I first set the scene for ‘the constructivist turn’ (Hopf 1998; Checkel 1998) 
in the study of European foreign policy, which has provided the theoretical underpinnings 
to the study of NPE. I then demonstrate the usefulness and underlying problems of NPE as 
an analytical tool in an overview of the state of research. 
 
1.1 Social constructivism in the study of European foreign policy 
For social constructivists, not only identity and interest of actors are socially constructed, 
but also norms and principled ideas constitute an autonomous role in formulating state 
preferences (Wendt 1995; Ruggie 1998). Social constructivism, therefore, addresses the 
questions neglected by rationalists about issues such as the socialisation process of 
international norms, how interests are defined, thus underlines the constitutive impact of 
norms on the nature, empowerment and behaviour of state actors (Risse-Kappen 1994, 
Checkel 1998, Risse and Skikkink 1999, Klotz and Lynch 2007). Therefore, states 
pursuing human rights objectives in international relations is linked to their self-identity 
and value.  
 
The contribution of a constructivist approach to European foreign policy studies thus has 
changed the research agenda by asking different sorts of questions about foreign policy 
(Bretherton and Vogler, 1999, 2006; Rosamond 2000; Checkel 2006; Christiansen, 
Jørgensen and Wiener 2001; Tonra and Christiansen 2004; Rumelili 2004; Manners and 
Whitman 2003). Although social constructivists in this sub-field do not form a single and 
coherent school, there is a shared emphasis on the interaction between agency and structure 
which are mutually constituted (Hay 1995, Rosamond 2000; Bretherton and Vogler 1999, 
2006). While rationalists are keen in explaining choices and behaviour in terms of why 
certain decisions are made and actions taken, and their immediate consequences 
(Moravcsik 1993, 1997); constructivists are interested in understanding identity creation or 
a longer term model of norm compliance (Tonra and Christiansen 2004, 2011; Risse and 
Sikkink 1999). To that end, constructivist approaches have the merit of moving away from 
explanations of foreign policy merely based on absolute and relative gains characterised by 
materialistic considerations (Hill 1993, 1996; Stavridis and Hill 1996), and instead, to 
embrace beliefs, values, norms and ideas as significant explanatory variables of foreign 
policies (Risse-Kappen 1994, Checkel 1998). Therefore, it paves the way for new practices 
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of European identity construction which capture the complexity of the EU’s international 
role in world politics (Ginsberg 1999, Bretherton and Vogler 1999, 2006; Elgström and 
Smith 2005, Whitman 1998, 2002; Zielonka 1998, 2008, Manners 2002, Manners and 
Whitman 2003), and better appreciate the importance of ideational objectives, such as the 
promotion of human rights, rule of law, good governance and democracy, which come to 
represent some major foreign policy objectives pursued by the EU and its member states 
(Lucarelli and Manners 2006, Smith 2001, 2005, 2008; Stavridis 2001). In this sense, the 
social constructivist paradigm is well placed to provide the theoretical basis for analysis 
that prioritises non-material power and focuses on the independent role that norms play in 
influencing EU foreign policy principle and action, as well as the practices of the third 
countries with which the EU interacts (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002, Diez 2005; 
Youngs 2004).  
 
1.2 The Normative Power Europe Approach 
As it is widely acknowledged that there is something unique about the EU, opinions range 
from Europe as an (increasingly) irrelevant factor in international relations (Zakaria 2008; 
Kagan 2003, 2008), to the EU as one of the world’s three main empires in the twenty-first 
century (Khanna 2008). In academic debates, a number of adjectives have been introduced 
to characterise Europe’s global role and relevance. For instance, Europe or the EU has been 
envisaged as as a ‘civilian power’ (Whitman 1998, Maull 1999, Telò 2007), a ‘soft power’ 
(Nye 2002, 2005), a ‘post-modern power’ (Cooper 2000, 2003), a ‘transformative’ power 
(Leonard 2005), an ‘ethical power’ (Aggestam 2008) or a ‘Market Power’ (Damro 2011), 
all of which share the same origin - Dȗchene’s ‘Civilian Power Europe’ (1972) against 
Bull’s ‘Military Power Europe’ camp. Manners (2002), whose work was theoretically 
enriched by constructivism in the study of European foreign policy, argues that both 
‘Civilian Power Europe’ and ‘Military Power Europe’ reflect the rationalist bias for and 
insistence on materialistically driven policy actions and outcomes. For Manners (2002: 
239), such debates were hindered by various academic attempts to measure how much a 
state Europe looks like. He thus proposes to locate EU foreign policy in the ontological 
attributes of the EU, arguing that the principles that guided the development and 
enlargement of the European project (peace, reconciliation, democratisation, 
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multilateralism, human rights, etc.,) are the ‘constitutive’ features that make the EU a 
distinctive and unique polity as a ‘normative power’(Manners 2002: 252). 
 
In current NPE literature, there is a distinction between descriptive, analytical and 
normative definitions of NPE. First of all, the descriptive account of NPE refers to the 
ideological dimension of the EU’s international identity which Manners defines as having 
‘the ability to shape the conception of “normal” in international relations’ because of ‘what 
it is’ (Manners 2002: 237). For Manners (2002: 240), this aspect of NPE traces the origins 
of Europe’s normative difference in three aspects: (1) the historical context from which the 
EU was created; (2) a hybrid polity; (3) its political legal constitution. This unique 
combination produces a European international identity that is based on its constitutive 
norms embedded in EU treaties, declarations and policies, and ‘predisposes it (the EU) to 
act in a normative way in world politics’ (Manners 2002: 242).  
 
For a normative definition of NPE as distinct from ‘ethical foreign policy’, Manners (2007: 
118) defines being ‘normative’ as ‘being honest about why and how foreign policy is 
conducted’, and therefore ‘being honest about the advocacy for, and analysis of foreign 
policy’. To that end, ‘normative’ refers to what is regarded as ‘normal’ in world politics 
(Manners 2002: 32), which is being standardised by international law, hence objective. He 
then elaborates on this definition by suggesting that if the EU’s normative principles are 
indeed recognised by the UN system, they should be universal (Manners 2008:56).  
 
An analytical dimension to the definition of NPE, on the other hand, is highlighted by Diez 
from a social constructive perspective that NPE “focuses on the independent power of 
norms to influence actors’ behaviour” (Diez 2005: 616). Compared to its predecessors, 
namely ‘civilian power’ (Dûchene 1972) and ‘military power’ (Bull 1982) which focus on 
rational interests underlying relational power or structural power, a normative power refers 
to a kind of power that sets standards in world politics with its influence exerted by norms 
themselves ( Diez and Manners 2007: 175).  
 
The concept of NPE has also received much critique for how it has been formulated and 
defined. For some, it is not clear how these descriptive, empirical and normative 
dimensions of NPE hang together with so much confusion (Aggestam 2009, Forsberg 2009; 
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Haukkala 2008, Sjursen 2006a). Others notice that value pluralism can make this 
interpretation of NPE potentially problematic when it comes to the purpose of the concept. 
Since all major international actors contribute to determining and shaping norms in 
international relations, a normative power should seek to strengthen not just international 
law but cosmopolitan law (Eriksen 2006, Sjursen 2006b). Manners therefore clarifies that 
‘it was, and is, a statement of what is believed to be good about the EU; a statement which 
needed to be made in order to stimulate and reflect on what the EU should be (doing) in 
world politics’(Manners, 2006b:168). Others suggest that NPE is a discursive construction 
rather than an objective fact (Diez 2005; Pace 2007). Furthermore, Diez and Manners 
(2007) add that ‘reflection and reflectivity’ are crucial to the legitimacy of a normative 
power. 
 
Since first formulated in 2002, the notion of ‘normative power’ has raised substantial 
interests and debates among scholars engaged in wider discussions on the ‘nature’ of the 
EU, its relevance with norms, perceptions and ‘roles’ in international relations. 
Theoretically, the concept of NPE has been linked to a wider discussion in international 
relations (IR) about the role of norms (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) and the 
‘constructivist turn’ in IR theorising (Checkel 1998). Therefore, NPE is widely seen as a 
perspective that captures the EU’s uniqueness, and defines, directs and legitimises its 
international role (Diez 2005). Not only has it become a grand narrative that helps to 
explain the source of legitimacy of European foreign policy bestowed by this construction 
of external identity, it also opens up a normative question about how norms are diffused 
through a discursive form of power (Diez and Manners 2007). It also resonates with Article 
21(1) of the Lisbon Treaty which states:
 4
 
‘the Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the 
principles which have inspired its own creation, development and 
enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: 
democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the 
                                                          
4
As an amendment to the Treaty on European Union. See also Article III-193(1) of the draft EU Constitution. 
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principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of 
the United Nations Charter and international law’. 
On the empirical front, the NPE concept has been widely applied to studies of the EU 
(Manners 2006:168): for example, environmental policy by Lightfoot and Burchell (2004a, 
2004b, 2005); the EU and global governance by Lamy and Laïdi (2002); EU foreign policy 
by Sjursen(2006b); Euro-Mediterranean relations (Adler et al, 2006; Bicchi 2006); 
European Neighbourhood Policy (Haukkala 2008); Europe and its others (Diez 2004, 
2005), EU values and principles (Lucarelli and Manners 2006); Pace (2007) and Harpaz 
(2007) on Middle East conflicts; and on normative foreign policy of EU and other global 
powers - Russia, India and China (Tocci 2008); Brummer (2009) on EU sanctions policy; 
and Wood (2009) on energy security. Although the EU’s power of attraction is clearly 
found on what it is seen to represent on an ideational level (Laïdi 2008b), most empirical 
studies simply refer to NPE without identifying norm diffusion mechanisms or the 
parameters with which we could measure the EU’s normative power. Moreover, despite 
some successful stories on the abolishment of the death penalty, EU enlargement, the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Kyoto Protocol, most empirical studies tend to 
be quite pessimistic about the construction of NPE. Furthermore, current NPE literature 
needs more study of European policies beyond its regional focus on enlargement processes 
and neighbourhood policies. Especially in cases where the construction of NPE are 
fundamentally challenged, there seems to be an obvious need to deal with uncomfortable 
criticisms such as ‘Eurocentrism’ (Gerrits 2009: 2), ‘Eurocentric Imperialism’ (Sjursen 
2006b: 242), or ‘European Messianism’ (Wang 2009) put forth by countries with no 
prospect of membership and different normative priorities in their world views.   
 
NPE, notwithstanding its problematic theoretical formulation, has made a vital contribution 
in conceptualising the unique international role of the EU in normative aspects. It 
introduces a multi-dimensional understanding of power and effectiveness, and articulates 
how the EU influences the normative conceptions of the world by standing by the 
principles and values it was founded upon. In this thesis, this notion is adopted as an 
analytical tool for its strength in providing us an alternative way in understanding and 
judging such EU influence on China beyond a rationalist paradigm. By focusing on the 
ideational impact of EU norms as reflected in Chinese academic and official discourses, 
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the NPE analytical framework in this thesis will be uniquely modulated to highlight the 
level of norm contestation and misperceptions of both sides on issues under investigation.  
 
2.2 China as a Case Study: Some Theoretical Clarifications 
Before introducing the tripartite NPE framework, concerning the growing cynicisms from 
both within and outside Europe regarding the validity of NPE as an analytical tool (Gerrits 
2009), it is important to introduce the Chinese perspective on NPE, and clarify the degree 
of contestation in interpreting human rights norms, thus provide normative basis for the 
subsequent case-studies.  This section analyses the link between Chinese perceptions on 
the EU’s international role and China’s domestic human rights discourse. In so doing, I 
first look at potential theoretical challenges that a Chinese case poses to the construction of 
NPE, and the role of human rights in formulating EU-China relations. I then link universal 
human rights to the NPE concept, and clarify the condition of contestation on universal 
human rights in the case of China.  
 
2.2.1   Chinese Perspective towards the EU’s International Role 
Many have noticed that, despite a growing body of literature and debate in the last decade 
centred on European foreign policy in normative terms, the EU’s self-representation as 
NPE, both in academic literature and official discourse resonates with few outside of 
European academic circles. Some have concluded that NPE is not easily understood, 
recognised or appreciated by those outside of the EU, hence NPE is Eurocentric, self-
obsessed and problematic (Mahbubani 2008, Gerrits 2009).  Two recent publications on 
Chinese perceptions of NPE seem to have echoed this observation (Womack 2008, Wang 
2009), in which both scholars tend to dichotomise the Chinese world view with the 
European one by picturing the Chinese culture as being radically at odds with that of the 
Europeans. While cultural and historical differences have played some part in shaping 
China’s world view and response to those of the Europeans, these explanations are neither 
adequate nor representational in the Chinese study of ‘the EU model as civilian power and 
normative power’ (Zhu 2007: 151). This section concentrates on the view of Chinese 
academics on the international role of the EU and the perceived example it sets – the 
European model. I draw upon publications primarily between 2003 and 2009 by leading 
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Chinese scholars who had been actively involved in EU-China academic exchange.
5
 
 
The EU’s International Role 
As with the official discourse, the Chinese EU analysts tend to share a common view that it 
is in the EU’s interests to become an independent pole in world affairs (Shambaugh 2007, 
Men 2006). This has much to do with the dominance and persistence in using a realist 
approach to the study of international politics within the Chinese academic community. 
Many view the EU’s role as an emerging pole of power so as to balance US hegemony 
(Wang 2004; Zhao and Fang 2004). Therefore, the EU integration and enlargement are 
considered as the EU’s political ambition driven by a fundamental objective to seek a pole 
in a future multipolar world, despite the lack of hard power (Zhao and Fang 2004). 
 
Although it is suggested that there is ‘a remarkable homogeneity, uniformity, and 
conformity in Chinese perceptions of Europe and Sino-European relations’ (Shambaugh 
2007: 128), some nuanced or distinctive views can be identified. Chen (2005: 15) suggests 
that the reason for the lack of the balancing effects from other major powers such as the 
EU or Japan, is because they share common values and liberal identity with the U.S, which 
leads to the establishment of a ‘common security community’ between them. For Chen 
(2005: 16), this tendency has therefore limited China’s chances of forging strategic 
partnerships with the EU to counter-balance the United States. Feng (2006) warns of an 
overly generalised ideas of what constitutes a ‘pole’, and argues that the EU’s “soft power” 
and its global economic clout should been taken into consideration, however incomplete or 
unbalanced the ‘pole’ is (cited in Shambaugh 2007: 131). Moreover, many Chinese 
scholars recognise that the EU is a strong advocate and prime example of promoting 
multilateralism which resonates with China’s Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence 
(Song 2007; Dai 2007; Zhu 2007; Crossick and Reuter 2007: 209).   
 
In exploring the EU as an emerging power in world politics, there has been a shift of 
paradigm towards ‘a constructivist turn’ in Chinese academia since 2001 (Zhu 2007: 151). 
Regarding the notion of NPE, there have been very few written works by Chinese scholars. 
Wang’s account (2009) indicates a formidable discrepancy between Chinese and European 
                                                          
5 
In 2003, China published its first EU policy paper. 
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understanding of this role concept. The so-called historical-cultural perspective applied to 
the ‘Chinese perception’ of the NPE is in fact a realist/positivist understanding of power (in 
decline) and post-modernist/colonialist interpretation of ‘Europe’ in which universal norms 
such as human rights was undermined by cultural relativism. On the other hand, Song 
(2010a) notices that ‘many Chinese prefer the EU to be a social power; a social power 
means that the EU provides different kinds of models for international politics, as well as 
political and social development for others.’  
 
In Chinese academic discussion, the notion of NPE seems too readily associated with 
‘European superiority and centralism’ (Wang 2009: 70), but not much academic research 
has been done in terms of verifying its theoretical and empirical relevance from a Chinese 
if not Chinese official perspective. However, a younger generation of Chinese scholars 
have recently started to move beyond a descriptive account of NPE towards more original 
thinking with regard to the EU’s international role and global governance (Jian 2009, Wang 
and Rosenau 2009).   
 
By contrast, there has been a substantial amount of scholarly attention already devoted to 
the study of the EU as various models for China’s domestic reform and foreign policy. If 
the link between certain European models and human rights issues can be established in 
the case-studies, China’s willingness to learn from European models would sit well with an 
NPE perspective, in particularly ‘the power of example’.  
 
The European Model 
The so-called “European model”, a framework in which Europe/EU are taken as political, 
economic and social models that inspire the Chinese leadership in dealing with its 
economic and political reform, is much discussed among Chinese scholars who are 
engaged in European studies.  
 
There is considerable amount of appreciation for various European social welfare, 
integration, development, and even political models in China, although usually their 
emulation would not be openly admitted by the Chinese authorities (Song 2010b: 775). For 
instance, after Deng Xiaoping’s “Socialism and Chinese Characteristics” in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, Jiang Zemin put forward the so-called “Three Represents” in the late 
Chapter Two 
 
31 
 
1990s, and Hu Jintao came up  with “Promoting the Ruling Capacity of the Communist 
Party” through “Scientific Outlook on Development” in order to promote “Harmonious 
Society”6. These slogans and strategies were arguably drawn from the Chinese government 
funded research projects on the European social democratic parties, which were taken as an 
example for the CCP to better position itself in the Chinese society (Song 2007; Chen and 
Zhong 2005).  
 
Moreover, the EU as an integration model which can be applicable to settle the Taiwan 
question has been discussed among Chinese academic community and think-tanks, even 
though the Chinese officials do not openly recognise the EU model as an example to follow. 
(Song 2007: 178). With a strong resemblance to the “one country, two systems” proposal 
by China to settle cross-strait relations with Taiwan, the EU model is believed to be 
potentially attractive to China (Blankert 2007: 90-92). 
 
Finally, Chinese academic studies have paid special attention to the ‘Nordic model’ of 
social welfare since the 1980s when China was facing various social problems alongside 
its economic reforms (Huang 1987). In particular the ‘Swedish model’, not only for its 
welfare system but the socialist democracy – has been considered by many as the role 
model for China to follow in decades to come (Song 2007; Zhang 1994).  
 
2.2.2 The Human Rights Dimension of EU-China Relations 
In defence of a normative perspective on European human rights foreign policy towards 
China, this section presents a general picture of how both sides have studied the human 
rights dimension of EU-China relations. Holslag (2006: 558), for instance, concludes from 
a neo-liberal perspective that the means of low politics does not necessarily steer China’s 
transformation in a way that is suitable to Europe’s own interest. He believes that it is the 
form of asymmetric interdependence in which Europe takes a dominant position to give 
itself the economic leverage and moral high ground. For Holslag, China’s compliance with 
the Western standards of human rights, good governance, rule of law and a strong civil 
society is adaptive; hence it has not been a question of choice, but a question of necessity. 
From an institutionalist perspective, Algieri (2002) argues that political issues, such as the 
                                                          
6
 Political reform in China often means changes in the CCP governing theory. Therefore, each time leadership 
changes, new phrases will be added to the official discourse.  
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events at Tiananmen Square have not been an irritant in the EU-China economic relations 
in the long run. For Algieri (2002), the EU prioritises the strategic and economic relations 
with China without abandoning the attempt to press on China to accept Western ideology. 
Although the EU has pragmatically chosen a dialogue approach on human rights issues 
over a confrontational one in such a way to gain China’s cooperation since the late 1990s, 
the initial idea of instrumentally using human rights issues to transform China is still very 
present (Algieri 2002: 69). 
 
Despite the validity of these perspectives in explaining choices and behaviour in terms of 
why decisions are made and actions taken, they are often too rigid in excluding of non-
material dimensions and disregarding the importance of norms and identity in defining 
state interests. However, when norms and identify do receive scholarly attention, it risks 
imexplicitly flirting with cultural or moral relativism. For instance, Shambaugh (2007) 
highlights the strong sensitivity among the Chinese official elites towards Western attitudes, 
and calls for more scholarly attention on Chinese academic studies by European scholars to 
reflect upon Chinese views on ‘Westernising China’ and ‘Western cultural superiority’ 
which are often associated with the European promotion of human rights. Golden’s (2006) 
socio-cultural perspective extends this remark further by arguing that anything associated 
with Western Enlightenment values is likely to be met with understandable resistance 
because of the Chinese perception of its colonial past and moral order. 
 
Due to the political sensitivity of this subject matter, Chinese scholarship on human rights 
has rarely challenged the official discourse since 1989. Today, there are still significant 
boundaries on what can be said or published. Chan (1999: xii) notices that ‘the official 
views inevitably seep through academic writing’. Hence it is difficult to map out how 
Chinese intellectual elites genuinely perceive European criticisms of China’s violation of 
international human rights. In official and semi-official scholarly discussions, some see the 
European concerns on human rights as an aspiration to “Westernise China via “peaceful 
evolution” (Wang 1997: 13, Zhao 2000: 12), or ‘Europeans have a historically formed 
sense of superiority, an attribute of the [concept of] European centralism’ (Mei 2006: 24, 
cited in Shambaugh 2007: 136). Others suggest (Huo 2005: 13; Dai 2005: 80) that the EU 
presents itself as a ‘saviour’ or ‘teacher’ whose culture, value system and social institutions 
should be the future direction for China to follow.  
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In this thesis, I consider that a universalist view on human rights should not be jeopardised 
by cultural or historical consideration. In fact, sometimes the source of antagonism from 
post-colonial countries like China has not been the substance of universal arguments, but 
rather who advances them (Donnelly 2007: 306).   
 
2.2.3   Universality of Human Rights 
The claim of universality has been considered as the fundamental basis of NPE 
construction (Tocci 2008, Gerrits 2009), even though liberal universalism is now 
increasingly challenged from both outside and inside the liberal world (Richmond 2006: 
292). In this thesis, my objective position on universal human rights is to a minimum 
extent. Universalists such as Donnelly and Henkin represent the mainstream human rights 
position in the West which is sceptical about collective rights advocated by countries like 
China (Donnelly 1989, 2007; Edward, Henkin and Nathan 1986). In a cross-cultural 
context, however, it is Parekh’s position of minimum universalism that has a wider appeal. 
He argues that there are certain ‘universal constants’ such as human dignity, worth, 
equality and fundamental interest which ‘generate appropriate universal values’ (Parekh 
1999:128). To translate this position into normative standpoint of NPE, I suggest that, as 
long as the human rights norm under concern are institutionalised at the highest level of 
international law, such as UDHR, NPE should be spared of being accused of an expression 
of Eurocentric or cultural imperialism. 
 
One of the central premises of normative power is that other actors should wish to emulate 
the EU ‘for norms and the Union stands for and the example it sets’ (Aggestam 2009: 29). 
Thus, for successful promotion of human rights, the EU’s normative power is crucially 
dependent upon the way in which China perceives the legitimacy of the EU’s actions.  
 
China is often considered as the main advocate of Asian values and cultural relativism, and 
China has long engaged in adaptive learning to parry the West’s trust (Wan 2001). Kent 
(1999) concludes that the difficulty in implementing human rights norms in China lies in 
its rigid political culture and unsuitable system of law. Nathan (1994: 643) adds that human 
rights are likely to remain a structural weakness in China as long as the country remains 
outside the trend of democratisation. After carefully analysing how Chinese intellectuals 
have discussed the human rights concept since early twentieth century, Svensson (2002) 
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confirms the universality of human rights by analysing the Chinese original thinking on the 
concept of human rights since the early twentieth century. A cultural anthropologist and 
sinologist by background, she suggests that any reference to “Chinese culture” or “Asian 
values” would be best avoided when it comes to human rights, due to the heterogeneous 
and changing nature of national identity and culture (Svensson 2002: 9).    
 
In order to specify the definition of normativity in the following case-studies, I begin the 
framework of analysis by examining the different normative interpretations between the 
EU and China, and then a definition based on the highest level of international law is 
chosen to form the basis of normative criteria. Although the UN framework provides 
legitimacy to certain universal values, the implementation and specific interpretation of 
meaning is rendered differently in Chinese official discourses. Moreover, it is worthwhile 
noticing that, universality of human rights has not only been challenged by Chinese 
authorities, but also European themselves, who can be motivated by a respect for the other 
culture. While avoiding an extreme cultural relativistic approach, I intend to highlight any 
perceived imperialistic or Eurocentric endeavour which should lead to greater self-
reflexivity and sensitivity for the Chinese historical, legal and cultural traditions.   
   
2.3  Establishing the NPE Framework: From Theoretical to Empirical 
Analysis 
The proposed framework aims to establish a systematic linkage between the NPE concept 
and the EU’s normative agenda towards China on human rights. It detects and evaluates 
the normative tendency in EU human rights policies through three variables, namely, 
normative principle, normative means of power, normative ends. These three variables feed 
into a three-stage framework drawn from Manners’ tripartite analytical approach which 
was designed to compare and contrast what the EU ‘is’; what the EU ‘says’ and ‘does’; and 
its ideational impact (Manners 2002: 252; 2006b: 69-81; 2008:67).This interpretive 
method facilitates the study of rhetoric, perception, discourse and identity in EU external 
actions. Instead of trying to set up objective standards to measure policy principles, actions 
and impacts, an interpretive approach to NPE aims to understand various phenomena with 
content and meanings  (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2000: 136, in Manners 2009a: 19), and 
evaluate them normatively.  
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As illustrated in Figure 1.1, the tripartite theoretical framework is combined with 
normative ethics in each stage of analysis in order to understand and judge the EU’s 
normative power.   
 
Figure 1.1: 
 
 
2.3.1   Construction of Principle 
The theoretical framework starts by examining the constitutive principles of the EU. It asks 
how these principles become externalised as aims and objectives in the EU’s foreign policy; 
and how we might evaluate them through virtue ethics. 
 
2.3.1.1 Normative Identity 
Manners’ (2002: 240) first and foremost claim about NPE is its normative identity.  
According to Manners, the normative identity of the EU derives from its historical 
experience, hybrid nature of its polity and its treaty-based legal order, which make the EU 
stand out from the rest of the Westphalian world. Therefore, the idea that EU normative 
differences are good is because the initial design of European integration is directed 
towards ‘pooling their resources to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty’ (Preamble to 
the Treaty establishing the European Communities: TEC).   
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This normative identity has propelled the EU to place universal norms and principles at the 
centre of its internal and external policy dimension (Manners 2002: 241). Regarding 
human rights, the EU makes its legal basis closer to the European convention on human 
rights and fundamental freedoms (ECHR) and UDHR than most other actors in world 
politics (Balfour 2008). The EU member states ascribed to the International Bill of Human 
Rights including the UDHR, the ICESCR and the ICCPR as the legal justification for its 
external human rights policy, whereas the US ratified the ICCPR in 1994, fifteen years 
after signing it, but it has never ratified the ICESCR.  The EU’s normative difference from 
the US has therefore ensured it possess a comparative advantage over the US in pressuring 
China to abide by international human rights laws.    
 
2.3.1.2 Normative Interest 
Social constructivists see identities and interests of actors as socially constructed, and 
highlight the independent role of norms and identities in the formation of state preferences 
(Wendt 1995, Risse and Sikkink 1999). Therefore, states pursue human rights goals abroad 
for reasons to do with their identity and status. Manners (2002: 251) suggests that the EU’s 
refusal to extradite suspects of terrorism to the US comes to represent an example of the 
EU having normative interests instead of instrumental ones. In this case, one could argue 
that a normative identity for the EU lays the basis for normative interests. The empirical 
study conducted by Tocci (2008) also suggests that EU normative interests do exist, but are 
not always a dominant force in the EU’s action.   
 
When it comes to the EU’s ‘constructive’ engagement with China, the rationale adopted by 
the European Commission is that economic cooperation with China should bring political 
changes. In this case, it is worthwhile asking whether EU normative interests are 
necessarily at odds with its economic interests, or how can the EU be normative, at the 
same time, having selfish interests? For, Forsberg (2009: 12), interests, strictly speaking, 
simply cannot be normative. In discussing whether we should exclude the interested-based 
dimension from the discussion on normative power, Aggestam (2009: 33) highlights the 
difficulty in distinguishing between ‘interests’ and ‘norms’, and yet, this distinction is 
crucial for normative justification of a particular action. However, on the empirical ground, 
the uneasy coexistence between norms and interests is inevitable and will become more 
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obvious as we see ‘the decline of the West’. In discussing the EU’s role in promoting the 
UDHR, Balfour (2008: 3) notices that, promoting human rights can be extremely complex 
in practice, not only the others tend to see the UDHR just a reflection of Western views 
‘used to dress up the imposition of “values” onto different societies’, but also ‘a mask’ to 
hide its selfish interests. 
 
In the EU’s relations with China, there had been an ideological dimension being put 
alongside trade and economic development, due to the assumption that increased contacts 
with European partners should lead to liberalisation of the Chinese economy and 
eventually the political system. However, in reality, this much anticipated ‘spill-over’ effect 
has yet to occur, and economic and strategic objectives often override human rights 
concerns (Patten 2002, in Panebianco 2006: 139). 
 
2.3.1.3 Self-binding Behaviour 
Diez (2005: 636) suggests that the EU’s ‘formal commitment to international law’ is a 
classic example of such self-binding behaviour to international norms, which comes to 
represent one of the distinctive features of ‘being normative’. According to Sjursen (2006b: 
244), self-binding indicates that the EU makes itself normative through an emphasis on 
international law and multilateralism. For Manners (2007:119), self-binding refers to 
ratifying the highest level of international law or cosmopolitan law.  
 
On the issue of human rights, the EU has developed a widely recognised normative 
identity by subscribing to the UDHR’s principles. However, it still has loopholes that 
China can exploit to develop counter-arguments towards EU criticisms. For instance, 
Chinese representatives at the EU-China human rights dialogue have frequently raised the 
issue of asylum-seekers and refugees, when facing criticisms on its own violations of 
ethnic minorities’ rights. 7 
 
                                                          
7See the Press Release by the Council, Press: 134, Nr: 9995/09, following the 27
th
 round of EU-China 
Dialogue on Human Rights in Prague on 14 May 2009. Summaries of the 24
th
 and 28
th
 rounds of human 
rights dialogue (17/10/2007 and 24/11/2009) which also mentioned China’s counter-arguments are available 
on the respective Presidency countries’ websites at 
<http://www/eu2007.pt/UE/vEN/Noticias_Documentos/20071017UEChina.htm> and 
<http://www.se2009.eu/en/meeting_2009/11/24/eu-china_dialogue_on_human_rights> 
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The area of human rights has been traditionally studied from legal and institutional 
perspectives. In a positivist approach, incoherence suggests ‘unilateralism and double 
standards’, therefore,  it is a matter of legal credibility, which requires the external human 
rights policy to be practised the same way internally (Alston and Weiler, 1998: 8-9). In 
view of virtue ethics, the EU should be ‘living by virtuous example’ (Coombes, 1998, in 
Manners 2008: 56). To that end, the EU’s policy coherence and consistency are put down 
as an ethical matter.   
 
2.3.2 Normative Action 
What is important about of NPE is not just the universal nature of the norms being 
promoted, but also the means through which they are diffused. This type of norms 
diffusion in the absence of physical force is set to derive from the EU ‘being reasonable’, a 
notion which invokes the Kantian enquiry underlying deontological ethics (O’Neil 2000, in 
Manners 2008: 57) Thereby, the second stage of analysis looks at how the EU promotes its 
own principles. It looks at the process of normative power at work and what is the nature 
or character of normative actions. 
 
The putative existence of the EU as a ‘normative power’ often creates adaptation problems 
in translating normative actions into policy language. What constitutes normative action 
and non-normative action? What conditions foster and retract the diffusion of European 
ideas? How do the different diffusion mechanisms interact? In circumstances where 
European ideas meet with contestation and resistance, how do we measure the 
effectiveness of ‘soft’ normative mechanisms, such as persuasion, invoking norms and 
shaming? With these questions in mind, I draw from Manners (2002, 2009a) and Forsberg 
(2009), and illustrate how five types of norm diffusions mechanisms -  namely, persuasion 
and argumentation; invoking norms; shaping the discourse; showing example; conferral of 
prestige or shame – can be applied to the Chinese case. 
 
2.3.2.1 Nature of Normative Actions 
Deontological ethics suggests that the EU should focus on the rationalisation of 
responsibilities and rules in its external actions (Manners 2008: 57). According to 
deontological ethicists, public debates and reasoning are the means to identify common 
good and create the interest groups. In the practice of foreign policy, the making of 
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domestic and international law is believed to be the key to identify such common good 
(O’Neil 2000: 52, cited in Manners 2008: 57). Speaking of normative action, Manners 
suggests that ‘being reasonable’ ensures that the EU acts normatively through a process of 
engagement and dialogue. 
 
2.3.2.2   Persuasion and Argumentation 
Normative power is most readily associated with persuasion as opposed to the use of 
‘illegitimate force to shape world politics’ (Manners 2002: 244). Persuasion, as suggested 
by Forsberg (2009: 16), requires the abilities to bring eloquent rhetoric, personal or 
collective appeal and the relevant knowledge and expertise into play. For Manners (2009a: 
12), persuasion by NPE refers to constructive engagement, institutionalisation of relations, 
and multi- and pluri-lateral dialogue between participants. 
 
The EU’s promotion of human rights relies on a twice-annually dialogue with China 
established in 1995, to replace the previous confrontational approach which held China 
responsible at the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) through co-sponsoring a 
resolution with the U.S (Baker 2002). The human rights dialogue allows both sides to 
exchange views on a broad range of issues in an exclusive environment. The key issues 
discussed over the years have been those concerning China’s cooperation with UN 
mechanisms, the death penalty, ethnic minorities’ rights, freedom of expression, and 
individual cases. By using a dialogue approach, some believe it is a more discreet solution 
that the Chinese appear more receptive to, and arguably more likely to produce results, 
such as legal judicial reform on the death penalty in 2003 (Schabas 2009: 10). In addition 
to the dialogue sessions, the EU raises its concerns on human rights with China in bilateral 
summits, ministerial and experts’ meetings. The EU’s comprehensive engagement strategy 
with China is thus based upon persuasion rather than relying upon the imposition (or threat) 
of sanctions by the US especially during the Clinton administration (Panebianco 2006: 
140). A different approach between the US and the EU has also emerged concerning 
China’s entry into the World Trade Organisation (WTO). For many years, the US applied 
conditionality to the Chinese application, while the Europeans preferred to integrate China 
in the multilateral institutions and influence China from within. 
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However, this shift in the EU’s human rights approach bears several important questions in 
empirical investigation regarding the rationale of these presumably more normative means. 
First of all, when coercive means are available to influence China, relying on soft measures 
such as persuasion might indicate hypocrisy or the mere result of political weakness, 
economic interdependence, and/or strategic considerations rather than of one’s own virtue 
(Tocci 2008: 9). K.E. Smith (2003: 205) notices that poor, marginal African states tend to 
be subjected to double-standards, such as being imposed negative conditionality more 
easily than strategic countries, even if they have similar human rights records. Furthermore, 
the extent to which the European Union itself may have changed through its interaction 
and dialogue with China is another salient question. Particularly through the dialogue 
approach and cooperation programmes, there is a possibility that the EU’s rhetoric on 
human rights issues in China is being shaped by the Chinese official views. 
 
2.3.2.3 Invoking Norms 
Another mechanism typically associated with NPE is invoking norms, or activation of 
commitments, which refers to agreements third powers have committed themselves to 
(Forsberg 2009: 17). In the context of EU promotion of human rights, this mechanism 
corresponds to the use of démarches, resolutions, declarations in which China’s 
international legal obligations would be invoked in a responsive manner when violations 
on human right in China are brought to the EU’s attention. For successful norm diffusion 
through invoking norms, not only China has to subscribe itself to certain legal 
commitments, the EU needs to be clear and consistent as to which international legal 
norms should apply in certain issue areas and individual cases. Furthermore, a range of 
cooperation programs including an EU-China working group designed to push China 
towards full ratification and implementation of the ICCPR and the ICESCR. The EU’s 
ability to monitor, and implement these programs should be an important barometer of the 
normative power of the EU.   
 
2.3.2.4 Shaping Discourses 
According to Manners (2002: 239), normative power refers to the ability to shape 
discourses. In Manners’ list of diffusion mechanisms, this type of normative power is 
closely associated with ‘cultural filter’, which refers to, according to Kinnvall (1995:61-67, 
quoted in Manners 2002: 245), learning, adaptation or rejection of given norms as a result 
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of international norms and political learning by third countries. An example of this 
mechanism in the case of China on human rights can be found in discursive changes in 
Chinese official rhetoric, scholarly debates on the death penalty, which is believed to have 
led to a reportedly dramatic decline in the practice of the death penalty over the last ten 
years (HRIC and FIDH, 2004; Schabas 2009: 9). Although one cannot be certain how 
much credit we should give to the EU-China dialogue, legal seminars, training/visiting 
programmes of Chinese lawyers, judges, academics, and civil servants, one certainty 
remains that this progress – however modest it might be – is not the result of the US’ 
normative power. 
 
2.3.2.5 Power of Example 
For Manners (2002: 247), the essence of NPE is not what the EU does or says, but ‘what it 
is’, by which he indicates that normative power is the power of attraction through which 
the EU simply stands as a model for others to follow. Hence, ‘power of Example’ is 
considered by some as the most normative form of power (Manners 2002, Zielonka 2008, 
Forsberg 2009). However, Forsberg (2009: 18) argues that the EU’s attraction could be its 
economic power, too; whereas ‘power of example’ should convey a positive sense of 
learning. In the EU-China context, economic interdependence and the EU being an 
example are closely interrelated as neo-liberalists would assume that interdependence will 
automatically make China a responsible international stakeholder (Dent 1997; Dai 2007). 
This thesis, however, would primarily focuses the non-materialistic dimension of this 
diffusion mechanism, for instance, the Chinese desire to adopt various aspects of their 
perceptions of the ‘European model’ that may be of use to China’s own reform process. 
 
2.3.2.6 Conferral of Prestige or Shaming 
According to Manners (2009a: 12), the attribution of prestige involves public declarations 
of support to membership of an international community, while the attribution of shame 
involves public condemnation or the use of symbolic sanctioning. For Foot (2001: 9), 
shaming is an important form of norm diffusion mechanism because it is bound up with 
state identity, the idea of belonging to a normative community of states, civilised behaviour, 
or being an insider versus an outsider. For Risse and Sikkink (1999: 26), states often resent 
and sometimes are sufficiently disturbed by their own international image that they would 
start to make human rights concessions. In the Chinese context, raising China’s human 
Chapter Two 
 
42 
 
rights problems at international fora and publicising the Tibetan cause are cases in which 
China is subject to the normative process of shaming. In the absence of direct material cost, 
shaming would be an effective tool if China is seriously concerned about its reputation and 
recognises the validity of international human rights norms (Foot 2001:10; Risse and 
Sikkink 1999: 25). However, invoking a sense of shame on China’s behalf could lead to 
anti-Western demonstrations among Chinese nationalists and diplomatic defiance in the 
Tibetan case.
 8  In China’s WTO entry negotiations, the EU had positively encouraged 
China and supported its integration with the international institution, following the 
rationale of controlling China from inside (Panebianco 2006: 140). Whereas, The EU’s 
arms embargo on China has been widely considered as a symbolic sanction, which for 
Chinese official and academics is a matter of political discrimination as it puts China 
alongside Zimbabwe, Sudan and Myanmar (Anthony 2005; Lindsey 2005; Willis 2009). 
Despite a few member states’ attempt to lift the ban in 2003, proponents of the decision 
cited that national export regulations were already strict enough, and China has become a 
different country since 1989, whereas opponents insisted on retaining the embargo as 
China’s political repression shows little sign of decreasing (Lorenz 2004).  
 
2.3.3 Impact 
The final stage of analysis considers the normative impact of the EU’s actions. Manners 
(2009:18) suggests that a normative power approach would evaluate results differently 
from rationalist/positivist approaches, which ‘seek objectivity in the subjective social 
world’. In this thesis, the gaps between EU policy action/inaction and China’s socialisation 
need to be identified before arriving at any understanding of how the EU shapes the 
definition of normality through the attraction and acceptance by the Chinese. The process 
of socialisation, as defined by (Risse and Sikkink 1999:5), refers to the process in which 
international norms are internalised and implemented domestically. In the Chinese context, 
this process can be reflected in human rights dialogues, and cooperation programmes 
designed to strengthen the rule of law and to promote civil, political, economic and social 
rights as part of the EU’s constructive engagement with China since the mid-1990s.   
 
                                                          
8
 ‘A time for muscle-flexing: as Western economies flounder, China sees a chance to assert itself-carefully’, 
The Economist, 19 March 2009 
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However, given the lack of transparency in EU-China dialogue, alongside the difficulties in 
projecting an evaluating effective socialisation towards a strong regime with weak civil 
society (Peerenboom 2002: 191), we face several methodological problems. First of all, 
how can the effects of external pressure be distinguished from Chinese domestic pressure? 
Secondly, without precise causal links accounting for China’s norm compliance, it seems 
unlikely to isolate the EU’s normative impact from that of other norm entrepreneurs, such 
as the UN and the U.S. To address these problems, I take an issue-specific approach to look 
at how certain EU policies influence China’s rhetoric and behaviour. For instance, on the 
issue of the death penalty, the EU has clearly taken a distinctive moral authority and 
embarked on a global abolitionist campaign, therefore, the EU is more likely to be the 
major driving force than any other international actor in shaping China’s domestic 
discourse. Whereas on other issues in which China has not change its fundamental 
approach, I ask to what extent the EU has contributed to the international visibility of 
China’s human rights violations, and to what extent the Chinese perceptions on Western 
imperialism, sovereignty, its economic imperatives or the need for internal stability have 
weakened or undermined the impact of NPE.  
 
Additionally, to judge the impact of the EU’s policy action, consequentialist ethics, drawn 
from the utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill’s ‘greatest-happiness principles’, suggests that 
the right consequences should be evaluated not on merits of those who deliver the action, 
but on the general rules or principles found in the target society (Manners 2008: 58). 
Straightforward as it is, this path for judging NPE might call the EU’s human rights 
principles into question because of value pluralism. Kent (1999:14) suggests that one right 
consequence in China, should be an active and transparent engagement with human rights 
dialogues which are open not only to political and scholarly elites, but independent 
scholars, lawyers, NGOs and representatives of civil society. Foot (2001:11) adds that 
normative results in China begin with a transformation of Chinese official discourse on 
human rights, and China’s gradual involvement with international human rights regimes, 
domestic reforms and a growing civil society.  
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2.3.4 Application of the Tripartite Approach 
After establishing the internal validity of the NPE approach, the next step is to apply this 
framework of analysis to the selected cases, each of which is operationalised in three 
analytical procedures in order to guide the data collection and empirical investigation.     
 
2.3.4.1   Specification of Data Collection 
In this thesis, it is the operationalisation of NPE which determines data requirements and 
therefore leads to alternative interpretations. These data requirements are determined by 
standardised research questions addressed in the tripartite framework and key concepts 
embedded in the NPE hypotheses across three stages of analysis, such as constitutive 
principles, persuasion, norm-invoking, self-binding shaming, or local ownership. 
 
The first stage of analysis begins by looking at which principles provide guidance in 
framing the EU’s foreign policy. This involves empirically describing what principles are 
being promoted and then normatively judging these principles through virtue ethics 
(Manners 2008, 2009a: 18). In operational terms, I examine the EU’s founding legal 
documents and treaties. Additionally, I look for commitments to universal human rights 
and value-based arguments in EU Guidelines on human rights, the Council’s statements, 
declarations, conclusions, foreign policy speeches within each case-study between 1989 
and 2009. 
 
The second stage looks at the way in which human rights principles are translated into 
actions. From an NPE perspective, I aim to identify the non-coercive nature of policy 
actions with elements of persuasion, argumentation, conferral of shame or prestige, 
provoking norms and shaping discourses. I therefore analyse empirical resources based on 
the Council’s 28 press releases on EU-China human rights dialogues (1995-2009), 
declarations, the Commission’s Communications on China; the Parliament’s public 
hearings, debates, resolutions and archives. In order to identify mechanisms of norm 
diffusion, I look at EU missions and operations detailed in the EU’s China strategy papers, 
and archival records (1989-2009) of the activities by the EU’s Delegation in China. 
Specifically, I seek relevant cooperation programmes funded by the Commission which 
have been directly and indirectly designed to address issues of the death penalty and the 
Tibet question.  
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The final stage of analysis examines the normative impact of the EU’s action/inaction. In 
so doing, I identify four different sources of data to analyse normative impact in the 
Chinese context. First of all, I ask whether China has become increasingly involved in an 
active and transparent engagement with EU-China human rights dialogue. Increasing 
involvement by the Chinese means allowing independent scholars, lawyers, and NGOs to 
participate in the human rights dialogue, Chinese official co-ordination and budgetary 
contribution in co-sponsoring EU initiated programmes. Thus, data can be found in the 
Council’s press releases on EU-China human rights dialogue, the Council’s Annual Reports 
on Human Rights and documentation on the Commission’s missions and operations in 
China. Secondly, China’s prospect of fully ratifying the ICCPR is another benchmark for 
norm compliance. Therefore, I look at working papers and archive files from the 
Commission-funded EU-China Human Rights Networks which aims at assisting China on 
reforms towards the ratification of the ICCPR. Thirdly, since normative impact is most 
readily associated with the changing perception of normality, I seek to identify change in 
rhetorical construction of Chinese perception or misperception towards the EU’s 
international role, in particular the way in which two cases are discussed against the 
backdrop of EU-China relations. Relevant data can be found in foreign policy statements 
issued by the Chinese Foreign Ministry, transcripts of Chinese Foreign Ministry’s Press 
Conferences, official news media reporting, as well as academic publications by leading 
Chinese scholars from elite institutions which are considered as the closest possible to the 
Chinese foreign policy-making (Leonard 2008; Shambaugh et al 2007).    
 
2.3.4.2     Analytical Strategy  
Upon establishing two databases for the sub-cases, the evaluation of NPE hypotheses is 
about examining each case across three stages of the tripartite framework to see if the EU 
principle, action and impact are as the NPE approach predicts. For Manners (2009a:19), all 
three stages of the framework should shape and feed into each other. Therefore, at each 
stage of analysis within individual cases, I compare the claims of normative principles, 
actions and impact against one another, ensuring that the tripartite approach itself is 
internally valid and replicated across cases.  Finally, the empirical evidence of both case-
study chapters and their analytical conclusions are the focus of analysis in the final chapter. 
The justification of case selection in the previous chapter has demonstrated that each of 
these cases address certain variables of the NPE framework in a complementary manner, 
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synthesising these comparable findings would ensure the undertaken research method is 
robust, comparing to a single case-study or multiple randomly sampled cases (Yin 2009: 
156). 
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Chapter Three 
 
Human Rights and EU-China Relations: 1989-2009 
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter provides the historical background for the analysis of EU normative power in 
the case of China in the field of human rights. It aims to set the scene for the following 
case-studies as well as to illustrate how China and its EU partners interact with each other, 
regarding what is arguably the ‘thorniest’ issue in contemporary EU-China relations. This 
chapter does not directly assess the extent to which the EU is a normative power in the 
Chinese case. Instead, the rationale is to explore what the EU has actually done and how 
China has responded. On the European side, I analyse the arguments provided by EU 
actors in support of their external policy action. The findings shall later feed back into the 
larger debate about what sort of international actor the EU is, and the extent to which the 
notion of NPE captures the EU’s international role. On the Chinese side, I use both primary 
and secondary data which shed light on how the EU and human rights are perceived in 
Chinese official discourse.  
 
This chapter covers the breadth and scope of the development of EU-China human rights 
diplomacy. Thereby, it combines a review of the evolution of the EU as an international 
actor in normative field and the rise of China, with a narrative of the role of human rights 
in shaping EU-China relations from 1989 to 2009. Section Two seeks to highlight the 
change in policy discourses, policy instruments, and interaction of the main forces at work 
in EU-China relations. To that end, the year of 1989 and 1997/8, which define historical 
phases in this narrative, is determined by the ways in which the EC/EU approached human 
rights issues in China. Section Three explores the Chinese perceptions of the EU’s 
emerging international role and the changing human rights rhetoric and practices in China. 
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It aims to link contemporary Chinese discourse on the EU to the role of human rights in 
Chinese foreign policy in the eyes of Chinese political elites. Section Four first asks 
whether human rights norms have a growing impact on European foreign policy towards 
China. Then, I proceed to analyse the ways in which an emphasis on negotiation, 
persuasion, knowledge-partnership and intellectual exchange have influenced human rights 
discussions between the EU and China. To that end, this section opens up the discussion on 
the extent to which the EU’s China foreign policy can be understood as a normative power.  
3.1 The evolution of EU-China relations in the field of human rights 
This section asks two sets of questions: 1) how does the EU pursue human rights as its 
foreign policy objectives towards China? What rhetoric, instruments and methods are 
adopted? 2) Why has the EU adopted a non-coercive and comprehensive engagement 
approach in its human rights policy towards China? Is this the product of internal dynamics 
– related with its identity and value-based foreign policy? Or, are they influenced by 
China’s growing economic influence and diplomatic tactics?  
 
To present this historical narrative, I choose not to focus on the institutional arrangements 
of the CFSP and the role of main actors as the centre of the discussion. Instead, I approach 
the development of this human rights dimension through identifying patterns of evolution 
and dynamics in policy rhetoric and action through a chronological narrative. Along these 
lines, it paves the way for subsequent analysis on whether NPE fits these policy 
instruments and methods.   
 
The timeframe of the narrative for this section is broadly defined by the change of nature in 
policy instruments and methods adopted by the EC/EU towards China in the 1990s. 
Although this watershed rests upon the year 1997, the actual EU policy shift towards 
dialogue and engagement was initiated as early as 1995. However, given the setbacks 
during the early stage of the EU-China dialogue (1995-1997) and the abandonment of the 
Common Policy towards the UNCHR in 1996, the year 1997 represents a relatively fresh 
start in which the position of the EU can be more clearly delineated.   
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 3.1.1 Phase one: from principle to pragmatism 1989-1997  
The European Community (EC) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) established 
formal diplomatic relations in 1975. At the time, China had just entered into an anti-Soviet 
partnership with the United States in 1971-2 followed by Sino-Soviet split in the mid-
1960s, whilst the original six members of the EC - Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Belgium and Luxembourg - had launched the European Political Cooperation (EPC) 
process in 1970 as the forebear for the future Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). 
By and large, the way in which EU-China relations developed has been characterised by its 
geographical distance, primacy of trade and misperceptions from both sides (Shambaugh 
1996, 2007; Stumbaum 2007).    
 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the relationship between Western Europe and China has 
been widely seen as derivative of broader relations with the two superpowers, in which 
human rights was largely a non-issue (Yahuda 1995, Wan 2001).  The reasons for Western 
Europe’s neglect of the human rights situation in China are primarily two-fold. Firstly, the 
promotion of respect for human rights in third countries was not an explicit objective on 
the EPC’s agenda until the late 1990s.  Up until 4th June 1989, only four documents issued 
by the European Parliament had referred to China and human rights, none of these texts 
were publicly released at the time (Wan 2001: 67). Secondly, the EC exempted China from 
human rights criticism because China was considered as a strategic check on the Soviet 
Union. Thus, a better relationship with China served as leverage against Moscow (Cohen 
1987: 474-488, Yahuda 1995).  
 
On the Chinese side, human rights were not considered as an issue with Europeans at this 
stage; therefore, China did not take any diplomatic action to defend its human rights record. 
As Nathan (1994: 624-628) notices, China often defended itself by attacking Western 
Europe for its colonial past prior to 1989. Although the term ‘human rights’ was rarely 
mentioned, China resorted to norms such as self-determination, racial equality, and justice 
to facilitate its propaganda both at home and abroad with the third world countries (Wan 
2001: 68).   
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3.1.1.1 Tiananmen 1989: the darker days in the past  
After the rapprochement in the 1980s, the steadily improving EC-China relations seriously 
deteriorated as a result of the 1989 Tiananmen Crackdown which still haunts China’s 
relations with the West to this day.  
 
In late May 1989, the EP adopted a resolution urging the Chinese authorities to engage in a 
dialogue with student representatives amid the ongoing protests.
9
 While deploring ‘the 
brutal repression of the people of Beijing’, the EC Commission issued a strong statement 
on 5 June 1989, in which it warned of the EC-China relations:  
“being permanently affected if the policy of the Chinese government were 
to start on a course which would put at risk the policy of openness and 
reform followed until now”.10  
On 6 June 1989, the Twelve condemned the crackdown, and suspended all high-level 
contacts with the PRC.
11 
 However, while recalling the drafting of this statement during the 
Parliament question time with regard to which tone of language and measures to be taken 
against the PRC, Mme. Cresson, the then President-in-Office of the Foreign Ministers 
believed that the twelve member states ‘were not on exactly the same wavelength’.12   
 
On 27 June 1989, according to the Council’s statement, an arms embargo was to be 
imposed on the PRC by member states, co-operation projects were to be reduced including 
those in the areas of culture, science and technology; and the visas extension for 10,000 
Chinese students in Europe were to be dealt with favourably (Möller 2002).
13 
Amongst 
those in favour of strong measures towards China, France went further than most in giving 
political asylum to a number of those who had been prominent in the democracy 
movement, partly due to the resonances with the French revolution in 1789 (Foot 2001: 
116; Baker 2002: 50). As early as 4 July 1989, however, some foreign ministers of the EC 
Twelve announced their intention to re-establish political contacts with China. Especially 
                                                          
9
 Bull. EC 5-1989, point 2.4.7; European Parliament, OJ C158, 26.6.1989 
10
 Bull. EC 6-1989, point 2.4.1 
11 
Bull. EC 6-1989, point 2.3.2 
12  
Question no. H-153/89 (EFPB document no. 89/204), the European Parliament, September 1989, Brussels, 
quoted in Baker (2002), p.50. 
13
 Bull. EC 6-1989, point 1.1.24 
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Britain and Portugal, both of which needed to resume high-level ministerial visits 
regarding their ongoing negotiations over the future of retrocession of Hong Kong and 
Macao (Foot 2001:116). On 2 August 1989, the EC granted an emergency loan of ECU 
500,000 (US$70 million) for flood relief in Sichuan Province. 
14
 China accepted the 
donation, but insisted any other diplomatic activities regarding 4 June as interference in its 
internal affairs. By October 1990, the bans on high-level contacts and co-operation projects 
were to be gradually eased as agreed by the European Council, due to China’s indication of 
further commitment on international human rights, its positions on the Gulf War and issues 
regarding Cambodia (Baker 2002: 50).  
 
On the Chinese side, the international pressure on human rights and the collapse of fellow 
communist countries in Europe posed a severe challenge to the Chinese government. Deng 
Xiaoping, the country’s leader who ordered the crackdown, had famously said in 
September 1989 that:   
“The West really wants unrest in China. It wants turmoil not only in China 
but also in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The United States and 
some other Western countries are trying to bring about a peaceful 
evolution toward capitalism in socialist countries. […] We should be on 
our guard against this.” 15 
Deng’s position was widely seen as a consequence of the combination of concessions and 
resistance by China while dealing with Western Europe over human rights disputes (Wan 
2001, Nathan 1994). Facing Western economic sanctions, China did not retaliate against or 
bend under pressure. Deng told former Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau in July 
1990 that: 
“We may not have other abilities, but we have proved ourselves in resisting 
sanctions. […] After all, the People’s Republic of China has developed under 
international sanctions for most of the more than forty years of its history.”16 
Moreover, China did not criticize Western Europe as harshly as it did the United States, 
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which was explicitly blamed for undermining the Chinese socialist system via ‘peaceful 
evolution’ amid the fall of communism in Eastern Europe (Shambaugh 1992: 111). With 
Brussels, the Chinese government was more willing to engage in dialogue, ‘and hoping to 
divide the West to its advantage, by sending a message that dialogue was a more productive 
approach than confrontation’ (Wan 2001: 71). 
 
3.1.1.2 Early 1990s: Mercantilists with Principles 
The fall of Berlin Wall in October 1989 put an end to the Cold War in Europe. The 
subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union in August 1991 brought an end to the bipolar 
era.  By summer 1990, most of the European sanctions had been lifted except the arms 
embargo. Therefore, the normalisation of relations between the EC and China took a 
relatively short time in the context of profound changes in the international system 
(Yahuda 1995, Casarini 2009).   
 
In Europe, the need to restore relations with China had been driven by mainly economic 
concerns over the recession following the German unification than the political ambition to 
play a role in international politics at the beginning of the post-Cold War era (Möller 2002: 
20). As the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht laid its ground work for future development of the 
CFSP, the deepened European political integration had to some extent freed Member States’ 
bilateral relations with China from dealing directly with human rights issues. Until 1994, 
the European Parliament was the only EU institution being explicit and vocal about 
China’s ongoing human rights problems.17 While there was a surge in the number of anti-
dumping cases dealt by the Commission in 1994, the Community placed an emphasis on 
its cooperation projects in China, including financial aid, technical assistance, and 
economic cooperation.
18 
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Drawn from Germany’s ‘Asia Concept’ of 1993, and the Commission’s 1994 
Communication on ‘a New Asia Strategy’, the EU adopted its first Communication on 
China, entitled ‘Long-Term Policy for China-Europe Relations’ on 15 July 1995, which 
shifted the EU’s China policy from confrontation towards dialogue and engagement.19 This 
change of strategy to constructive engagement was first and foremost in response to the 
rise of China and the potentialities of its market for European business. It also ambitiously 
put the EU member states’ relationships with the PRC into a ‘single integrated framework’, 
which is considered by the Commission as ‘a cornerstone in Europe’s external relations, 
both with Asia and globally’.20 Regarding human rights, the Commission reiterated that ‘a 
commitment to human rights and fundamental freedoms is at the heart of EU policy 
worldwide’. This change of policy is justified by the Commission on the basis that: 
‘There is a danger that relying solely on frequent and strident declarations will 
dilute the message or lead to knee-jerk reactions from the Chinese 
government… […] To make progress, all the EU institutions should pursue 
human rights issues through a combination of carefully timed public statements, 
formal private discussion and practical cooperation.’21  
It then went on to suggest engaging China in bilateral dialogue on human rights, and 
providing training and technical assistance in the legal and judicial fields to establish a 
civil society in China, meanwhile continuing to raise China’s human rights situation at the 
international level.
22  
At this stage, the EU still believes the use of public statements 
reinforced by detailed discussions in private settings can achieve maximum effectiveness.  
 
In the PRC, economic growth started to reach a spectacular scale, especially after 1992 
when the reformers brought new momentum to China’s transformation towards a market 
economy. During this period, China relied on Western Europe as a major source for 
technology transfer and development aid, whilst itself becoming an increasingly important 
market for the Europeans. 
23
 For the Chinese, 1993 was an important turning point in its 
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relations with Western Europe. Different from previous years, the 1993 Tokyo G7 summit 
declaration did not mention China’s human rights or sanctions on China (Wan 2001: 71). In 
1994, the Chinese delegation headed by Mrs Wu Yi, Minister for Foreign Trade and 
Economic Cooperation met with Sir Leon Brittan, European Commissioner for 
Competition in Beijing. For the first time since the 1989 Tiananmen Crackdown, the 
Community delegation did not attach human right standards as conditions for the 
negotiations on Chinese membership of the GATT, instead, it emphasised on:  
‘the importance of non-discrimination with the aim of ensuring that China 
was granted the same concessions by the Community as certain other 
countries, thus preventing the Member States from adopting policies 
unilaterally’.24  
On 12 September the same year, the Chinese President Jiang Zemin made a speech on 
“Four Principles for the Development of the Relationship between China and Western 
Europe” in Paris, namely: 1) mutual respect in search of common ground; 2) downplaying 
of differences; 3) mutual benefit; 4) dealing with international problems through 
consultation and cooperation.
25
 Although Jiang’s speech made little reference to specific 
issues or policy areas, it shows that China’s interests were clearly in having good economic 
relations with individual member states, therefore Paris was chosen as the venue instead of 
Brussels.  
 
At member state level, before the EC officially lifted the economic sanctions on financial 
aid and soft loans on China in October 1990, Germany and France had already breached 
these sanctions with regard to projects undertaken by their own companies (Nesshöver 
1999: 93, quoted in Wong 2005a: 14). For Wong (2005a:14), it was the economic 
considerations which ‘chipped away the collective EC resolve and discipline’ and EC 
countries were competing to get back into the Chinese market as early as the end of 1989.  
 
In this context, the overall trend of the EC/EU policy on human rights in China from 1989 
to 1997 lay principally in two domains: 1) bilateral relations between individual EU 
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governments and China; 2) holding China to account in multilateral fora, in particular the 
Commission on Human Rights (CHR) by annually co-sponsoring a resolution criticising 
China’s human rights record with the US. It shows the powerful reality of state sovereignty 
which makes promoting human rights norms extremely complex and difficult in practice. 
In this case, not just China remained sensitive over national sovereignty, the lack of the EC 
level instruments, economic competition and conflicting interests among Member States 
further undermined the EC’s common foreign policy on human rights (King 1999).   
 
3.1.1.2.1 Dialogue between individual EU governments and China 
In the early 1990s, the bilateral relations between China and individual EU member states 
dominated the development pattern of Sino-European relations. On the one hand, as the 
general trend of trade volumes with China increased significantly, the situation of 
individual member states varied, depending on the structure of their national economies, 
positions on human rights and certain political issues. China, on the other hand, insisted on 
a good political relationship as a precondition for trade deals, as China became 
increasingly skilful at playing ‘divide and rule’ tactics to exploit the internal competition 
among EU member states (Wong 2005a, 2005b, Baker 2002, Wan 2001). Moreover, the 
UK and France as former great powers maintained a strong propensity in dealing with 
China bilaterally. This section looks at the cases of the ‘Big Three’ – Germany, France and 
the UK – amongst which the policy divergence and convergence were to become the 
driving force behind the shift towards ‘constructive engagement’ with China and an 
increasingly value-based foreign policy in discussions of CFSP structures.    
 
 Germany 
Germany’s foreign policy towards China in the early 1990s can be summarised as three-
fold: 1) silent diplomacy on human rights; 2) change through trade which aims at 
encouraging Chinese political liberalisation; 3) a strict ‘one China’ policy that does not 
recognise Taiwan’s sovereignty (Sandschneider 2002, Wong 2005a, Weske 2007, 
Stumbaum 2007).   
 
Following the Tiananmen events 1989, Germany strongly and strictly supported the 
Council’s sanctions policy adopted in Madrid, but the government under Kohl resumed its 
commercial ties with China even before the economic sanctions announced by the Twelve 
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were officially lifted in September 1990 (Wong 2005a). In 1993, Germany became the first 
EU member state to elaborate an official strategy towards Asia in which China was at the 
core of the largest growth region in the world. This strategy had then depoliticised its 
economic relations with China and brought Germany significant commercial success in 
trade. Meanwhile, Germany had also been able to benefit from China’s discriminatory 
trade measures against Britain, France and the US during this period (Möller 1996). 
 
By the mid-1990s, Germany had become China’s most important European trading partner 
(accounting for 40% of all European exports in 1996)
 26
, and China became the biggest 
market for German exports in Asia. Economic relations between Germany and China are 
dominated by small and medium-sized businesses, and Germany was much less affected by 
EU-China textile disputes than other European countries, such as France (Weske 2007:5).   
 
Despite the warm relationship between China and Germany in the early 1990s, individual 
politicians’ views on human rights or deviation from the pragmatic line of China policy 
have led to occasional setbacks. For instance, former German foreign minister Joschka 
Fischer has been openly critical of the human rights situation in China (DW News, 1994; 
quoted in Stumbaum 2007: 85). The vote for a resolution on Tibet by the German 
parliament in June 1996 brought German-Chinese relations into a diplomatic crisis 
(Hasenkamp 2004: 444).   
 
 France    
In the early 1990s, French exports to China were characterised by France’s large scale 
government-led business with China and yet overshadowed by French sales of arms to 
Taiwan, all of which had strongly politicised the economic relations between both sides. As 
a consequence, Sino-French trade figures were largely restrained and shaped by political 
issues during this period.      
 
In the aftermath of Tiananmen 1989, Mitterand’s Government was proactive in convincing 
and supporting the EC to impose sanctions on China. However, in the spring of 1991, 
France became one of the first European countries to resume their relations with China. 
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Similar to other Western countries which lifted sanctions within two years after the 
Tiananmen Crackdown, France’s decision was based on the precondition that China was to 
let a delegation of French legal experts visit China and evaluate its human rights situation, 
which almost undoubtedly ended up drawing a negative report (Cabestan 2006: 328).  
 
As the major host country for Chinese dissidents, the tensions with China over human 
rights issues were further exacerbated by the French US$4.8 billion sale of sixteen 
LaFayette frigates in 1991 and US$3.8 billion sale of sixty Mirage2000 fighter-interceptors 
to Taiwan in December 1992 (Mengin 1992: 46). Consequently, China closed the French 
Consulate in Guangzhou, and excluded French companies from the Chinese market 
(Cabestan 2006: 329). In spring 1993, French aerospace contractors, for the first time, took 
the major part of the production process in a large deal with Airbus (six A-340 planes) to 
China, in partnership with German companies (Taube 2002: 86). Since then, Airbus sales 
had been the backbone of French exports to China. 
 
Germany’s silent diplomacy and mercantilist approach to China made a notable impact on 
the rest of the EU member states’ policies. In 1994, a joint France-China communiqué was 
issued during Prime Minister Balladur’s visit. It shifted many of the French priorities in 
favour of the PRC by reaching an agreement in which the French government authorised 
no further arms sales to Taiwan, and recognised PRC as the only legitimate government of 
China, and Taiwan as China’s integral part (Wong 2005a:4). In 1995, Jacques Chirac’s 
election victory reassured this new momentum to develop a close tie with China. In 1997, 
France became the first country in the Western democratic world to establish a 
‘comprehensive global partnership (partenariat global)’ (quanmian huoban guanxi 全面伙
伴关系 ) with China. 27  On human rights, France pushed strongly for a “constructive 
dialogue” with China instead of criticising China collectively with other Member States at 
the UNCHR in April 1997(Cabestan 2006). Together with Germany, Italy, Spain and 
Greece, France’s breakaway from the established EU policy of co-sponsoring the 
resolution at UNCHR, was often thought to be linked with big commercial contracts China 
could offer in return (Baker 2002: 56). As a result, the EU for the first time was left 
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without a common policy on China since the events of Tiananmen in 1989.
28
 
 
On the one hand, the French government has been very keen on improving its trade figures 
with China ever since early 1990s. The volume of bilateral trade between France and China 
remained one third of German-China trade in 1996, and it was largely based on big 
contracts in areas such as energy and transport.
29
 Since the opening of Chinese market in 
1978, only a very small percentage of the Chinese population in the early 1990s could 
afford to buy luxury goods such as perfumes and wines in which France was competitive 
(Wong 2005a:3). On the other hand, the political and strategic aspects of Sino-French 
relations seemed to play a significant role in the economic dimension due to their shared 
strategic and cultural interests despite having different political values (Cabestan 2006). 
Since the mid-1990s, both sides came to see each other as ‘an independent player in 
international relations’ that ‘contribute to a multipolar and culturally plural world’.30  
 
 The UK    
Before 1989, issues related with Hong Kong’s handover had already strained the Sino-
British relations since the negotiation between Deng and Thatcher’s governments in 1984. 
The events of Tiananmen Square in 1989 raised further anxieties in Britain about the future 
prospect of Hong Kong, especially with regard to ensuring the political freedom of its 
people. The appointment of Chris Patten as the new and last Governor of Hong Kong in 
1992, however, had worsened Sino-British relations. The pro-democracy Governor had 
manifested a series of reforms to introduce political freedom into a society which he 
believed to be the only area in Asia that was free but not democratic (Patten 1998).  
 
Consequently, the UK’s export business during the 1990s was greatly influenced by the 
handover issue of Hong Kong. Having experienced a substantial increase in export during 
1992 and 1993, British exports to China did not enjoy a substantial boost which many 
other European economies had experienced. 
31
 This is seen as retaliation from the Chinese 
side, due to Chris Patten’s ‘unilateral actions’ to push for political reforms in Hong Kong 
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between 1992 and 1997 (Wong 2005a: 20). In 1994, the Chinese government threatened to 
discriminate in trade issues due to Governor Chris Pattern’s policy advocating 
constitutional reform in Hong Kong, whilst Sir Leon Brittan, the then EU Trade 
Commissioner, warned China that the Union would not overlook one of its member states 
being singled out this way (Wong 2005a). As a result, British companies in the 1990s, 
tended to be left out of public bidding processes while seeing contracts taken by other 
European suppliers, such as German car manufacturers or companies in the chemical 
industry (Taube: 2002: 87).  
 
Regarding human rights policy, Britain under New Labour, urged EU member states to 
adopt a common position on China during its EU presidency in the first half of 1998. 
While representing the EU, the New Labour government also wanted a fresh start with the 
Chinese government, especially a year after the hand-over of Hong Kong. It is believed 
that the concern for the peaceful transition to Chinese rule in Hong Kong also played a role 
in the UK Presidency’s human rights agenda (HRIC 1998: 29). When the 1998 UNCHR 
was due to take place, British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook insisted upon forming a 
common EU stance at the UNCHR as he believed ‘we are much more likely to get progress 
if we all speak with one voice and all press the same message.’32 However, his position had 
more to do with having a unified EU voice, than criticising China in international fora 
(Baker 2002).  
 
3.1.1.2.2 Co-Sponsoring a Commission Resolution 
Before 1998, China had not signed the ICCPR and the ICCER. Therefore, the UNCHR in 
Geneva became the only international platform in which China’s human rights situation 
could be raised (Kent 1995: 10-18).   
 
In such context, the EC Twelve adopted this measure in response to the Tiananmen 
Crackdown in June 1989, which later became the only form of open political pressure that 
had survived after other adopted measures faded away by October 1990. Due to the lack of 
any EC level instruments at the time, this measure fell within the competence of the 
Member States (King 1999: 323). However, if acting alone, individual member states 
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might hesitate to sponsor such critical resolutions for fear of commercial retaliation from 
China. Therefore, a common position regarding China’s human rights issues could be seen 
as a notable success for European Political Cooperation (EPC) and the CFSP in the early 
1990s. From 1990 to 1996, Member States had adhered to this approach in response to 
China’s record on human rights except the year 1991 when China’s vote was needed at the 
UN Security Council to endorse the military action led by the US and its French and 
British allies against Iraq during the Gulf War (Wong 2005a: 14). 
 
In 1995, the Commission proposed a new strategy, advocating the prioritisation of 
commercial relations in reaction to China’s rising economic status. 33 However, much to 
China’s dismay, the EU maintained that ‘effective concertation in the human rights debate 
at the international level is a prerequisite for a successful policy’, despite proposing a 
dialogue approach towards China’s human rights.34 In the meantime, a resolution critical of 
China on human rights was again co-sponsored by all EU member states, and a no-action 
motion for a resolution was rejected at UNCHR for the first time since 1990. It was a result 
that concerned NGO groups and supporting governments considered a success, but some 
EU member states such as Germany and France saw as a failure (Baker 2002, HRIC 1998). 
Nevertheless, the defeat of a no-action motion and mixed reactions from EU national 
governments had subsequently contributed to the shift in EU policy on China’s human 
rights situation at the CHR (Baker 2002:54).  
 
Subsequently, the commitment for a resolution on China’s human rights problems was not 
as strong in 1996. Although all Member States continued to co-sponsor a resolution on 
China at the CHR this year as no-action motion was voted in favour, it was not a legal 
option later due to the change of composition in the CHR (HRIC 1998: 27). On the 
Chinese side, Beijing called off the first bilateral dialogue on human rights this year, in 
response to EU refusal to drop the China resolution at the UNCHR (HRIC 1998: 28).
 
 
 
Towards 1997, the EU position became much less defined. France, Germany, Italy and 
Spain pulled out from the joint-resolution which caused a division among EU member 
states (Patten 1998: 304). The change of French policy, for instance, was seen as France’s 
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unwillingness to offend China shortly before President Chirac was to sign an export 
contract for Airbus during his state visit to Beijing.
35
 Moreover, cultural relativism also 
started to appear in some EU member states’ official discourses. For instance, French 
President Jacques Chirac stated in 1997 during a visit to China that ‘human rights, 
although a universal principle, are dependent on national circumstances.’36 
 
At the EU level, the European Commission had been advocating forcefully that the 
resolution be abandoned, whilst the Parliament strongly opposed this move and the 
Council indicated that consensus was hard to reach.
37
 When a consensus on China was 
eventually formed, EU member states decided that neither the Union nor individual 
members would support a resolution on China, citing the hope of encouraging China to 
make progress.
38
 In September 1997, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen met with the 
European Troika to discuss a ‘non-confrontational’ approach to human rights in the 
margins of the UN General Assembly in New York.
39
 Subsequently, the Chinese delegation 
toured France, Luxembourg, Germany, Sweden, Spain and Norway to reiterate that they 
believe ‘the only way to resolve difference is through constructive and earnest dialogue, 
not confrontation’. 40  In October 1997, China signed the ICESCR and released the 
prominent dissident Wei Jingsheng shortly before President Jiang Zemin was due to visit 
the United States.
41
 
 
3.1.1.3 Patterns of Evolution and Dynamics 
In the first phase (1989-1997), the EU’s human rights policy towards China was 
characterised as a strategy of pressure and criticism in multilateral fora such as the United 
Nations, with limited but growing bilateral exchange and cooperation. During this period, 
human rights were gradually established and consolidated as a key element of the EU’s 
external identity, ever since the most important turning point for international human rights 
came after the end of Cold War, and subsequently with its inclusion as a standalone 
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objective of the CFSP in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. Meanwhile China had gone through 
stages of rapid economic growth and diplomatic rapprochement with Western liberal 
governments; however the stain of events at Tiananmen on 4 June 1989 which drew 
intensive global attention to its human rights problems received regular and unremitting 
public and NGOs attention. Eager to enhance its participation in international society after 
the isolation as a result of 4 June 1989, China was certainly capable of being shamed (Foot 
2001: 17). However, this does not necessarily bring China to involuntary compliance with 
international human rights norms when it comes to its bilateral relations. When facing 
human rights criticisms by the EU, China often responded with instrumental adaptation, 
trade retaliation, or diplomatic tactics with an assertiveness reinforced by its flexing 
economic muscles. For the EU, China’s cooperation on multilateral fora was needed and its 
lucrative market was impossible to resist, thus member states were lured by China’s huge 
market and realised no one could afford to stay out of the race. As member states rushed 
back to China, the EU was facing an ever more pertinent dilemma between normative 
concerns and materialistic interests.   
 
Against this background, having to seek a way out of this dilemma while being driven by 
competing interests of member states, the EU’s change of policy orientation with China 
was almost inevitable. Amid the temptation of China’s huge market and the hope that 
China could be persuaded and changed as China itself had proposed, the EU member states 
were eventually unable to reach an agreement regarding co-sponsoring a draft resolution 
against China at the UNCHR in 1997. Consequently, it has lead to a move towards a 
seemingly more normative/non-coercive approach based upon dialogue and unconditional 
engagement rather than coercive verbal or material sanctions, in such a way as to ease the 
inherent tensions in the implementation of EU foreign policy to promote both principles 
and interests.     
 
 
3.1.2 Phase Two: the Age of Dialogue and Engagement 1998-2009 
“There are those in Europe who claim that entering into a dialogue with 
China on human rights will only lead to cosmetic and diplomatic changes 
without any fundamental shift in policies and practices in China….. My 
feeling is that, in the long term, an approach based on exerting as much 
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pressure as possible by keeping the dialogue alive, but not necessarily at 
all costs, is the only realistic way of making progress towards a civil 
society in China based on the rule of law.” 
                                                      --------------------- Sir Leon Brittan (1998)
42
 
The Year 1998 marked the fiftieth anniversary of the UDHR and the Human Rights Year 
for the EU. In this year, the EU declared that:  
‘Both internally and externally, respect for human rights as proclaimed in the 
Universal Declaration is one of the essential components of the activities of the 
Union’.43  
As a result, the EU decided to issue an annual human rights report each year, initiating a 
series of new measures to facilitate its work on human rights, including the guidelines on 
the abolition of the death penalty, fight against torture, protection of human rights 
defenders,  and monitoring elections.
44
 
 
In February 1998, the EU General Affairs Council issued a conclusion with a decision to 
abstain from sponsoring a resolution at the UNCHR, with which the Parliament 
disagreed.
45
 The Council listed a number of Chinese improvements to justify its change of 
strategy, including the release of the Sakharov Prize laureate Wei Jingsheng, the signature 
and proposed ratification of the ICESCR, the Chinese invitation to the High Commissioner 
on Human Rights Mary Robinson and the visit of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention to China in 1997 (HRIC 1998).  
 
In the Commission’s 1998 Communication, the role of human rights in the EU’s foreign 
policy is much more articulated than in its previous China policy papers. It states that ‘a 
commitment to universally recognised human rights and fundamental freedom lies at the 
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heart of the EU’s policy world-wide’46, and:  
‘The resumption of the EU-China human rights dialogue without any 
pre-conditions gives the EU a real opportunity to pursue intense 
discussions which, coupled with specific cooperation projects, remains 
at present the most appropriate means of contributing to human rights 
in China’.47 
In 1999, China brutally cracked down on Falun Gong, a religious group that had millions of 
members practicing meditation exercises (Ching 2008:45). At the time, President Jiang was 
royally received in London on his first state visit to the UK, however, the British 
government was considered ‘less liberal and more hypocritical’ to have banned 
demonstrations and protests in the royal parks.
48
 In December 1999, a delegation of EU 
leaders, led by EU Commission President Romano Prodi, urged the Chinese government to 
ratify the two international human rights covenants, and raised the issues of Falun Gong 
and prosecution of democracy activists during a meeting by Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji 
who had yielded little ground.
49
 In the same year, the last British governor to Hong Kong, 
once denounced by the Chinese government as ‘a criminal who would be condemned for a 
thousand generations’ (Patten 1998: 142) was appointed EU Commissioner for Foreign 
Relations. Despite an earlier promise of a tougher stance on human rights in China at a 
European Parliamentary hearing, Commissioner Patten had been well-received by the 
Chinese leaders with no reported clashes on human rights with the Chinese during his four-
year appointment (Wan 2001: 74).  
 
In May 2000, the EU and China signed a bilateral market access agreement which was a 
milestone in China’s WTO accession process. Unlike the US who attached human rights 
with trade, the Europeans preferred engagement than confrontation, ‘in order to have China 
in the multilateral institutions and to “control” it from inside’ (Panebianco 2006: 140). In 
2001, despite China’s decision to ratify the ICERCR, the Parliament passed a resolution on 
Beijing’s bid to host the 2008 Olympic Games, urging the International Olympic 
Committee to reconsider Beijing’s candidacy until China had made a fundamental change 
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in its human rights.
50
 In the Commission’s 2001 strategy paper on China, the EU pressed 
for a ‘more result-oriented human rights dialogue’ through ‘implementing and preparing 
human rights-related assistance programmes in support of the rule of law and legal reform, 
economic, cultural as well as civil and political rights and democracy’.51   
 
Despite the twists and turns over issues on human rights which had always been the bone 
of contention between EU and China, the Commission’s 2003 Communication called for a 
‘Maturing Partnership’ and extended the list of cooperation areas towards a wider 
spectrum.
52 
A month later, China issued its first and only policy paper on the EU, in which 
it states: 
‘the Chinese side appreciates the EU’s persistent position for dialogue and 
against confrontation and stands ready to continue dialogue, exchange and 
cooperation on human rights with the EU on the basis of equality and 
mutual respect so as to share information, enhance mutual understanding 
and deepen cooperation in protecting, inter alia, citizens’ social and cultural 
rights and the rights of the disadvantaged.’ 53 
The current framework of EU policy towards China is set out in the Commission’s 2006 
Communication to the Council and the European Parliament entitled ‘EU-China: Closer 
Partners, Growing Responsibilities’. Central to this policy paper is the theme of 
cooperation. It states that the EU will reinforce cooperation to ‘ensure sustainable 
development’, ‘pursue a fair and robust trade policy’ and ‘work to strengthen and add 
balance to bilateral relations’.54 The concern for China’s human rights issues and lack of 
progress is significantly toned down. Instead, the EU ‘should continue to support China’s 
internal political and economic reform process, for a strong and stable China which fully 
respects fundamental rights and freedoms, protects minorities and guarantees the rule of 
law’. 55 Unlike previous policy papers on relations with China, the EU human rights policy 
does not constitute a separate section, but is integrated in a section titled ‘Supporting 
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China’s transition towards a more open and plural society’. What is also new to this policy 
paper is the call to expand people-to-people exchanges, inter-civilisational dialogue, 
common curriculum development, and knowledge-based co-operation.
56
  
 
For those optimistic observers, it seems that now is a good time to ‘put flesh to the bones’, 
and to extend this ‘learning dimension’ to the area of human rights (Crossick and Reuter 
2007). Wiessala (2009:96), on the other hand, suggests that this communication should be 
read as ‘the EU’s linguistic-constructive diplomatic arsenal’ which had produced ‘a new, 
subtler flavour, emphasising commonality, shared responsibilities and respect for 
difference’.  
 
In 2008, there was an extended list of incidents and issues between the EU and China that 
caught intensive media attention. China first occupied a central place in EP debates on 
external policy following the state crackdown on Tibetan riots in Lhasa in March.
57
 Then, 
the EU Foreign Minister Council’s un-official but high-profile meeting in Slovenia on the 
situation in Tibet and their attendance to the Beijing Olympics Opening Ceremony in 2008 
brought additional strains on the EU-China relations. By awarding the 2008 Sakharov Prize 
to the Chinese dissident Hu Jia after Wei Jingsheng in 1994, Parliament further infuriated 
China through acknowledging ‘the daily struggle for freedom of all Chinese human rights 
defenders’.58  
 
On the Member State’s level, there were major public protests in Paris and other European 
capitals during the Olympic torch relay, highlighting the strong public concerns on human 
rights problems in China, particularly in Tibet. These images had stirred up strong 
nationalistic sentiments in China, which led to a campaign by the Chinese to boycott the 
French supermarket Carrefour with warnings from the Chinese government about the 
damage on Sino-French relations. President Sarkozy’s meeting with the Dalai Lama in 
December 2008 had resulted in China cancelling the EU-Summit while France was holding 
the EU Presidency. Facing China’s skilful exploitation of European weaknesses and 
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diplomatic defiance, cases such as the execution of Wo Weihan in 2008 and the British 
citizen Akmal Shaikh in 2009, and the arbitrary detention and prosecution of Liu Xiaobo, 
had demonstrated the limit of the EU’s declaratory measures.59 
 
3.1.2.1 The EU-China Human Rights Dialogue 
Although the EU has general dialogues including human rights with numerous countries, 
the only regular, institutionalised and highly structured dialogue on human rights remains 
with China until this day. Such a focused human rights dialogue is used by the EU only 
concerning countries with which the EC has no agreement (as with the former dialogue 
with Iran), or where the agreement does not contain a human rights clause, as with the 
1985 EEC-China Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation. 
60 
  
 
The first EU-China dialogue on human rights was launched at China’s suggestion and was 
held in Brussels in 1995 (HRIC 1998: 27-34). At that stage, the EU still stood firmly on the 
use of international fora to raise China’s human rights issues in addition to its bilateral 
dialogue with China. Following the second meeting in Beijing in January 1996, China 
pulled out from the session, because EU member states proposed again to co-sponsor a 
resolution at the UNCHR that year.
61
 On 23 October 1997, the EU-China dialogue was 
resumed. As preconditions, China suggested that the dialogue focuses exclusively on 
discussion with regard to technical cooperation, such as legal assistance; whilst the EU 
insisted on raising various issues including Wei Jingsheng’s trial, and the situation of the 
disappeared Panchen Lama which were uncomfortably cut short by the Chinese.
62
 
 
When the decision to abandon co-sponsoring a resolution critical of China at the CHR was 
formally adopted by the EU General Council on February 23 1998, the EU justified this 
policy shift as ‘an active, sustained and constructive way’ to promote human rights in 
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China.
 63
 The EU believes that dialogue enables the EU and China ‘tackle their difference 
in a frank, open and respectful manner’, and it allows the EU ‘to obtain China’s agreement 
in principle on a cooperation programme designed to strengthen the rule of law and 
promote civil, political, economic and social rights’.64  In order to show progress that 
reassured the EU of its decision, China committed to sign the ICESCR just days before 
President Jiang Zemin went on his first state visit to the US in October 1997. The General 
Council’s statement also noted other Chinese improvements that justified its change of 
strategy, including Hong Kong’s peaceful transition to Chinese rule, the release of Wei 
Jingsheng, and the invitation by Beijing to High Commissioner on Human Rights Mary 
Robinson.
65 
 
 
While the twice-yearly human rights dialogue remains fit for purpose today, there has been 
an increasing concern that it lacks tangible results.
 66
 Sir Leon Brittan warned at an earlier 
stage that: ‘A dialogue without results will soon run out of steam and will not be acceptable 
to public opinion in Europe’. 67 In recent EU policy papers, there have been concerns that 
the dialogue needs to improve the quality of exchange and achieve concrete results, and be 
flexible about the source of input, and co-ordinate better with Member States’ human rights 
dialogue mechanisms with China.
68
According to a recent EU think tank paper, China has 
dealt with EU pressure on human rights issues ‘by accepting formal dialogues’, and then 
‘turning them into inconclusive talking shops’ (Fox and Godement 2009:8).   
 
While the dialogues of the early 1990s were squarely focused on the central issue of rights 
violations occurring in the PRC, more recent sessions have tacitly accepted a cultural 
relativist approach. For instance, in the press releases by the Council following the 24
th
, 
27
th
 and 28
th
 rounds of human rights dialogue, the different political values held by the 
both sides were mentioned before both sides ‘exchanged’ their human rights concerns over 
the other side. Chinese representatives have raised the issue of racism, discrimination, 
asylum-seekers, and ethnic minority and refugee issues in the EU, meanwhile, its own 
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violation of ethnic minority rights was raised by the EU.
69  
 
 
One of the major problems with the dialogue approach is the lack of transparency and 
accountability in this process.
70 
There has been no detailed account of the actual progress 
provided by either side, and NGOs and independent lawyers and scholars are generally 
excluded from discussion, sometimes even from cooperation programs. For conducting 
case-studies in this thesis, I combine EU press releases, academic literature, NGO reports 
and media accounts available on the dialogue, to piece together a picture of the process. 
Inevitably, it will be a general overview. Nonetheless, the emphasis of an NPE perspective 
is to identity normative tendency of the EU’s changing human rights policy, rather than the 
facts and issues involved in the dialogue process.    
 
3.1.2.2 Engagement, Partnership and Cooperation 
In order to ‘encourage China’s own efforts towards opening up, socially and economically’, 
the use of the EC cooperation programme to encourage China to improve its human rights 
conditions was first mentioned in the Commission’s 1995 Communication. 71 It was based 
on the belief that human rights can be more sufficiently realised and better protected if the 
China is encouraged to become more open to free trade, market economy, different people 
and ideas through active and comprehensive engagement with the international community 
in all policy areas.
 72
 However, at the time, cooperation with China as such was still at a 
very ‘small scale’. The EU still relied on the Member States and European NGOs to 
support and deliver cooperation programmes, including training, technical assistance in the 
legal and judicial fields.
73
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Policy Justification 
In the Commission’s Communications of 1998 and 2001, it is suggested that giving policy 
advice and assisting China in its reform process should be the best form of cooperation, as 
it fits well with China’s own top-down approach to reforms and governance in general.74 In 
the Commission’s 2002 China Country Strategy Paper, supporting China’s transition to ‘an 
open society based on the rule of law and respect for human rights’ became one of the EU’s 
top priorities for cooperation projects with China.
75
  In the Commission’s 2003 and 2006 
communications, the wording of ‘promotion of human rights’ and ‘respect for fundamental 
freedom’ which often antagonised the Chinese, have been replaced by ‘building the 
capacity of the emerging civil society, establishing networks between European and 
Chinese civil society organisations, and encouraging Chinese NGOs to participate in 
international conferences open to civil society’. They also set out a new trend of ‘people-
to-people exchange’ by encouraging links among academic institutions and social 
organisations from both sides through their participation in EU-China cooperation projects. 
For instance, within the framework of Erasmus World and the Marie Curie fellowships, the 
EU’s cultural, educational and research links are established with Chinese universities with 
the participation of numerous students and researchers from both sides who have been 
engaged in European studies.
76   
 
 
Projects on the Ground 
The details of the EU-China strategic partnership were set out by the European 
Commission in its National Indicative Programme (NIP) for China (2005-2006).
77
 Despite 
its technical nature, it provides an extremely useful review of the recent Country Strategy 
Paper (CSP) of 2002-2006, identifying its progress and shortcomings. Particularly, it shows 
how decisions are made between the EC and its Member States, and between the EC and 
China, regarding policy dialogues or cooperation programmes with China. The 2005-2006 
NIP identified education, intellectual property protection, and good governance and rule of 
law as the main priorities for the year of 2005, with an indicative budget of €250 
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million.
78
According to this document, the Delegation of the EU in China specified the 
consultation process on the implementation of proposed cooperation projects, including co-
ordination with Member States, communication with the Chinese governmental bodies and 
consultation with NGO organisations.
79   
 
 
A programme titled ‘Governance Capacity Building’ became a focal area of the 2002-2006 
CSP, in which it states that “Promoting good governance, the rule of law and human rights 
are key priorities of the EC Co-operation”. One of the largest EU programmes in terms of 
funding has been the legal and judicial cooperation programme (2000-2004). With total 
funding of €13.5 million for four years, this programme funded study trips and visits by 
Chinese lawyers, judges, prosecutors, and other legal professionals from both sides.
80 
It is 
considered by the Commission as ‘the most important foreign assistance project of its kind 
in China, which supported the strengthening of the rule of law in China’.81 Scholarships 
and funding for cooperation are also available in the area of governance and civil society. 
According to an assessment conducted by the British Council which led the European 
Consortium to manage the programme in partnership with the Chinese government, some 
Chinese participants had expressed that the knowledge they gained in Europe has been 
brought back to China, and has already started to have impact on both their personal 
outlook and the institutions they serve.
82 
Other major projects in China funded under the 
EIDHR budget line include: the EU-China Network on the Human Rights Covenants; 
Strengthening the Defence of Death Penalty Cases in China; and The Human Rights 
Micro-Projects Programme.
83
 
 
In 2007, an independent Country-Level Evaluation of the Commission’s co-operation 
programme was published.
 84
 Based on reviews of the main areas of co-operation since 
1998, the EC’s China policies have been rated positively, however, promotion of human 
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rights is not specifically mentioned, nor has any recommendation on human rights policy 
been made.
85
 Table 3.1 in the Appendix shows an overall trend between 1989 and 2009 that 
the EU-China cooperation and EU aid programmes shifted from poverty reduction oriented 
projects to governance capacity building and eventually knowledge- based cooperation. 
 
3.1.2.3 Patterns of Evolution and Dynamics 
In the second phase (1998-2009), engagement and cooperation have overtaken open 
criticisms as the core strategy of the EU’s human rights policy towards China. For the EU, 
human rights promotion has been ever more visible in EU foreign policy debates and 
declarations, with an emerging sense of portraying itself as a unique player in the field of 
human rights during this period. Human rights had become incrementally 
constitutionalised into a ‘value-based’ EU foreign policy, with its promotion being 
institutionalised in specific agenda for implementation. As for China, there has been an 
increasing deployment of vocabulary, such as ‘commonality’, ‘strategic partnership’, 
‘maturity’, and ‘constructive engagement’ in EU policy papers on China, in line with a 
general perception of a ‘rising’ China, and its economic importance to the EU. In practice, 
human rights dialogues were established between the two sides, coupled with numerous 
cooperation programs. To that end, the EU had clearly abandoned the rigid and 
confrontational approach to human rights promotion in China since the late 1990s; instead, 
emphasis was placed on normative mechanisms of persuasion, argumentation, partnership 
and engagement.   
  
As demonstrated in the previous section, a confrontational approach only led to 
instrumental adaptation, deviant diplomatic behaviour, or trade retaliation by China, 
instead of its norm compliance. Since the late 1990s, the stark dilemma the EU 
encountered in this phase has developed into one that is between seeking partnership with 
China and applying its human rights policy with rigour. Underlying this dilemma, however, 
is not merely the materialistic interests in conflict with the EU’s normative concerns, but 
also the practical need to engage China in moral persuasion to achieve ideational impact in 
the long term. Furthermore, without directly addressing specific human rights issues, this 
policy strategy which was translated into educational exchange and knowledge-based 
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cooperation should be given credit as a creative effort in promoting human rights through 
the ‘dare to know’ and the ‘capacity to aspire’ (Hutton 2008: 53, 201), which are key to 
human rights consciousness, and therefore sit well with an NPE perspective to promotion 
of human rights. However, this is not to say that EU human rights policy towards China is 
purely idealistic and normative in nature in the second phase. That trade relations have 
been and still are the backbone of EU-China relations suggest that purely idealistic or 
strictly realist approaches are equally insufficient to the understanding of EU promotion of 
human rights policy towards China.  
3.2 Chinese Perspective and Response 
Whether the EU has been a ‘normative power’ towards China on human rights issues 
depends on the extent to which the EU is perceived as being normatively justifiable to 
promote its standards and persuade China to adhere to its own principles and norms. 
Therefore, it is important to identify sources of legitimacy from the EU’s perceived 
characteristics, in other words, to look at Chinese perceptions of the EU’s international role 
- as an NPE. Turning this perceived legitimacy into normative power, the EU should have 
the ability to persuade China, and that depends on the Chinese attitudes towards learning 
while the EU serves as an example.  
 
This section looks at Chinese perceptions of the EU’s international role and China’s human 
rights discourses. The former indicates the source of legitimacy and potentialities of NPE 
in the Chinese case; the latter uncovers the extent to which the idea of human rights is 
genuinely considered by the Chinese authorities as a normative issue or diplomatic tactics.  
 
3.2.1 Chinese perceptions over the EU’s international role 
This sub-section provides a general review of Chinese perceptions of the EU’s 
international role in official Chinese discourses. By ‘Chinese perceptions’, I mean rhetoric 
and opinions presented by the Chinese authorities. Whereas Chinese academic views on 
this have been reviewed in Chapter Two for theoretical discussion, their impact on China’s 
policy-making remaining unclear.  
 
Chinese official views of Europe’s role in the world do not exist independently, rather ‘they 
are largely derivative from broader Chinese understandings of, and preferences for, the 
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global system and order’ (Shambaugh 2007: 128). As reflected in various official 
documents and speeches, the official Chinese view of Europe’s role in the world has roots 
in China’s broader expectations for developing an international order based on non-
hegemony, multipolarity, political equality, cultural diversity, and economic 
interdependence.
86
 
 
When China first established diplomatic relations with the EEC in 1975, Chinese Foreign 
Trade Minister Li Qian received the first official representative, Christopher Soames, from 
the EEC who visited China and stated that:   
 “Since the founding of the EEC, there has been growing tendency towards 
unity between the Western European countries. They withstand external 
pressure and interference and safeguard their sovereignty and independence 
with unremitting efforts. This is a positive factor in the changing international 
situation…we are willing to witness that the EEC and the third world develop 
better relations. It is our belief that, if all countries that are subject to the 
invasion, interference and control by the super-powers unite together, they will 
surely defeat the superpowers’ conspiracy of seeking global hegemony”. 87  
Although EU-China relations have evolved considerably since then, there remains a strong 
propensity in Chinese official discourse to view Europe as a unitary actor in international 
politics. For instance, China’s former ambassador to France, Cai Fangbai (2005: 34) 
suggests that: 
 “In external relations, the EU endorses global multipolarization and advocates 
multilateralism in responding to challenges that the world faces. The goal of 
the EU is to become the dominant force in Europe and sit as equals at the same 
table with the United States.” 
So far, only one policy paper has been produced by the Chinese authorities specifically on 
the EU in 2003 in which China states:  
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 ‘The European Union is a major force in the world…the EU is now a strong 
and the most integrated community in the world…the European integration 
process is irreversible and the EU will play an increasingly important role in 
both regional and international affairs’. 88 
China thus believes that due to ‘differences in historical background, cultural heritage, 
political system and economic development level’, it is inevitable that both sides do not 
share views on some issues.
89
 However, China sees ‘no fundamental conflict of interest’ 
between the two. According to this paper, China’s Europe strategy is promoting closer ties, 
continuing economic cooperation with of the EU, and more people-to-people exchanges to 
increase learning from each other.
90 
 
 
Within the framework of this policy paper, Chinese Premier of the State Council, Wen 
Jiaobao made several important policy speeches following the issue of the EU strategy 
paper. On 6 May 2004, he gave a speech to the China-EU Investment and Trade 
Symposium in Brussels on ‘a comprehensive strategic partnership’ between the two 
sides.
91
 He referred to ‘comprehensive’ as ‘the cooperation should be long-term and stable’, 
‘transcending the differences in ideology and social system and … not subjected to the 
impacts of individual events that occur from time to time’, whilst ‘Partnership’ as ‘the 
cooperation should be equal-footed, mutually beneficial and win-win’. 92 This was the first 
time the basic terms of the new EU-China relationship were expressly defined by the 
Chinese authorities.   
 
In China’s official discourse on its relationship with the EU, there is also a strong emphasis 
on mutual understanding. Regarding human rights, Wen Jiabao stated:  
“Mutual understanding is the basis of the cooperation. […] Most Europeans 
paid attention to Chinese developments, but they do not understand our 
progress in other fields, such as politics and social fields. … we put on the 
priority of the rights to survival and development and try the best to achieve 
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social justice. Chinese government has helped more than 200 million 
peasants getting out of poverty, and provided over 20 million urban low-
incomers with the lowest life guarantee, which makes an outstanding 
contribution to the global anti-poverty campaign.”93  
To date, China’s 2003 EU paper remained the apex of China’s assessment of the EU. In 
subsequent years, China became increasingly frustrated with the EU over a range of issues, 
including the failure to remove the arms embargo
94, Europe’s perceived unwillingness to 
grant China market economy status, European leaders meeting the Dalai Lama, the threats 
to boycott the 2008 Olympics
95
 and an increasing number of trade disputes and persistent 
criticism of China’s human rights record, especially from MEPs. China’s deputy foreign 
minister, Fu Ying, warned that the level of ‘misunderstanding’ between the EU and China 
was on the rise, because:  
“Europe believes it has the best and that the whole world should copy it, 
although after a long period of time, many countries that did copy it are not so 
successful. But Europe does not lose its confidence, you keep on lecturing.”96  
Nevertheless, within a longitudinal timeframe, the extent to which the negative reactions on 
the Chinese side were tactical and temporary remains to be seen. The enquiry through an 
NPE perspective directs towards a social-constructivist approach to the understanding of 
the dialectic of ‘agency’ and ‘structure’, and the role of ideas, role concept and identities as 
drivers of politics and constitutions (Tonra and Christiansen 2004; Wiessala 2009). For EU-
China relations, the emphasis is therefore placed on persuasion and knowledge-based 
cooperation, in which intellectual debates and exchange of ideas matter.  
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3.2.2 Chinese strategic thinking, tactics and pragmatism over the issue of human rights  
After the Tiananmen crisis in June 1989, many observers believed that the rule of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would fall to the ‘third wave’ of democratisation 
(Huntington 1968; Nathan 1994). Today, China’s rapid economic growth has helped give 
credence to the government’s claim that China would have descended into chaos were it 
not for the crackdown.
97 
Domestically, open debate about the Tiananmen killings is still 
forbidden in mainland China, and the government has never held an official inquiry. 
Internationally, it quickly restored normal relations with the West and became a ‘strategic 
partner’ with substantive economic weight, even being seen as representing a normative 
system in its own right (Crossick and Reuter 2007). It is believed that China’s response to 
international human rights pressure is best summarised by Nathan (1994, 2003) as being 
consistent in strategy, flexible in diplomatic tactics and driven by realism.  
 
3.2.2.1 Chinese Strategic Thinking 
Since 1989, China has made some progress in bringing itself closer to international law 
when it came under international pressure to do so, including the signing of ICECR in 
1997 and ICCPR in 1989. However, China’s participation in the international human rights 
regime came partly in an attempt to undercut the West’s support for a draft resolution at the 
UNCHR that would have openly embarrassed China (Baker 2002). For the Chinese 
Communist Party, proper adherence to international standards would threaten the Party’s 
rule, domestic political and social stability in view of its leaders (Foot 2001, Kent 1999).  
 
Considering the international society a European concept by origin, the Chinese 
government interprets the advancement of human rights as being imposed by the strong 
over the weak, assuming the values in one civilization are superior over those of another 
(Foot 2001:44). On the other hand, China believes the concept of non-interference and 
sovereignty equality as the final defence against the rules of a divided, unequal world. In 
reaction to the 1999 NATO bombing in Kosovo, China reiterated its opposition to the 
‘absurd theory that “human rights transcend sovereignty”’98. Johnston (1996: 217) suggests 
that, while China’s strategic culture has historically exhibited a relatively consistent hard 
realpolitik, which translates into a preference for offensive uses of force; the EU security 
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culture relies upon the concept of comprehensive and cooperative security.  While the 
human dimension of security is an important component of the European security culture, 
the Chinese primarily focuses upon economic growth and ‘traditional security’ based on 
ancient military strategy inspired realism (Attinà and Zhu, 2001:92)  
 
Due to China’s disastrous colonial experience starting from the first Opium War in 1839 
which was justified by the British in the name of ‘trade rights’ (Golden 2006), there has 
been a constant warn of the dangers of weak rule, which leads to a strong concern with 
maintaining domestic stability, which are prioritised over any economic or human rights 
costs. This is a common theme in academic discussion over Chinese nationalism of the 
way in which Chinese culture shapes its strategic behaviour (Johnston 1995, 1996; Shih 
2003; Twomey 2006). Over the years, the Chinese attitude to Western ideas and political 
institutions has been complex and ambivalent among intellectual and political elites. As 
Donnelly (2007:306) rightly points out, anything that associates with Western values is 
likely to be met with understandable suspicion in the postcolonial context. Therefore, 
China’s strategic culture, its understanding of rights, and who is entitled to promote them 
would be the fundamental questions for normative justification of EU external human 
rights policies.  
 
3.2.2.2 Chinese Official Discourse on Human Rights 
Since 1989, the Chinese authorities have made ample use of a new range of methods and 
institutions to formulate its own vision of human rights, and defend its human rights record. 
One important aspect of the new Chinese human rights policy has been the issuing of a 
number of White Papers since 1991. These white papers have been addressed more to a 
foreign than a domestic audience. Not only do they refute Western criticism but also 
portray the CCP as a defender of human rights. Arguments made by these white papers 
often refer to the fact that China’s conditions were worse before 1949 when the CCP took 
power.
 99 
 In these papers, the Chinese authorities emphasises on the right to subsistence 
and development as the foundation for developing civil and political rights; Chinese 
progress in legal and judicial reform, collective rights over individual rights; the 
instrumental use of human rights as a political leverage against China by Western 
                                                          
99
 White Paper, Fifty Years of Progress in China’s Human Rights (2000); White Paper – progress in China’s 
Human Rights Conditions in 1998 (1999); White Paper – Progress in China’s Human Rights Cause in 1996, 
(1997); White Paper – The Progress of Human Rights in China (1995). 
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governments, and the interference of China’s internal affairs (Wachman 2001: 268-9). 
Among these views, the most commonly addressed and deceptively convincing are the 
alleged Chinese particularity and stage of development.
  
 
 
 Chinese particularity 
In the early 1990s, the Chinese government often argued that the Western view of human 
rights does not fit the Chinese cultural and historical background. While accepting the 
universality of human rights, the Chinese government rejects a single or Western definition 
of human rights. Therefore, understanding China’s attitude towards Western promotion of 
human rights does require caution and sensitivity over the legacy of European imperialism 
in contemporary Chinese history. However, one cannot help noticing that this argument can 
be problematic, given the inherent contradiction between endorsing universality of human 
rights and defending China’s exceptionalism. In rhetorical practice, the PRC thus avoids 
having international human rights standards imposed by others, while justifying its own 
strategy to human rights by emphasising China’s particular characteristics: 
‘China cannot copy the mode of human rights development of the developed 
Western countries, nor can it copy the methods of other developing countries. 
China can only start from its own reality and explore a road with its 
characteristics … China has … found a road to promoting and developing 
human rights which is in line with the country’s reality.’100 
Svensson (2002:321), who has traced Chinese public discourse on human rights since the 
early twentieth century, suggests that ‘there were not many concrete discussions regarding 
which aspects of Chinese culture render the Western concept of human rights infeasible in 
China, or whether China could formulate a human rights theory based on its own 
indigenous concepts’.   
 
 China’s stage of development 
In the same vein, another Chinese argument that human rights are determined by a nation’s 
reality - its guoqing (国情), has been central to its claim to special treatment. In the series 
of White Papers concerning human rights, China articulates its own view of human rights 
                                                          
100 
White Paper, Fifty Years of Progress in China’s Human Rights (2000). 
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as:  
‘…the top priority is given to the rights of subsistence and development, while 
taking into consideration the people’s political, economic, social and cultural 
rights and the overall development of individual and collective rights.’ 101 
In this way, China emphasises that it is still a developing country, thus the right to 
subsistence, and economic development should lay the foundation for civil and political 
rights as its own human rights strategy.
 
 
 
In the EU-China context, this view that focuses on China’s special national conditions and 
achievement in need of empathy and recognition has been often adopted by the Chinese 
authorities and scholarly elites to counter European criticisms. Addressing a European 
audience in The Hague in 2004, Wen Jiabao stated: 
“Democracy and fundamental rights has its historical development process 
in any country, it is not exceptional for the EU and China. We have already 
integrated the respect and protection of fundamental rights into the 
Constitution. The promotion of democracy and fundamental rights are 
ongoing together with the economic and social development”.102  
China’s European specialist Dai Bingran acknowledges that the human rights situation in 
China was ‘not as good as it should be’, but he stresses things had improved tremendously 
over the past 30 years since the Cultural Revolution.
 103
  He also asked of Europe “a little 
patience” and to be “a little tolerant”.104  
 
Overall, the Chinese official human rights discourse is self-contradictory. While China 
continues to argue that it has a distinctive strategy to develop human right according to its 
own economic and developmental conditions, it accepts the authority of international 
human rights standards in principle by signing up to ICCPR and ICECR, and yet justified 
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Ibid. 
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 Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, Speech to the China-EU Business Summit, The Hague, 9 December 2004, 
‘Strengthening All-round Cooperation and Deepening the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between 
China and the European Union’ 
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The ECAN (EU-China Academic Network) Annual Conference, 9 December 2008, see ‘EU-China 
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its deviations from these covenants by resorting to other international norms or validating 
cultural relativism (Donnelly 1999: 632). Furthermore, by arguing that criticism of the 
Chinese human rights record constitutes interference in its internal affairs or an imposition 
of foreign values, it undermines China’s own position by criticising other countries, 
notably the U.S (Svensson 2002: 310).   
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter aims to demonstrate that it is possible to delineate EU-China relations on 
human rights with reference to the notion of NPE. To begin with, I presented a historical 
narrative by chronologically dividing the analytical timeframe (1989-2009) into two phases 
characterised by the nature of policy instruments and strategy adopted by the EC/EU 
towards China. The EU in this narrative was treated as a global actor with an emerging 
sense of international identity, rather than a selective range of member states and EU actors 
which have operated in combination. In so doing, I have illustrated the evolution in EU 
policy discourses, the changing nature of policy instruments, and the interactions of major 
forces at work in the normative dimension of EU-China relations. To that end, a 
chronological approach allows me to focus the trends and changing nature of EU foreign 
policy rhetoric and practice, both in general and towards China. As a result, I have reached 
conclusions both regarding the EU’s interaction with China on human rights, and to a 
lesser extent, the evolution of a value-based identity in EU foreign policy.  
 
First, when the EU’s human rights policy on China was based on open criticisms and 
coercive measures in the first historical phase (1989-1997), the response was often 
cosmetic change or diplomatic tactics. As the EU’s economic interdependence deepened, 
its collective efforts in holding China accountable at international fora was eventually 
undermined by the lack of progress and the competing interests of national governments. 
Whereas in the second historical phase (1998-2009), not only did the EU’s international 
identity in the field of human rights become more pronounced, its policy strategy towards 
China also showed a clear inclination towards seeking partnership based on persuasion, 
argumentation, engagement and cooperation. To that end, I argue that this change in policy 
strategy is both instrumental and normative, and economic interests and normative 
concerns do not necessarily have to be in conflict with each other. Secondly, I have shown 
that, on the rhetorical level, the EU has been successful in rendering human rights as part 
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of its own political identity and self-image. However, in practice, promoting human rights 
through engagement can be problematic and ineffective because of the inherent tension 
between engaging with China and standing for its own principles.  
 
In the second section, I have aimed to link the contemporary Chinese official discourse on 
the EU’s emerging international role including the ‘European model’, to the role of human 
rights in Chinese foreign policy.  I have contextualised the EU’s promotion of human rights 
against the backdrop of the EU’s interaction with China on human rights, in such a way as 
to demonstrate its pertinence to the notion of NPE. The summary of Chinese official 
discourses has shown that the Chinese official views of the EU’s role are largely rooted in 
Chinese hopes for how international order should develop. However, there is a lack of 
shared values and a very different political system upon which they form their relations. 
On the issue of human rights in particular, China has established its own strategic thinking, 
tactics and pragmatic approach to respond to international human rights pressure. 
Especially in the post-colonial context, sometimes the source of antagonism from China 
has not been the substance or arguments on universal human rights, but rather the former 
European imperialist powers are advancing it. Moreover, the EU-China dichotomies on 
univeralist and relativist paradigms and China’s developmentalist view have set their 
understanding of human rights further apart. To that end, it remains to be seen whether the 
EU’s normative approach to promoting human rights based on persuasion and engagement 
would harmonise their divergence or simply provide a platform through which they would 
keep on talking past each other. 
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Chapter Four 
 
Abolition of the Death Penalty 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Given that the number of executions is more than the rest of the world combined, and the 
scope of crimes that are subjected to this punishment, China stands out as an exception in 
the global abolitionist movement (AI 1989, 2007, 2009).  The EU, on the other hand, has 
been a ‘living example’ in this global campaign and a champion of human rights by 
sponsoring the UN moratorium on the death penalty and systematically issuing 
declarations, including towards its major partners such as the US. In the EU’s interaction 
with China, the death penalty has been one of the central themes and top priorities on the 
EU’s human rights agenda. The scope of EU concern regarding the use of the death penalty 
encompasses China’s criminal procedure law, the process of court review and individual 
cases to which the EU has endeavoured to commit its resources and diplomatic 
intervention. Therefore, given the EU’s impressive record in developing a common 
approach on this issue, it is not surprising that the death penalty has been the first and 
perhaps the most successful empirical case to confirm the notion of NPE (Manners 2002, 
Lerch and Schwellnus 2006).  
 
To add to the current state of research, this chapter adopts the NPE perspective for China in 
the area of the death penalty so as to illuminate the nuances in its application on a country 
specific case-study. To that end, the main hypothesis of this chapter is that the EU can be 
conceptualised as a normative power towards China on the issue of the death penalty. The 
focus of this chapter is not the conflicts in the death penalty stance between the EU and 
China, but a reflection upon how the EU pursues its international role by extending a 
European norm to the international system, driven by its cultural heritage, moral 
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consciousness and principle of universal human rights, and how the normative system it 
represents influences a significant Other - China.   
 
Empirical evidence is presented in the form of an NPE tripartite framework developed in 
Chapter Two. Each section contains evidence and citations from legal studies and policy 
documentation that are analysed through an NPE perspective. The logic of the structural 
sequence depends on the NPE conceptual model with each section revealing one part of the 
theoretical arguments being made in the tri-partite analytical framework.
105
 In an attempt to 
verify the NPE hypotheses, this approach contains elements of description, causality and 
interpretation. The descriptive component stems from the empirical evidence based on 
primary data from EU and Chinese official documents, journalistic articles, NGO reports, 
as well as secondary data on current legal studies by EU and Chinese scholars, citations 
and references to the EU, China and international law regarding abolition of the death 
penalty. In order to evaluate policy coherence and consistency, and identify normative 
impact, this chapter uses causal arguments to some degree, in such a way as to measure the 
gaps between the EU’s abolitionist stance and the actual principles underlying its policy 
action/inaction, and between EU policy objectives and the actual impact on the ground. To 
that end, it is important to tap into Chinese official, academic and public discourse to 
identify any ideational impact of EU normative power on China’s death penalty practice.  
 
In so doing, this chapter first asks to what extent the abolition of the death penalty should 
be regarded as an international human rights norm. It is followed by a summary of Chinese 
history, law and practice on this issue. Then, it proceeds to apply the tripartite NPE 
framework to the issue of the death penalty in EU-China relations. This analysis requires 
looking at how the EU’s identity, policy action and external impact shape one another, at 
the same time, applying normative ethics and critiques across all three stages.  
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This analytical framework implies a comparative structure as it repeats itself for the second time in the 
next case-study. A comparative analysis drawn from both case studies will be the focus of the concluding 
chapter.  
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4.1 Abolition of the Death Penalty: an International Human Rights 
Norm 
In the international human rights community, it is widely believed that the death penalty is 
an issue of human rights, and the global movement for its abolition has been part of the 
international campaign for human rights (AI 2007:2). However, in the interdisciplinary 
field of the death penalty studies, not everyone regards the ‘human rights’ approach 
towards the death penalty as valid, especially outside Europe and the European dominion 
(Sarat and Boulanger 2005, Cho 2004). In most Asian countries, for instance, capital 
punishment is said to be sanctioned by deeply embedded cultural norms or ‘mindsets’ 
(Hood and Hoyle 2008: 7). Apart from countries in Asia, Africa or the Middle East which 
share certain political and cultural heritages, the USA, stands alone as the only democratic 
and economically developed country without fully embracing the abolitionist stance (Hood 
2001: 334).   
 
This section provides an overview of the extent to which the abolitionist movement of the 
death penalty has been established as an international norm. It sets the international 
background for the NPE analysis by asking the normative question as to why we should 
consider the abolition of the death penalty an international norm, as well as the 
positivist/legal question of what a human rights approach to capital punishment actually 
entails.  
 
The purpose of this section is justified in three-fold. Firstly, a summary of the international 
legal basis for the abolition of the death penalty provides us an external reference point for 
normative justification of NPE. For Manners (2008: 46), EU principles are generally 
grounded in the UN system and international human rights law, hence they are universal. 
In line with his normative position, this section sets out to avoid the danger of an 
imperialistic and Eurocentric view on ‘what is subjectively considered “good” on the 
grounds of its presumed universality’ (Tocci 2008:4) by clarifying the legitimacy basis for 
the abolition of the death penalty. Secondly, through a close examination of the key 
international legal basis and human rights instruments with regard to the death penalty, we 
would be able to see how the vagueness of certain legal formation allows retentionist 
countries, such as China, to justify their death penalty practices by developing their own 
interpretations of these legal terms. Thirdly, by clarifying what international treaties China 
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has subscribed itself to, it paves the way for subsequent analysis of the NPE, in which the 
effects of European influence on China’s death penalty stance need to be separated from 
those of the UN.    
  
4.1.1   A Normative View on the Abolition of the Death Penalty   
  
“Every person shall have the right to life. If not, the killer unwittingly achieves 
a final and perverse moral victory by making the state a killer too, thus 
reducing social abhorrence at the conscious extinction of human beings.” 
                                      ----------------------- Justice Albie Sachs
106 
 
A normative objection to the death penalty refers to the moral message it conveys – that is, 
the death penalty legitimises the behaviour of killing which the law intends to prohibit 
(Hood 2004: 4). Opposite to this view is a utilitarian argument for the death penalty based 
on the assumption of its unique deterrent effects as compared with alternative punishments 
(Hood and Hoyle 2008: 7). According to a number of important contributions documenting 
the political trend against the death penalty on an international level, it is believed that 
capital punishment is inevitably accompanied by unnecessary cruelty, arbitrary judgements, 
class or racial bias (Hood 2002, Hood and Hoyle 2008; Schabas 1997, 2003; Hodgkinson 
and Rutherford 1996). A normative view considers such unavoidable consequences of 
capital punishment as undermining the authenticity and moral weight of the entire legal 
system (Hood 2004: 14).  
 
In 1959, when the General Assembly adopted a resolution calling upon the Economic and 
Social Council to undertake a study of capital punishment in law and practice in different 
countries, one important conclusion was that the abolition of capital punishment would not 
cause a rise in crime.
107
 According to AI reports (1989, 2007), evidence does not suggest 
that capital punishment has any distinctive or convincing deterrence effect, instead, it 
should be considered as a form of state violence. In China, due to the political sensitivity of 
the subject, Lu and Miethe (2007: 23-25) notice that little empirical research on the 
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South Africa, case No. CCT/3/94, delivered on 6 June 1995.  
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 See Capital Punishment, presented by the French jurist Marc Ancel, UN Doc. ST/SOA/SD/9, Sales No. 
62. IV.2. and a complementary report in 1967 by Norval Morris, Capital Punishment: Developments, 1961-
1965, Sales No. E.67.IV.15.  
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deterrent and educative effects of the death penalty has been done, and the death penalty 
discourse is often driven by political or ideological considerations rather than empirical 
evidence.  In this case study, I adopt normative arguments for the abolition; therefore, 
reject the validity of a utilitarian point of view, due to the failure on the empirical ground.  
 
There are at least two reasons as to why a normative view of the abolitionist position is 
particularly salient for this case study. First of all, it resonates with the normative quality of 
the NPE concept regarding ‘why the EU should extend its norms in the international 
system’ (Manners 2002: 252). Secondly, if international law has no immediate influence on 
China’s death penalty rhetoric and practice, it is the normative arguments that can be 
strengthened and persuasive in the long term. This is evidenced by an emerging view 
among Chinese legal experts, acknowledging abolition as a mark of a ‘civilised society’ in 
the current internationally shared normative framework.
108
 
 
4.1.2   A Human Rights Approach to the Death Penalty 
While the basic arguments within the study of the death penalty – moral or utilitarian – 
have remained essentially the same since the 1980s, the nature of the debate has moved on 
towards a greater prominence of the human rights approach to the subject matter (Hood 
2002, Hood and Hoyle 2008). In the study of international law, Schabas (2002) suggests 
that we have witnessed the move from the proclamation of a principle to its regulation, and 
from regulation to its abolition. By principle, Schabas (1996, 2002) points to two 
fundamental human rights principles that are central to the death penalty debate: the right 
to life, and the protection against cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment.  
 
In this context, Hood and Hoyle (2008: 7) define the ‘human rights’ perspective as a belief 
that ‘the death penalty is a fundamental violation of the human right to life’, which is, in 
essence, ‘an extreme form of cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment.’ For Manners 
(2008: 37), if normative power seeks to achieve an international system based on norms, 
others need to be convinced of their universality. To that end, I consider a human rights 
perspective to the abolitionist norm as providing a legitimacy basis for normative power 
because of its universal nature as an institutionalised human rights norm. Therefore, a 
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China Daily, ‘China Questions Death Penalty’, Xinhua News Agency, 27, January, 2005. Reporting on an 
academic conference ‘International Symposium on the Death Penalty’ hold on 27 December 2004 which 
provoked the first public debate on whether China should abolish capital punishment. 
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human rights perspective based on the fundamental principles of ‘the right to life’ and ‘the 
protection against cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment’ is central to the normative 
justification of NPE.  
 
4.1.3 International Legal Context 
I begin by examining how normative principles with regard to the death penalty are 
enshrined in the highest level of international law, and present a paralleled development 
between Europe and China regarding the legal consequences and normative implications of 
international law in their respective domestic law and penal systems. A general 
chronological approach is established in order to highlight the progressive evolution of the 
abolitionist norm.  
4.1.3.1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
Today many abolitionists claim that the death penalty violates the fundamental right to life, 
which is laid down in Article 3 of the UDHR of 10 December 1948 (AI 1989, 2007; Hood 
2001: 331): 
‘Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person’. 
Although this brief rule is considered as a basic declaration of support for the right to life, 
no mention is made of the death penalty (Schabas 2002: 13). Moreover, the UDHR is not 
legally binding upon member states of the United Nations; instead it was intended as a 
general formulation of principles that serves as an authoritative interpretation of the 
Charter of the United Nations. As a result, ‘the right to life’ was not a binding legal norm 
according to this first international human rights document (Franck and Schabas 2003: 53-
54; Schabas: 2002: 13).  
 
Due to the vague language and non-binding nature of the UDHR, China’s membership of 
the UN General Assembly since 21 September 1971 has not led to an official view that the 
death penalty violates this human right. In the post 1989 period, China was confronted with 
fierce and unprecedented international criticism of its human rights record, thus the 
standard approach was to argue that all international critics were interfering in China’s 
domestic affairs. As a result, China, much like the Soviet Union earlier, tried to make use 
of selected parts of the UN Charter and the UDHR in order to defend its position that 
Chapter Four 
 
89 
 
human rights is a domestic issue (Svensson 2002: 265). It was not until 2004 that the 
concept of human rights has been added to the Chinese Constitution in which ‘the state 
respects and safeguards human rights’, and the legitimate basis of its human rights 
discourse maintains a relativist argument based on China’s historical and cultural 
particularity without making any reference to the UNHR.
109
 With regard to the death 
penalty, Schabas (2009: 9) argues that China accepts the accountability of the UDHR for 
the conduct of capital punishment, therefore what China implicitly acknowledges is that 
the UDHR governs death penalty practices, not the abolition. 
 
By contrast, the interpretation that the death penalty violates the right to life proclaimed by 
the UDHR would have lacked political vigour, had it not been adopted and reinforced by 
the Council of Europe and then the EU (Hood and Hoyle 2008: 22). Only two years after 
the UDHR, the Council of Europe adopted the European Convention of Human Rights 
(ECHR) which recognises the right to life, in 1950.
110 
In post-war Europe, when war 
crimes trials were still fresh in the collective memory, this provision was considered 
incredibly ‘anachronistic’ at the time (Hodgkinson and Rutherford 1996: 19).  
 
4.1.3.2   The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 
2
nd
 Optional Protocol  
It was not until 1966 that the United Nations gave the protection of human rights a legally 
binding formula through the drafting of the ICCPR and the ICESCR, both are based on the 
normative framework provided by the UDHR (Schabas 1996b: 19). As a result, the vague 
formulation of the right to life in the UDHR is replaced with detailed rules in the ICCPR 
(Franck and Schabas 2003: 55). For instance, Article 6 stipulates that: 
‘In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, death sentence 
may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law 
in force at the time […].’  
However, the ICCPR does not offer a definition or legal specification on what is meant by 
                                                          
109Official media report on the Second Session of the Tenth National People’s Congress (NPC), ‘Inclusion of 
human rights in Constitution marks a milestone’, Xinhua News, 14 March 2004. 
110 Article 2 of the Convention states that ‘save in the execution of a sentence of a court following this 
conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law’. Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedom (1995) 213 U.N.T.S.221.E.T.S.5.  
Chapter Four 
 
90 
 
‘serious crimes’ (Franck and Schabas 2003: 56). It simply conveys that the death penalty is 
an exceptional punishment not an ordinary sanction, hence allows exceptions from the 
fundamental right to life to exist, depending on the individual country’s interpretation of 
‘serious crimes’ (Frank and Schabas2003: 56). 
 
In 1989, an important step in the UN’s effort on the death penalty practice was the making 
of an additional protocol to the ICCPR aimed at abolishing capital punishment in 
peacetime. What is known as the Second Optional Protocol prohibits executions within the 
jurisdiction of States, and specifies that States undertake all necessary action to abolish 
capital punishment, with the only exception in the case of very serious crimes of a military 
nature committed in wartime (Franck and Schabas 2003: 59).   
  
In the ICCPR, the right to life is much more clearly defined, with certain limitations put on 
the use of the death penalty, especially regarding the restrictions on death penalty practice 
over non-violent crimes.
111
 For this precise reason, China has declined to ratify the ICCPR 
and had not signed the Covenant until 1998 (Schabas 2009: 11). Article 40 of China’s 
Criminal Law stipulates that: ‘the death penalty should only be applied to criminals who 
have committed extremely serious crimes…’. Although extremely similar to paragraph 1, 
Article 6 of the ICCPR, China’s Criminal Law clearly has interpreted it in a very wide 
manner (Hood and Hoyle 2008:99, Chen 2002: 1). Today, China has neither made any 
provisions in its Criminal Law to come in line with international standards and reduce the 
scope of capital punishment, nor offered further explanations regarding how ‘extremely 
serious crimes’ are defined.112 Instead, the Chinese official policy currently in use states that 
executions are applied to ‘criminals who have committed particularly serious crimes of 
extremely profound subjective evil, when social order could not be maintained if they were 
not killed’ (Hu 2000: 91-92, cited in Hood 2001: 342). When the former Head of the 
Chinese Food and Drug Administration, Zheng Xiaoyu was sentenced to death and swiftly 
executed for taking bribes linked to sub-standard medicines in 2007,
113
 the Chinese 
Communist Party’s official paper, the People’s Daily, states that: 
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See AI, Death Penalty Blog, 18 December 2006. 
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Despite the vagueness in its legal provision, the death penalty is currently applied to 68 criminal offences 
according to Chinese law, including non-violent crimes such as smuggling, counterfeiting currency, and 
bribery. See ‘China’s Death Penalty Reforms’ (2007), an HRIC Issues Brief, p. 1, Also see Chen, Zexian 
(2002), p.1 and Macbean (2008), p. 213.  
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‘The Zheng Xiaoyu case offers profound lessons that all public servants, 
especially leading officials at every level, should take to heart.’ 114 
In Europe, negotiation of human rights treaties on the use of the death penalty took 
considerably less time in the Council of Europe than in the United Nations (Hodgekinson 
and Rutherford 1996, Schabas 2002, Franck and Schabas 2003). On 28 April 1983, the 
Council of Europe took a step forward by adopting Protocol No. 6 to the ECHR 
specifically concerning the death penalty. 
115
 By 1989, the European Court of Human 
Rights observed that capital punishment has been abolished de facto in its contracting 
member states of the ECHR. On 25 February 2000, the EU issued its Memorandum on the 
Death Penalty in which it stresses the death penalty as ‘being a denial of human dignity’.116  
 
The European Parliament passed a resolution on 12 March 1992, in which it urged 
European Union member states to ratify the Second Optional Protocol without delay.117 As 
of today, all states of the European Union have ratified the Second Optional Protocol 
(Franck and Schabas 2003: 59). In contrast to retentionist countries, such as China and the 
United States who maintain that there is no global consensus that the death penalty should 
be abolished, 
118
 the Council of Europe and the European Union have clearly taken a 
universalist human rights language and moral authority that are willing to accept the 
premise that the death penalty is a fundamental denial of their humanity and right to life 
(Yorke 2008: 45).  
 
4.1.3.3 A Disputed Norm?  
According to an Amnesty International report (2010: 28), more than two-thirds of the 
nations around the world had abolished capital punishment in law or practice by the end of 
2009. It also shows that between 1999 and 2009, in average, over three countries a year 
have outlawed capital punishment for ordinary offences, and/or for all offences.
119 
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AI Report, Death Penalty Development in 2005, p. 15. According to this report, 66 countries had refrained 
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Despite the impressive progress that so many countries had abolished capital punishment 
owing to domestic developments, diplomacy, or participation in regional and international 
agreements, it is still far from becoming a well-established international human rights 
norm (Hood and Hoyle 2008: 32). Schabas (2002: 11) also notices that, notwithstanding 
the international abolitionist trend and the progressive development of legal norms, 
abolition of the death penalty has not yet become a customary norm in international law.   
 
Therefore, that the right to life in international law protects the individual against capital 
punishment allows exceptions for interpretation (Schabas 2002: 7). Consequently, major 
countries in Asia, Muslim states and North African countries, joined by two industrially 
developed countries – the United States and Japan - have shown strong resistance to the 
abolitionist movement since the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR was adopted by 
the UN General Assembly in 1989.
120
  The hostility and lack of support from these states 
had led to an initially timid stance on the direct abolition by the UN, whose primary focus 
has been on improving legal safeguards for those at risk of being sentenced to death, and 
limiting the scope of the death penalty (Franck and Schabas 2003: 53). Nevertheless, 
countries who defy that the death penalty violates international human rights are becoming 
the minority (AI 2008b, 2009). Thus, the progress of the international movement towards 
abolition is considered a definitive advancement in development which fewer countries 
attempt to block or delay (Hood and Hoyle 2008: 35). 
 
The purpose of this section is not intended to demonstrate that the death penalty should not 
be considered as violating the right to life in the case of China, but rather, to highlight the 
different interpretations of the fundamental norms that lay the basis for the abolitionist 
movement, which seems to be largely ignored in the existing NPE literature. This chapter 
therefore starts with the observation that despite its enhanced legal status in international 
human rights law, the normative justification of the abolitionist norm is implicit and 
contested. Moreover, this section illustrates that China remains under no legal obligation to 
comment on its domestic situation on the death penalty practice today, as it has never 
ratified any international treaty concerning this practice. Through this investigation, we can 
at least establish that if China has made progress in relation to the death penalty, either in 
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 Ibid. In 1989 at the UN General Assembly, 59 countries voted in favour and 48 abstained, 26 voted against 
the Protocol.  
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rhetoric or practice, it is unlikely the result of China’s participation in international legal 
processes.
121
 
4.2 The Death Penalty in China: Cultural, Political and Legal Aspects  
According to AI reports, China represents the most outstanding exception in the global 
abolitionist movement, both in terms of the number of executions which is more than the 
rest of the world combined, and the scope of crimes that are subjected to this extreme 
punishment (AI 1989, 2007, 2009, 2010). This section seeks to understand why this is the 
case by presenting an overview of the Chinese cultural, political and legal dispositions in 
relation to the relevant concepts and traditions in which the death penalty is embedded. To 
that end, the primary focus of this section is not the annual number of death sentences and 
executions, or legal and judicial procedures, 
122
 but the cultural and ideological 
underpinnings, political motivations and legal traditions which give an account of the 
reasons for or meanings of the use of capital punishment in contemporary Chinese society. 
By demonstrating the contradictions underlying the official justifications, it also helps us 
understand whether the European interpretation of the universality of the abolitionist norm 
holds power. The data and the interpretations presented in this section are drawn from 
Chinese official depiction of the death penalty practice, and analysed through insights from 
both Chinese and Western legal scholarship.  
 
4.2.1 Cultural Relativist Arguments 
In relation to the death penalty in EU-China human rights dialogue and legal seminars, a 
central place has been given to the debate on cultural heritage versus universal human 
rights (Schabas 2009, Kjaerum 2000). From a broader perspective, East Asian countries 
have been among the most vocal at the United Nations in opposing resolutions against the 
use of the death penalty by claiming cultural exceptionalism.
123
 Cho suggests that Asian 
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See Rosemary Foot (2000), Right Beyond Borders, in which she demonstrates China’s compliance to 
international law has been instrumental rather than constructive. Kent (2001) also observes that bilateral 
monitoring of human rights by members of the international community, provided at most ‘temporary, 
superficial and instrumental change’, and did not lead to deep rooted internalisation of human rights norms 
evidenced by ‘continued excessive use of the death penalty’ and other human rights violation. 
122 Amnesty International’s Death Penalty Logs may provide the closest estimate of these statistics, however, 
these counts are generated from Chinese media reports, which at best constitutes a snapshot of selective 
aspects of the death penalty in practice in China (Lu and Miethe 2007:3).  
123 
Amnesty International, Asian Office, available at:  
http://asiapacific.amnesty.org/apro/aproweb.nsf/pages/asian_values. [accessed 12 Jan. 2011]  
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societies have a different conception of the right to life, and a major component of the 
‘Asian values’ arguments in China is Confucianism, which prioritizes justice and 
retribution (Cho 2004, cited in Hood and Hoyle 2008: 102-3).  
 
One of the most persistent arguments put forwards by China in bilateral or international 
forums is that there is no real international consensus that the death penalty is a human 
rights violation, and the global abolitionist movement is largely lead by European powers 
to press their own agenda on other countries amounting to a sort of cultural imperialism or 
disrespect for other regions and country with regard to their history and culture (Ho 2005: 
278-279, Hood and Hoyle 2008: 102).
124
 Mr. Gan Yisheng, the spokesman for the Central 
Commission for Disciplinary Inspection of the Communist Party, the Chinese Central 
Committee, stated at a press conference on 2 August 2007 that:   
‘Different countries have different circumstances and have different cultural 
background and views on the death penalty. …The fact that China keeps the 
death penalty is due to its national conditions and cultural background. There 
is nothing to be criticized’.125 
Ho’s (2005) extensive survey on Chinese views on capital punishment reveals public 
reluctance to express an opinion and a general confidence in the death penalty as an 
efficacious deterrent against crime. He observes that: 
 ‘Since China has a long history of capital punishment and an old popular 
belief in divine retributive justice, there is neither sound reason nor imminent 
need to uproot this aspect of Chinese cultural tradition’ (Ho 2005: 284). 
BBC correspondent Holly Williams also notices that ‘even the most sophisticated urbanites 
would shrink from the idea of abolishing capital punishment altogether’, and according to 
one of her Chinese interviewees: ‘there is a Chinese saying that you should kill the chicken 
to scare the monkeys (sha ji jin hou, 杀鸡儆猴)…. We need that threat to be there, it is part 
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 See General Assembly GA/10678, 18 December 2007, ‘General Assembly Adopts landmark Text Calling 
for Moratorium on Death Penalty’, available at http://un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/ga10678.doc.htm. 
[accessed 12 Jan. 2011] Also see Hood and Hoyle 2008, pp.32-35 
125 
China View News, ‘Official: China “prudent” in using death penalty to punish economic crimes’, Xinhua 
News Agency, 2 August 2007. 
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of our culture.’126  
 
On the surface, the traditional value of ‘a murderer must be put to death’ (sha ren chang 
ming, 杀人偿命) has been so deep-rooted in the long tradition of the Chinese culture that 
China’s cultural difference constitutes a major obstacle for itself to develop an abolitionist 
position (Zhang 2005a, 2005b, Qiu 2001, Palmer 1996).
127
 However, both Chinese and 
Western scholars had found the cultural relativist approach weak and problematic when it 
comes to the Chinese reality. First of all, Confucianism is considered no longer a living 
tradition in China; its influence can only be understood in certain institutional context 
(Chan 1999, Macbean 2008). With the declining influence of Marxism and Maoism, the 
rising nationalism allows the Chinese authorities to manipulate Confucian tradition for 
their own political purposes both at home and abroad (Macbean 2008: 219-222).  
 
Moreover, Chinese authorities tried to project an image that the state kills only when 
absolutely necessary, and acquire legitimacy through carrying out a punishment which is 
very widely supported by the public (Lu and Miethe 2007). However,  it is believed that 
the lack of public awareness, informed public debates and education on the concept of 
human rights have reinforced the seemingly strong public consensus in China supporting 
the use of death penalty ( Macbean 2008, Lu and Miethe 2007, Ho 2005, Zhang 2005a).  
 
Furthermore, some scholars also cite Chinese historical secular tradition, and the anti-
religious policy introduced by the Chinese Communist Party since 1949 for the lack of 
moral guidance in today’s Chinese society, particularly regarding human dignity and 
humanistic ideals (Lu and Miethe 2007, Zhang 2005a, Qiu 2001).  
 
Finally, from a normative point of view, even if cultural factors have contributed to China’s 
pro-death penalty policy and public opinion; they cannot justify the secrecy of execution 
statistics held by the Chinese authorities and the extensive use of the death penalty for non-
violent crimes (Hood 2009).  
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BBC News, ‘China Executions “part of culture”’, 6 July, 2001 
127 A recent research survey as part of an EIDHR project entitled ‘Moving the Debate Forwards: China’s Use 
of the Death Penalty 2007-9’ also threw light on the so-called ‘prevalent myth’ that Chinese culture 
demands a ‘life for a life’. See Hood (2009) ‘Introduction’, Research Survey on the Death Penalty in China 
2007-9, p.4 
Chapter Four 
 
96 
 
4.2.2 Political Aspects     
 It is believed that the death penalty has been an instrument for the maintenance of state 
control, which has been a central feature in the criminal justice process of the People’s 
Republic of China (Palmer 1996: 105). Especially during the period of rapid economic 
growth in the post-Mao China, an increasingly draconian criminal justice system remains 
essential for the Chinese Communist Party to maintain control, preserve social order and 
ensure political stability (Lu and Miethe 2007, Ho 2005, Palmer 1996). In this respect, I 
discuss the role of ideological and political imperatives in China’s heavy reliance on the 
death penalty.  
 
4.2.2.1 Ideological Underpinnings 
Criminal justice in the Maoist era (1949-1976) was dominated by the political context in 
which the excessive use of capital punishment to eradicate ‘class’ enemies was a political 
necessity to construct a socialist legal system (Zhang 2005a: 4). The government declared 
that capital punishment should be ‘applied to those counterrevolutionaries whose crimes 
were persistently hostile to the people, and who adamantly refused to repent and reform’ 
(Cohen 1968: 536).  During these years, Chinese official policy on the death penalty was in 
some way similar to that put forward by the Soviet Union. While capital punishment was, 
in principle, incompatible with socialist ideals which advocate equal access to life chances, 
it was justified as an ‘exceptional measure of punishment which is temporarily applied 
pending its complete abolition’(Macbean 2008: 208).  
 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, in contrast to the experience of a number of other 
socialist regimes, China has retained the proletariat dictatorship (ren min min zhu zhuan 
zheng 人民民主专政) in the post Cold War era. When the popular commitment to socialist 
ideals has faded away, the Chinese Communist Party had to claim its legitimacy through 
enhancing material rewards and reinforce a coercive system of criminal justice (Palmer 
1996: 123).  
 
4.2.2.2 The Legacy of Maoist China 
Maoist China, especially during the Cultural Revolution (1967-1976) left a legacy of 
arbitrary arrest, detention and torture, extrajudicial executions and the abolition of most 
legal institutions (Chu 2000). During the Deng Xiaoping era, the Chinese Communist Party 
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claimed a shift in policy from the lawless Cultural Revolution to ‘rule by law’. This policy 
has laid the foundation for China’s unprecedented progress in law making when many laws 
including the current Constitution, Organization Law, Criminal Law and Criminal 
Procedure Law were drafted and passed (Chu 2000). Nevertheless, these laws inherited the 
political and ideological overtone of the Maoist era. For instance, in consistency with 
Maoist principles, the Constitution emphasises on the ‘proletariat dictatorship’, and the 
criminal law stipulates a number of anti-revolutionary crimes. (Lu and Miethe 2007: 17) 
Furthermore, while economic reforms have had a dramatic impact on the societal structure 
in China, a series of ‘strike hard’ campaigns (yanda, 严打) have been  introduced since 
1983 in response to a perception of growing social disorder and public anxiety about a 
string of high profile crimes (Tanner 2000: 94). These campaigns reintroduced the Maoist 
tactics of popular mobilisation and had reportedly led to a sharp increase in use of the 
death penalty.
128
 
 
Since Mao’s death, China has remained a one-party state with the Communist Party 
dominating the political landscape. On the one hand, Deng and his successor Jiang had 
ensured the Party’s leadership over governmental and economic affairs. On the other hand, 
after experiencing the lawless and turbulent period of the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese 
political elites became increasingly aware of the prospect of stability brought by rule of 
law.
129
 Thus, the challenge for the Chinese leadership was the balance between social 
stability and economic growth, both of which were essential for its political survival (Lu 
and Miethe 2007: 15).  
 
4.2.3   Legal Dimension of the Death Penalty 
China’s practice of the death penalty as part of Chinese legal tradition is grounded in the 
                                                          
128 
Due to the lack of official data, it is impossible for monitors such as the AI or Duihua Foundation to 
provide a definitive picture of ‘strike hard’ campaign in China. To have an idea of the scale of its 
application, according the EU’s Annual Report on Human Rights (2002:88), a large number of executions 
took place around the world in 2001, with the highest annual figure since 1996. AI attributes the dramatic 
increase to China’s “strike hard” campaign against crime and corruption during which the use of capital 
punishment intensified. AI estimates that during that year, at least 3048 people were executed in 31 
countries, 90 per cent of which were carried out in China, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the USA. Also see Tanner 
(2000), ‘State Coercion and the Balance of Awe: the 1983-1986 “Stern Blows” Anti-Crime Campaign’, The 
China Journal 44.  
129 Qiu Xinjiu, ‘Yanda de xingshi zhengce fenxi’ (An analysis of the “Strike Hard” criminal policy), in Fazhi 
de shiming, pp.197-205, quoted in English translation in Zhang Ning (2005b) ‘The Debate over the Death 
Penalty in Today’s China’.p.8 
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state’s collectivist responsibility system since ancient times and strengthened by the earlier 
period of socialist China (1949-1978), both of which share a culture of collectivism, and 
intolerance of deviance and crime (Lu and Miethe 2007: 22). This section attempts to 
reveal the extent to which the rule of law in China is understood differently in comparison 
to the conception adopted in Western liberal democracies.  
 
4.2.3.1 The Rule of Law in Contemporary China 
Since Mao’s death in 1976, China has undertaken a series of significant economic, political 
and legal reforms. Deng placed the need to develop democracy and consolidate the system 
of “rule by law” (yi fa zhi guo,以法治国) as the central principles of the Communist Party. 
Deng’s successor Jiang brought in the idea of ‘rule of law’ (yi fa zhi guo,依法治国) in 
which he acknowledged the lack of a formal tradition within the new legal system and the 
formation of citizen’s legal consciousness, and further stressed that the state and political 
officials must lead by example, and advocate the importance of law and disseminating 
legal knowledge to ordinary citizens.
130
 
 
According to Peerenboom (2004), the drive to implement rule of law responds to the 
leaders’ desire for legitimacy both at home and abroad. It mandates that the government be 
held accountable for its actions, as well as people’s demands for greater protection of their 
rights and interests as economic reforms progressed drastically (Peerenboom 2004: 115). 
In theory, establishing rule of law requires the policies of the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) to be translated into law and become legally binding. In practice, the Party often 
acts at odds to, or in the absence, of a clear legal basis (Peerenboom 2004:116). For the 
CCP, a primary challenge to introduce rule of law is to define more clearly what an 
acceptable role the Party should play, in order to be consistent with general requirements of 
a thin rule of law (Macbean 2008: 211).
131
 
 
                                                          
130 People’s Daily, ‘The Second Lecture on Law Held by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist 
Party’, 21 January 1995. Also see Jiang, Zemin (1992) ‘Intensifying the Reform and Open-door Policy’, 
Action Guide for the Twenty-First Century, Beijing: Xinhua Press, p.26. For further analysis of Deng and 
Jiang’s policies, see Lu and Miethe (2007: 19) and Peerenboom (1999) 
131 According Macbean (2008: 211), the state’s ‘thin’ concept of law refers to being scientific and rational 
without layers of meaning building a richer, more moral and ethical framework for judging state actions. He 
argued that it is difficult for the government to openly context the ‘thicker’ rule of law concept without 
undermining its rhetorical commitment to law and the development of a ‘harmonious’ society. 
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Despite the Chinese leadership’s reform efforts to strengthen law, law enforcement and 
legal consciousness, the structural problems in judicial independence, procedural fairness, 
system of law educational qualifications of judges and prosecutors have severely hindered 
the reform progress (Lu and Miethe 2007: 20-21; Peerenboom 2004: 116). These structural 
problems are said to be deeply rooted in the Chinese cultural legacy of collectivism and 
‘rule of man’ (ren zhi, 人治). They are often understood from the continuation of a cultural 
relativist view, in which both the Chinese leadership and its people have historically shown 
a strong desire for peace and stability, and being particularly fearful of disorder and chaos 
(Lu and Miethe 2007: 23).    
 
4.2.3.2 Crime Deterrence 
A belief in the deterrent effect of the death penalty has deep roots in China. For instance, 
‘kill the chicken to scare the monkeys’ (sha ji jin hou, 杀鸡儆猴) is a popular traditional 
saying. Ho’s (2005) interviews and surveys show that the Chinese public almost 
unanimously share their government’s belief in the social utility of capital punishment and 
in its deterrent effect. 
 
Although the Chinese authorities often cited the crime deterrence effect and its popular 
support as justifications for the death penalty practice, the Supreme People’s Court has 
never released any detailed statistics and considers them a State secret (HRIC 2004: 39).  
Therefore, the crime deterrence justification may contradict China’s secretive policy action. 
If the Chinese authorities indeed believed that the death penalty deterred serious crime and 
is mandated by public opinion, it should not have kept its statistics and scope of application 
confidential, as publicity ought to be desirable in this case (Schabas 2009: 8; AI 2009). For 
Wang Shizhou, an outspoken Professor of Law from mainland China, the reason for the 
Chinese statistics on its death penalty practice to be treated as state secret is that the figure 
would be simply too high.
132     
       
                               
4.2.4 Death Penalty with Chinese Characteristics? 
This section demonstrates that China’s use of the death penalty is largely influenced if not 
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The article is originally published in Xinhua Digest, No. 15 (2004), but it can only be accessed outside of 
mainland China at the website of the Chinese University of Hong Kong: 
http://www.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/wk_wzdetails.asp?id=3400. [accessed 16 Jan.2011] 
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determined by its historical secular tradition, the legacy of communist practice and legal 
tradition. It also clarifies the contradictions manifested in the CCP’s policy and 
justifications on the use of capital punishment. These contradictions, between the adoption 
of a cultural relativist approach and destruction of its own traditional cultures and values; 
between the reform-spirited jurisprudential proposals and intensified coercive ‘strike hard’ 
campaigns; and between legal theory and reality, have all revealed the fragility and 
instrumental nature of Chinese law (Lu and Miethe 2007: 19-22; Zhang 2005a: 4).  
  
At the time when the EU embarked on the global abolitionist campaign against the death 
penalty in 1998, the official rhetoric and limited scholarly debates were still very much 
centred around the theme of ‘Death Penalty with Chinese Characteristics’ (juyou zhongguo 
tese de sixing zhidu, 具有中国特色的死刑制度 ). 133  As a collective effort, Chinese 
academics and officialdom often denied the global abolitionist trend using deceptive 
statistics and facts, and justified China’s choices as ‘good for the well-being of the people’, 
hence lawful, justifiable and cosmopolitan (Ho 2005: 280-285). Ho (2005: 285) also 
notices the prevailing inaccuracy in these historical narratives at the time, however, he 
acknowledges the imprint of many Chinese traditional legal norms and values on the 
redistributive justice system and the overwhelming popular support. 
 
Many believe that it is unlikely for China to cast off its tradition and ideological 
commitment to capital punishment easily (Lu and Miethe 2007: 16; Palmer 1966: 131).
134
 
Nevertheless, there has been a noticeable change in attitude since the end of 1990s, 
evidenced by China’s readiness to discuss the issue of the death penalty with the EU and 
other Western abolitionist countries over official human rights dialogues and seminars. 
Furthermore, the possible exemption of all economic crimes from the use of the death 
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 In the 1990s, leading Chinese legal experts such as Guo (1998), Hu (1995) and Li and Shen (1992), Zhao 
et  al(1992) and Gao et al (1994) have published extensively on justifications of the death penalty based on 
cultural relativist and crime deterrence accounts. Zhao and Hu have been regular participants of EU-China 
human rights dialogue and legal seminars, their recent publication has indicated their arguments for the 
death penalty have changed towards pro-abolition, but with reservations concerning China’s current 
political and economic situation.  
134 
As an independent scholar, Li Shulun studied the characteristics of the Chinese law across different 
political systems and eras, and concluded that the Chinese law had historically emphasised ‘the state, 
instead of the society; authority, instead of rights; the rule of man, instead of the rule of law; concentration 
of power, instead of separation of power; collectivism, instead of individualism; substantive issues, instead 
of separation of power; substantive issues, instead of procedural issues.’ 
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penalty has now been openly discussed in legal and academic circles,
135 
and the official 
media have also joined the debates on possible reforms.
136
 
 
This section aims to show that despite the powerful arguments based on cultural relativism 
and crime deterrence, abolition as an international norm is not impossible to be realised in 
China. Through discussing the Chinese cultural, political and legal context on the use of 
the death penalty and the inherent contradictions in the official justifications, I intend to 
demonstrate that the normative justification of the abolitionist norm as far as China is 
concerned. To that end, I argue that China’s recent rhetoric change should be considered 
the sign of the Chinese ‘perceived legitimacy’ of the universal abolitionist norm, upon 
which the normative justification of NPE is based throughout this case study.  
 
Moreover, one has to bear in mind that China is a single-party socialist country, in which 
the role of the Party as the leading party is very different from those in liberal democratic 
rule of law states. China’s communitarian if not neo-authoritarian understanding of rights 
attaches greater importance to collective rights rather than the civil and political rights of 
individuals. The Chinese Communist Party has been successful in constructing a discourse 
using Chinese culture and the threat of cultural imperialism, to prevent other countries 
from interfering with its internal affairs (Peerenboom 2004: 123). Therefore, making 
reference to Western liberal understanding of universal human rights might only lead to 
‘temporary, superficial and instrumental change’ (Kent 2001: 143). Furthermore, China 
often points to the United States – a major advocate of democratic values and political 
freedom - to support its view that the death penalty does not violate human rights (Hood 
and Hoyle 2008: 35). To that end, I intend to argue that invoking the normative or 
humanistic aspect of the abolition in China might be potentially more persuasive and lead 
to more deep-rooted internalisation in the long term than rights arguments.  
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A collection of essays by leading legal experts, as a signifier of the final abolitionist gold was published in 
2004, edited by the former retentionist scholar Zhao Bing zhi (ed.), The Road of the Abolition of the Death 
Penalty in China, Regarding the Abolition of the Non-Violent Crime at the Present Stage, Remin University 
of China, Series of Criminal Jurisprudence (44). For a comparison to Zhao’s earlier view on the death 
penalty, see Zhao (1992)  
136 
China Daily, 16 December 2004, ‘Revision of Death Penalty System Urged’; 27 January 2005, ‘China 
Questions Death Penalty’, reporting on a high-profile academic event ‘the International Symposium on the 
Death Penalty’ at Xiangtan, Human province.  
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4.3 EU Normative Power against the Death Penalty in China 
To demonstrate that the EU is a normative power towards China through the death penalty 
case, I aim to establish a systemic linkage between the NPE framework and the EU’s 
promotion of the abolition of the death penalty in China. The empirical data are analysed 
through a tripartite framework, each stage deals with the way in which this principled idea 
is constructed, the mechanism through which normative power is diffused, and any 
normative impact in China is identified and judged.  
 
The interpretivist approach seeks to provide not only causal explanations of events, but 
also to give an account of the reasons for or meanings of action (Goldstein and Keohane 
1993: 228). In so doing, this tripartite analytical approach provides a set of procedures for 
discovering answers to research hypotheses generated from the NPE concept.  
 
4.3.1 Normative Principle 
The EU normative principle on the death penalty is based on a commitment to complete 
abolition in order to enhance human dignity and promote human rights within the EU, and 
through its diplomatic initiatives.
137 
The European Parliament adopted a 1994 resolution 
issued by the Council of Europe, stating:  
 ‘The death penalty has no legitimate place in the penal systems of modern 
civilised societies, and its application may well be compared with torture and 
be seen as inhuman and degrading punishment’.138 
And has made it clear that: 
‘The European Union is opposed to the death penalty in all cases and has 
consistently espoused its universal abolition, working towards this goal.’ 
This interpretation of the death penalty rejects the argument that is justified by cultural and 
religious relativism, or the overriding power of state sovereignty (Hood and Hoyle 2008: 
25), thus conveys a principled opposition to the death penalty as a violation of fundamental 
human rights.   
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Drawn from EU Memorandum on the Death Penalty, Council of the European Union, February 25, 2000, 
Brussels, p.1; and Guidelines to EU policy towards third countries on the death penalty, Council of the 
European Union, 3 June 1998, p.1 
138 
Parliament Assembly of the Council of Europe Resolution 1044(1994), 4 October 1994. 
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This section asks how and why the abolition of capital punishment has become part of the 
aims and objectives in EU foreign policy. For Manners, the EU is a normative power 
because of its ‘sui generis’ (2006d: 174) nature, and ‘its normative identity predisposes the 
EU to act as a normative power’ (2002: 242). In this vein, I seek to illuminate the role of 
the abolitionist norm in constructing a European identity and formulating EU foreign 
policy, through looking at EU identity, interest and behaviour regarding its adherence to the 
abolitionist norm.   
 
To begin with, I ask how and why the abolition of the death penalty became a constitutive 
principle of the EU. I do so by tracing the European cultural and ideological roots which 
lay the philosophical and normative foundation for its global abolitionist campaign. Then, I 
proceed to explore the relationship between identity and interest, as well as the link 
between internal and external practices. Finally, I evaluate the extent to which the EU’s 
pursuit of the universal abolition is coherent and consistent through virtue ethics.   
 
4.3.1.1   Normative Identity 
In Manners’ case study on the death penalty (2002), he traces the agents of change that 
have shaped the EU’s abolitionist policy and the way in which it has been diffused through 
a set of norm diffusion mechanisms.  Manners (2002: 240) claims that ‘the EU’s normative 
difference comes from its historical context, hybrid policy and political-legal constitution’, 
however, he did not draw close attention to the formation of the EU’s normative difference 
in his case study, especially concerning not just legal and political dimensions but also the 
cultural and historical origins of the abolitionist movement which are especially relevant in 
both Chinese official and academic perceptions of European abolitionist stance. This 
section thus explores the relationship between European abolitionist stance and European 
identity, and asks why European penal identity has a cosmopolitan disposition.  
 
 Cultural, moral and philosophical tradition 
 
‘The authority that exercises the right to punish should always be uneasy about 
that strange power and never feel too sure about itself.’ 
                              ---------------Foucault (1981: 461, cited in Yorke 2008: 43) 
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The first movement for reform in capital punishment since Ancient times in all parts of the 
world was generated by ‘the liberal utilitarian and humanistic ideas spawned by the 
Enlightenment in Europe towards the end of the eighteenth century’ (Hood and Hoyle 
2008:9). The ‘turning point’ arrived when the Italian humanist Cesare Beccaria argued that 
if the state uses the death penalty to enforce upon its own will, it legitimises killing which 
the law seeks to prohibit, hence, the death penalty was both inhumane and 
counterproductive (Hood and Hoyle 2008: 10; Franck and Schabas 2003: 49-51).  Yorke 
(2008: 65-67) suggests that the public discourse adopted by the Council of Europe against 
capital punishment is a departure from the traditional Enlightenment philosophy which 
accepts the death penalty as part of the social contract, and the ‘conscience’ of Europe. 
Zimring (1987: 11) notices the symbolic nature of the abolition which has been expressed 
through the ‘collective consciousness’ in Western Europe. Derrida considers the European 
‘public discourse against the death penalty’ not as a specific philosophical exposition, but a 
declaration ‘through inter alia considering a “history of cruelty”, the “impure” phenomena 
of executions, and state sovereignty vis-à-vis political pressure allied by the European 
supra-national structure’. (Derrida 2004: 199,201,202, 204,212, quoted in Yoke 2008: 44) 
 
 Identify formation as political objective 
‘In the United Europe of the future, the solemn abolition of the death penalty 
ought to be the first article of the European Code we all hope for’.  
                                 ------------------Albert Camus (1957, cited in Yorke: 43) 
In the study of cultural politics of European integration, telling the stories of ‘common 
cultural heritage’ and creating a ‘European consciousness’ have proven difficult in many 
respects (Delanty 1995; Shore 2000). For Shore (2000: 26), identity formation and cultural 
building have become ‘explicit political objectives in the campaign to promote what EU 
officials call I’idée Européene or “European idea”’.  
 
Why has the abolition movement become a primary human rights concern in European 
Union policy in international relations? Why does the issue of the death penalty seem to 
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predominate over all others on European human rights foreign policy agenda? 
139
 Manners 
(2002: 251) suggests that the EU might wish to be seen as in ‘the abolitionist vanguard’ in 
such a way to project a unique international identity against retentionist states led by the 
US and China. Girling (2005: 113) adds that European narratives on the death penalty 
derive from ‘the historical inevitability of this position’ and ‘the paradox of the continuing 
practice of the death penalty by “cognate others”, i.e., the United States.’ Schmidt 
(2007:125) argues that, while the United States constructed its identity based on 
‘individual liberty and laissez-faire economics’, the EU is in the course of creating its own 
identity, largely driven by political elites.
140 
 Therefore, just like the construction of NPE 
discourse itself (Diez 2005), the abolition movement emerges as one way of distinguishing 
the European self from the American ‘Other’. 
 
However, Manners (2002: 251) suggests that the significance of the EU’s commitment to 
abolition is normative rather than instrumental, given the examples of extradition to 
countries with capital punishment, including terrorist suspects to the U.S. The European 
penal identity has a cosmopolitan disposition and ‘extends the field of relevance and 
mutuality to embrace distant others as symbolically significant’ (Tomlinson 1999: 207, 
quoted in Girling 2005: 113). As the EU’s 2002 Memorandum stated: 
‘Effectively, for the European Governments the death penalty as a means of 
State punishment rapidly revealed itself as a denial of human dignity, which is 
a fundamental basis of the common heritage of the European Union as shared 
values and principles.’141  
The German Foreign Minister Joseph Fischer spoke on behalf of the EU at UNCHR in 
1999, and described this particular European community sentiment as: 
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Chapter Four 
 
106 
 
‘….the European Union’s conviction that States whose justice system kills are 
not meeting their responsibility to set an example to society. Europeans believe 
that the death penalty cannot be justified either ethically or legally and has not 
proven to be an effective means of combating crime.’142  
It is important at this stage to distinguish the role of the EU and the Council of Europe in 
this case study. Unlike the Council of Europe, the EU did not attach great importance to the 
death penalty as a human rights concern in the past (Schabas 2009). It was only in the 
1990s when individual EU member states had abolished the death penalty, that a very 
vocal European voice had gained prominence on the world stage (Girling 2005, Zimring 
2003). While the Council of Europe has played a vital role in making abolition a norm in 
post-War Europe, it is the European Union that has taken the abolitionist movement 
internationally since the mid-1980s, through making the abolition a precondition for 
membership and sponsoring many of the United Nations proposed resolutions and 
memoranda concerning the death penalty (Manners 2002: 246; Girling 2005: 114).   
 
 Legal Dimension 
The EU’s legal encounter with the death penalty started when the European Parliament 
adopted a draft resolution on the abolition in Europe 18 June 1981, following a proposal by 
the French Rapporteur Marie-Claude Vayssade acting on behalf of the European 
Parliament’s legal committee.143 This resolution made a strong case for abolishing capital 
punishment in the European Union and urged its Member States to implement the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
144 
In 1986, the European Parliament 
further called upon its Member States to ratify Protocol No.6 to the ECHR.
 145
 After a 
series of motions and declarations issued by the Parliament, a 1992 resolution urged all 
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Member States to ratify Protocol No.6 as well as the Second Optional Protocol to the 
ICCPR.
146
 
 
The first legal instrument that provides the EU a mandate to promote abolition was the 
1997 Amsterdam Treaty which came into force on 1 May 1999. The Final Act of the treaty 
includes a number of declarations, among which a ‘Declaration on the Abolition of the 
Death Penalty’ comes the first. The Amsterdam Treaty and its declaration on capital 
punishment then became the impetus for the General Affairs Council of the European 
Union to adopt the ‘Guidelines to EU Policy towards Third Countries on the Death Penalty’ 
on 29 June 1998 (Schabas 2002: 302-309; Franck and Schabas 2003: 66-67; Hood and 
Hoyle 2008: 22-23).  
 
It is believed that these EU legal instruments on abolition are not only based upon the 
international human rights framework, but also they tend to push the law further than what 
has been laid down in international law. Schabas (2002: 7) notes that ‘the ECHR is the 
only instrument to define a comprehensive list of exceptions to the right to life. The United 
Nations system chose to avoid such an approach, thus leaving the scope of exceptions to 
the interpreter’. Franck and Schabas (2003: 61) notice that the 1950 ECHR predated the 
conventions agreed upon by the UN based on the content of the UDHR, as it would take 
much longer for the UN to agree on legally binding conventions than among the member 
states of the Council of Europe, all of whom share pronounced cultural consensus and 
political similarity. Schabas (2002:305) further adds that the EU 1998 Guidelines follow 
the classic statements of limitations on capital punishment that are found in Article 6 of the 
ICCPR as well as in the Economic and Social Council’s resolution entitled ‘Safeguards 
Guaranteeing Protection of those Facing the Death Penalty’. To this end, the legitimacy of 
the EU’s principled idea with regard to the death penalty is manifested in ways in which it 
is defined and formulated within the framework of international human rights law. As a 
result, when the UN became more involved and assertive in pushing for a global 
moratorium, 
147
 the battle against the use of capital punishment in Europe was already over.   
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4.3.1.2 Normative Interests 
While constructivists look into how identity construction is designed to transcend the 
dichotomy between ideational and instrumental dynamics (Wendt 1995, Finnemore and 
Sikkink 1998, Hopf 1998), the debate on NPE has increasingly moved beyond its purist 
formation towards a co-existence between its strategic and normative dynamics (Aggestam 
2009, Youngs 2004). To distinguish normative interests from traditional strategic or selfish 
interests, Forsberg suggests that normative interest does not exclude self-interest, it can be 
a wider interest for common good, or milieu goals (Wolfers 1962:73-77) instead of 
possession goals (Forsberg 2009: 11-12). Laïdi (2008b: 4) suggests that the EU is 
structurally disposed to extend its norms into the world system in order to keep up its 
global prestige and advance its own interests through the support of international system.   
 
The position taken here is not to fundamentally challenge the EU’s genuine commitment to 
its normative principle of universal abolition, nor to say the EU does not have self-interests. 
Rather, it is to identify whether there is a rationalist dimension to the EU’s promotion of 
the abolitionist norm, either as instrumental use of human rights norms, or a strategy 
employed to achieve a milieu goal.    
 
First of all, there is a rather instrumental argument for the EU’s adoption of abolitionist 
norm as a constitutive principle and foreign policy objective. After signing the Maastricht 
Treaty in 1992, the ‘crisis of confidence’ in the EU allowed the EU institutions and 
Member States to reflect upon its collective identity, and one route was through acceding 
to the ECHR (Manners 2002: 246). From the outset, the EU has developed itself into a 
hybrid of supranational and intergovernmental entity characterised by the willingness of 
member states to yield national sovereignty (King 1999: 313, Manners 2002: 240), in 
which case, the nature of global abolition which transcends state sovereignty resonates 
with the EU’s post-Westphalian quality. Therefore, in the progress of political integration, 
the elite driven abolitionist movement is considered as an attempt by the EU institutions to 
cultivate a ‘banal Europeanism’ by unifying its people and to establish a distinctive 
European identity (Girling 2005: 117-118; Schmidt 2007: 129).     
 
Secondly, the fact that abolition is prioritised over other human rights norms in EU foreign 
policy suggests that this choice can be seen as driven by strategic consideration. Schmidt 
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(2007: 130-131) argues that EU pursuit of abolition not only serves the common good for 
all mankind in their own mind, but also puts ‘a distinctive moral stamp on EU foreign 
policy’ which provides the EU with the moral superiority over the United States.  
 
The 2008 EU Memorandum on the Death Penalty states that: 
‘Long ago European countries, […] made a choice for humanity, abolishing the 
death penalty and thus fostering respect for human dignity. And this is an 
ultimate principle that the EU wishes to share with all countries,[…]. If it 
succeeds in reaching this goal, both the EU and those countries will have 
furthered the cause of humanity, as Beccaria foretold. The EU thus invites the 
USA to equally embrace this cause.’148 
Thus, the EU’s normative interest is also revealed in the milieu goal the EU has subscribed 
itself to, both for the prominence of its voice at the world stage, as well as for the common 
good. Furthermore, the distinctiveness of EU external identity is manifested through the 
cultural/moral battle within transatlantic relations over the definition of what is means by 
being ‘European’ (Girling 2005, Schmidt 2007).  
 
4.3.1.3 Self-binding Behaviour 
‘Self-binding’ to international norms refers to the EU’s formal commitment to international 
law and multilateralism (Manners 2007, Sjursen 2006b, Diez 2005). This is evidenced by 
its Member States unanimously subscribing to the ICCPR and the OPT2, as well as the 
EU’s crucial role in advancing the abolitionist norm within the UN system. By the time the 
Amsterdam Treaty was drafted in 1997 which recalls the signature of the 6
th
 Protocol to the 
ECHR among its member states, the death penalty had not been practiced in any of the EU 
countries, and had been abolished through the ratification of the OPT2 in most Member 
States.
149
 In fact, not only do the EU member states practice what they have agreed within 
the UN human rights framework and incorporated it into EU guidelines, the ECHR as a 
regional instrument adopted by the EU, had provided a model for many international and 
regional human rights laws, notably the ICCPR (Schabas 2002: 259).  
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As the abolition in Europe has gone so much further ahead compared to the rest of the 
world with the international organisations arriving rather late in this movement, the 
European history of abolition consists of unconnected events without the binding effect of 
international law (Zimring 1987: 19; Girling 2005: 114). Especially in the early phases of 
the abolition throughout the 1960s, each European country had its own debate about the 
death penalty and each country abolished it afresh (Girling 2005: 115). Zimring (1987: 20) 
notices that this was a period of change even without a common ‘European-wide’ discourse 
on abolition, therefore, each of the European abolitionist countries discarded the death 
penalty ‘in its own way and at its own pace but toward the same end’.  
 
4.3.1.4 Virtue Ethics 
‘If ever one were justified to speak of “virtuous circles”, this is certainly such a 
case; clearly good examples and peer pressure have played a very important 
role in convincing governments and legislators alike that the death penalty 
belongs to a primitive and uncivilised past.’150 
                              ----------Daniel Tarcschys, Secretary General of the Council of Europe 
 ‘The EU considers that abolition of the death penalty contributes to the 
enhancement of human dignity and the progressive development of human 
rights’.151 
                              ------------------ EU Guidelines on the Death Penalty (1998) 
For European political elites, the abolition of the death penalty seems not only a matter of 
human rights, but a virtue to do with ‘the enhancement of human dignity’. 152 In the first 
stage of the tripartite analysis, I interpret this virtue through exploring its cultural, moral 
and philosophical underpinnings as well as political and legal foundations, all of which 
have formulated the shared idea of the common good and a ‘European conscience’.   
 
To normatively judge the EU’s principles, Manners (2008: 56) suggests that virtue ethics 
emphasises the importance of the character or traits which serve as guidance in the EU’s 
                                                          
150 
The Death Penalty Beyond Abolition, 1999, the Council of Europe Publishing, p.2 
151 
EU Guidelines towards third countries on the Death Penalty,1998, p. 1 
152
 Ibid., p.3 
Chapter Four 
 
111 
 
pursuit of external actions. This interrogation reveals that these characters and traits can be 
understood as ‘humanistic values, ethical points of view and human rights reasons’ against 
the death penalty as ‘a denial of human dignity, which is a fundamental basis of the 
common heritage of the European Union as a union of shared values and principles’.153   
  
 In order to live by this ‘virtuous example’, virtue ethics suggests that the EU’s policies 
should be both coherent and consistent in a normative sense (Manners 2008: 55). By 
normative coherence, Manners suggests that (2008: 55-56) the EU should promote its 
constitutive principles which come to shape its own internal and external practices, and are 
in line with ‘a more universalizable and holistic strategy for world peace’. Whereas 
normative consistency entails that the EU itself should comply with the norms which it 
seeks to promote (Manners 2008:56). Therefore, in order to judge normative principles, 
one should look beyond the positivist dimension which focuses on the level of consistency 
and coherence in legal treaties and policy action, towards normative justification of EU 
principles. Manners (2009a: 2) suggests that ‘normative power should primarily be seen as 
legitimate in the principles being promoted’, in which sense, legitimacy of its principles 
are embedded in international treaties, conventions, and agreements, particularly those in 
the UN system. Aggestam (2009: 28) argues that EU foreign policy principles are 
normatively justifiable if they are agreed within the UN even before being embraced by 
EU treaties.   
 
Consistency in the EU promotion of abolition reveals some nuances in the way we ought to 
envisage its legitimacy as suggested above. The EU has repeatedly called upon third 
countries to sign and ratify the ICCPR and the OPT2 in bilateral or international forums, its 
own legitimate basis for abolition has been the ECHR which it interprets and applies as a 
regional system. According to Schamas (2002: 26), instruments such as the ICCPR adopted 
many concepts from the ECHR, meanwhile adapting them into international legal thinking 
and interpretation on the scope of human rights. Therefore, one could argue that the EU’s 
norm on the death penalty locates itself within the international human rights framework, 
but has also been successfully projected to the international legal system during its 
formation.    
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Coherence, on the other hand, is reflected the EU’s adoption of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, which prohibits the extradition of offenders to any country where the 
death penalty might be imposed unless a special guarantee is given.
 154
 In the case of China, 
the issue of the death penalty provides concrete confirmation that the EU is not just 
‘obsessed’ with attacking China, the EU is also firmly against the use of capital punishment 
in the U.S which has been the major target of EU human rights instruments on abolition 
(Harris 2009: 17).  
 
Furthermore, the American exceptionalism among Western liberal democracies has 
important implications in understanding the construction of EU penal identity and the 
uniqueness of its foreign policy. Not only does the American case serve as a rival 
explanation in understanding the distinctiveness of EU foreign policy identity, it also 
becomes an essential reference point for retentionist countries to reason against rights 
arguments for the abolition based on universality of liberal democracy and rule of law 
(Hood and Hoyle 2008: 35). Lastly, this interrogation of EU normative principles also 
consists of an implicit comparison with the Chinese official arguments for the use of the 
death penalty, in such a way as to illuminate the challenge to the legitimacy and liberal 
universality of EU normative principles.  
 
 4.3.2 Normative Action 
In the Guidelines towards third countries on the death penalty adopted in 1998, the EU sets 
out the circumstances for its policy action, including the use of declarations, démarches, 
human rights reporting, encouraging third countries to accede to international instruments, 
raising the issue in bilateral and multilateral co-operation.
155
 The legitimacy basis for these 
policy actions are the UN minimum standards. It means where capital punishment is in 
practice, the EU calls for its use to be gradually restricted only for ‘the most serious 
crimes’ 156  as laid down by international law. Moreover, the EU is also a leading 
institutional actor and lead donor in supporting NGOs who are actively engaged in the 
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abolitionist movement worldwide, including Amnesty International, Hands off Cain and 
Human Rights Watch.
157
 
 
Instead of focusing on EU foreign policy instruments, this section seeks to understand the 
ways in which the EU shapes the discourse on the death penalty in China. Thus, the central 
focus of this analysis is how the abolitionist norm the EU stands for is diffused through a 
discursive form of power. It is suggested that a normative power sets standards in world 
politics with its influence exerted by norms themselves (Diez and Manners 2007: 175). 
From a normative power perspective, NPE is not a foreign policy toolbox, but an 
independent power of EU norms that influence others (Aggestam 2009: 31, Diez 2005: 
616). Through five mechanisms outlined in the NPE framework, I aim to identify norm 
diffusion with and without policy action, and evaluate its normative justification through 
deontological ethics.   
 
The empirical data for analysis is a combination of EU official documents, media reports, 
NGO reports, and documentation from both sides of EU-China cooperation programmes 
from 1998 to 2009 since the EU has undertaken a diplomatic mission to persuade other 
nations on the issue of the death penalty.   
 
4.3.2.1   Persuasion 
For Manners (2009a:12), persuasion in promotion of principles by NPE refers to 
constructive engagement, institutionalisation of relations, particularly the use of ‘multi- 
and pluri-lateral dialogue’ with third countries. Forsberg (2009: 16) suggests that 
persuasion requires using articulate rhetoric, personal or collective appeal and applicable 
knowledge. In this case study, I consider EU-China human rights dialogue fitting neatly 
into this category.  
 
During the course of the twice yearly human rights dialogue between the EU and China, 
China’s the death penalty practice has always been among the key issues of discussion 
since 1998.
158
 Other platforms such as major political dialogue meetings at ministerial and 
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Summit levels have also been used by the EU to raise its views on the death penalty.
159 
 
 
In 1996, China broke off from the dialogue in protest of EU Member States’ intention to 
co-sponsor a resolution with the United States at the UNCHR. When the dialogue was 
resumed in 1998 on the condition that the EU had abandoned the tabling of a resolution on 
China, the then serving Vice-president of the European Commission, Sir Leon Brittan, 
justified the adoption of this non-confrontational approach by citing progress and 
commitments made on the Chinese side, one of which is that China would report on the 
implementation of UN Covenants in Hong Kong and would not introduce the death penalty 
in Hong Kong.
160 It is argued that the EU’s substantive concern for the issue of the death 
penalty might have also played a role in the policy shift towards a dialogue approach, as 
the practice of tabling a resolution together with the United States, a country with capital 
punishment practice, would mean that the draft resolution would not be able to call for an 
abolition, but only criticise its excessive use (Kinzelbach 2010: 39).   
 
However, the level of EU expectation from the use of dialogue approach to influence 
China’s death penalty practice had changed over the years, largely depending on the 
domestic situation in China and how China responded to the EU’s pressure. At the early 
stage of the dialogue between 1998 and 2000, the EU did not start with a strong 
abolitionist stance; instead it focused on excessive use and pushed China to make sure that 
all appeals are eventually dealt with by the Supreme People’s Court, and to release data on 
the execution numbers and other relevant information on China’s death penalty practice.161  
 
In 2001, eight benchmarks were finally established and agreed by the Chinese after a two-
year drafting process for assessing the effectiveness of the dialogue, one of which states 
that progress in the area of the death penalty is defined as: 
‘compliance with ECOSOC guarantees for the protection of those sentenced to 
death and restriction of the cases in which the death penalty can be imposed, in 
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keeping with Article 6 of the ICCPR; provisions of statistics on use of the death 
penalty.’ 162 
In response to China’s ‘strike hard campaign’ which resulted in a significant increased 
number of executions, a seminar complementing the dialogue rounds was held specifically 
on the death penalty on 11-12 May 2001 in Beijing.
163
 In the same year, having signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights and making several reform efforts in the judicial and legal system, China expressed 
in the dialogue session its decision to ratify the ICESCR later that year, the EU then 
stepped up its pressure on the death penalty by calling for ‘limitation on the use of the 
death penalty with a view to its abolition’. 164 
 
In 2003, China had sentenced Tenzin Deleg Rinpoche, a Buddhist lama, and his assistant 
Lobsang Dhondup to death for their alleged involvement in a bomb attack in 2002 in 
Chengdu, Sichuan Province, which were the first death sentences for political crimes 
committed by Tibetans in twenty years.
 165
 Dhondup was immediately executed in January 
2003, whereas Tenzin Deleg was sentenced to death with a two-year execution reprieve.
166
 
After several declarations, démarches and EU resolutions were issued,
 167
 the Council 
stated that: 
‘The EU regretted, however, that there was little progress on core issues such 
as the death penalty. […] The EU also repeated its strong condemnation of the 
execution of the Tibetan monk Lobsang Dhondrup. The EU made it clear that 
the way in which the trial of Lobsang Dhondrup and Tenzin Deleg Rinpoche 
was handled was felt as a breach of the trust built up by the EU-China 
dialogue.’168 
The EU’s doubts over China’s commitment to the dialogue soon mellowed over two 
ritualistic years of 2005 and 2006. However, a series of escalations in tension began in 
2007, when China refused to participate in a Human Rights Legal Seminar on ‘the right to 
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fair trial’ on the day of the event on 10 May, due to its opposition to the attendance of two 
NGOs invited by the EU under the German Presidency.
 169
 Before the seminar, the EU 
stood by its invitation and believed that there were no grounds to exclude Human Rights in 
China (HRIC) and China Labour Bulletin. The Chinese side initially did not boycott the 
event, but reacted angrily on the day and walked out en masse, stating that the two groups 
were non-EU and anti-China.
 170 
 Both the EU and the Chinese delegations had refused to 
compromise on their stances and the seminar was annulled.
171  
While NGOs publicly 
applauded the EU for not yielding to China’s pressure over the principle of the freedom of 
expression (HRIC 2010), both sides did not issue public statements regarding this 
incident.
172
 Subsequently, the official human rights dialogue took place according to 
schedule in an ‘open and constructive atmosphere’. 173  Moreover, the EU praised China on 
a number of legislative reforms during the dialogue session, including a review by the 
Supreme Court of all death penalty cases starting from January 2007 which was considered 
a major progress since 1979. However, when the EU requested to see statistics on death 
penalty cases in China, it was again declined by the Chinese counterparts.
174  
 
From a normative perspective, the decision taken by the German Presidency may have 
been a strong sign of EU normative commitment in the support of human rights defenders 
and its principle of freedom of speech. However, it seemed to be counterproductive in 
engaging China in a normative procedure in which the EU wishes to be persuasive.  In 
contrast to the beginning of the dialogue in 1995 and the resumption in late 1997, the walk-
out in May 2007 demonstrated that China could outmanoeuvre the EU through its deviant 
behaviour, and its human rights stance has clearly toughened since the dialogue approach 
was adopted.  
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Compared to the execution of Lobsang Dhondup in 2003, the case of the medical scientist 
Wo Weihan in 2008 had taken the tension between the EU and China over the human rights 
dialogue further to an unprecedented level. Wo Weihan was sentenced to death for 
espionage and executed on 28 November 2008 - the final day of the EU-China human 
rights dialogue in Beijing. Because Wo’s two daughters are Austrian citizens who looked to 
Austrian government and the EU to demand a fair and transparent trial for Wo, the 
subsequent three-year diplomatic efforts behind the closed doors, 
175
 including pleas by Mr. 
Heinz Fischer, Austrian President and the EU Troika, had proved in vain.
176
 During the 
dialogue starting on 24 November 2008, the case was mentioned in the discussion, but the 
Chinese delegation did not inform the EU that Mr. Wo would be executed soon. The EU 
believed the timing of the execution as an affront, and according to Austria’s Foreign 
Minister, Ursula Passnik: 
‘This execution comes precisely on the day of dialogue between the EU and 
China on human rights shows the lack of consideration and the harshness with 
which this case has been handled. This [must] be considered as a premeditated 
affront by the entire EU’.177  
In the Council’s declaration, the EU condemned the execution of Wo in ‘the strongest 
terms’, stating that:   
‘The execution seriously undermines the spirit of trust and mutual respect 
required for this EU-China dialogue on human rights.’ 178 
As this event became highly publicised, the spokesman of the MFA, Qing Gang responded 
on 1 December 2008 that: 
‘…Wo Weihan is Chinese citizen… He could not be treated in a different way 
only because he has some foreign relatives. … The EU and Austria’s 
accusation against the Chinese judicial authorities intervened brutally into 
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Chinese judicial sovereignty, trampled the spirit of the rule of law, and 
undermined the basis of the healthy development of the bilateral talks on 
human rights.’179 
The impact of Wo Weihan’s case had attracted much public attention in Europe, China and 
Taiwan, 
180
 it had also directly resulted in the cancellation of EU-China legal seminars in 
the following year of 2009.   
 
The dialogue approach to the death penalty issue reflects the EU’s ambition to project its 
constitutive principles through a non-coercive approach of reasoning. However, the 
dialogue with China on this issue has demonstrated several difficulties in implementing 
this approach, especially in circumstances where the EU norm is not necessarily an 
international norm, and China’s willingness to engage in the dialogue is largely 
instrumental. From a normative perspective, the legitimate basis for the reasoning process 
in this case is defined by the EU Guidelines within international law which does not 
prohibit the death penalty, as illustrated in Section One. Initiating the dialogue approach 
without a clearly defined objective and later establishing the benchmark based on 
minimum international standards have therefore weakened the EU’s power in projecting its 
principle. As a result, discussions taking place during past dialogue sessions ended up 
aiming at limiting the use of the death penalty to a few well-defined, most serious crimes, 
instead of a ‘for-against’ debate.  
 
Moreover, the human rights dialogue with China is the only regular and institutionalised 
dialogue on human rights between the EU and third countries. Therefore, China is treated 
as a special case, in which the universality of human rights would inevitably be on the 
agenda in order to ‘allow candid exchange of views on EU issues of concern’ 181 . 
According to previous press releases, the process of the dialogue sessions is often 
described as being conducted in:  
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‘[…] a constructive atmosphere and was an occasion to express concerns and 
differences of opinion with regard to the implementation of international 
human rights standards in China and the EU.’182   
As a central place was given to the debate on cultural heritage versus universal human 
rights on the issue of the death penalty during EU-China human rights dialogues (Kjaerum 
2000: 5), the presumed strength of persuasion as a means to diffuse norms through 
reasoning is both limited by the certain circumstances in which China is willing to 
participate, and undermined by the fundamental challenge it posed to the legitimacy of the 
abolitionist norm.   
 
4.3.2.2 Invoking Norms 
This model of norm diffusion refers to a mechanism of normative power that activates 
commitments which the target country subscribed itself to. What can be invoked could be 
the agreements between the EU and third powers, or any international agreement if 
violated (Forsberg 2009: 17). Therefore, even if the EU cannot persuade China to adopt an 
abolitionist policy through a dialogue approach, it can still invoke certain agreements to 
which China is a party. On the issue of the death penalty, China has yet to bind itself to any 
of those international human rights instruments, but démarches were made based on 
China’s signature of the ICCPR which provides certain restrictions on the use of this 
extreme punishment. In this section, I look at how démarches, as an alternative approach to 
the dialogue, have been used to invoke China on its general use of death penalty and 
individual cases.  
 
Since 1998, the EU has been active in lobbying China on the issue of the death penalty 
through démarches, which have been carried out based on standards defined by the ICCPR 
and the EU guidelines on the death penalty.
183
 The former Commissioner Chris Patten 
spoke of his frustration with the human rights dialogue at the European Parliament at 25 
October 2000 that: 
 ‘There were references to China and we know well the record there. It is an 
issue that we raise again and again in our human rights dialogue. I cannot 
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say hand on heart, or even hand off heart, that it is getting us very far, but we 
continue to raise the issue’.184 
Given its confidential nature as opposed to public statements, the practice of démarches 
can only be traced from EU annual reports on human rights and the annual reports from the 
Council to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of CFSP. 
However, none of these documents reveal the details of content. 
 
Reviewing EU Annual Reports on Human Rights from 1998 to 2009, it shows that China is 
amongst the top recipients of EU démarches every year – both on individual cases as well 
as on the death penalty which is subjected to regular démarches under the EU’s guidelines. 
According to these Guidelines, general démarches are made when the Chinese legal and 
judicial systems are considered closed for public and international scrutiny and the death 
penalty might have been abused. For instance, EU concern about ‘strike hard’ campaigns 
has usually been raised through démarches towards Chinese counterparts within the 
framework of political dialogue meetings. 
185  
 Specific démarches are carried out in 
individual cases which violate the UN minimum standards based on the sources provided 
by EU missions, delegations and international and local NGOs.
186 
 Following the death 
sentences of the Buddhist lama, Tenzin Deleg Rinpoche and his assistant Lobsang 
Dhondup, fearing both would be soon executed, a démarche was immediately made before 
the Parliament had passed a resolution.
187 
 
 
The strength of the use of démarche thus lies in the speed of the EU’s reaction. China’s 
signature of the ICCPR provides a legitimate basis for the EU’s normative action in a 
complementary manner with the work of NGOs and other institutions. 
188
 Nonetheless, 
compared to the dialogue approach, the use of démarche merely serves as a signal of 
concern rather than a push for China’s concession.  
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4.3.2.3 Shaping Discourse 
Manners (2002: 239) argues that normative power has the ability to shape discourses 
through learning, adaption or rejection of norms as a result of international norms and 
political learning by third countries. Forsberg (2009:17-18) suggests that Pace’s (2007) 
case study on Israel’s adoption of a Mediterranean identity serves an example of NPE 
‘shaping the discourse of what is normal’.  In this section, I illustrate how three EU 
cooperation projects on the death penalty can be seen as this way of discursive rhetoric 
practice.    
 
Project 1: ‘Human Rights Network’ 
During the dialogue sessions, the EU had repeatedly urged China to ratify the ICCPR, and 
this concern had been materialised into a five-year project in 2002 – the EU-China Human 
Rights Network. Activities under this project involved organising conferences, training 
sessions, internships, exchanges and publications with Chinese academics for a period of 
three years in order to facilitate the ongoing EU-China Human Rights Dialogue.
189
 Funded 
by the European Commission, it worked towards reducing the differences in the 
interpretation of basic concepts in international covenants between the EU and China.
190
 Its 
partnership comprised of 15 European universities – one from each then EU member state, 
led by the Irish Centre for Human Rights; and 15 Chinese universities, led by the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences (CASS).
191
 
 
Since the HR Network was responsible for organising EU-China legal seminars which ran 
in parallel with the human rights dialogue, its outcomes and recommendations were 
tailored to feed into the dialogue process and its legal seminars.
192 
Through organising 
many academic events between European and Chinese scholars, one of the provisions of 
the HR Network was to develop specialised legal literature in Chinese in the field of 
human rights. The issue of the death penalty was categorised under the heading of ‘the 
ICCPR and domestic law’, one of the seven prioritised themes. Given the strong expertise 
on the death penalty on the European side, the network resulted in the translation of The 
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Introduction to the International Criminal Court into Chinese as well as The Abolition of 
the Death Penalty in International Law.
193
 However, on the Chinese side, the only paper 
produced by a Chinese scholar on the death penalty offered little more than a descriptive 
account on the differences between current international, EU and Chinese law with regard 
to ‘the rights to life’.194 After the project ended in 2006, few academic activities followed 
up, despite a comprehensive network that had been developed between 2002 and 2006.  
Curiously, the website <www.eu-china-humanrights.org> which was built to provide 
detailed information about the network with full access to its activities and publications has 
already been removed.    
 
Project 2: ‘Strengthening the Defence of Death Penalty Case in China’ 
The first cooperation project that specifically addresses the issue of the death penalty is 
entitled ‘Strengthening Defence in Death Penalty Cases’(2003-2006), targeting Chinese 
legal professionals, including defence lawyers, academics, judges, prosecutors, legislators, 
Ministry of Justice officials. It was an EIDHR project delivered by the Great Britain China 
Centre (GBCC) on behalf of the Commission’s Delegation in China. 195  With an 
overarching objective to reduce the use of the death penalty rather than abolition, the 
project worked towards enhancing the defence capacity of Chinese lawyers so as to ensure 
a higher success rate of appeals.
196
 Chinese legal professionals were therefore invited to 
participate in training modules, workshops, professional networking, and research 
coordinated between the GBCC and the EC delegation in China.
197 
 
 
It was noticed by the GBCC that the timing of the project coincided with a mounting 
disquiet amongst Chinese legal professionals and media that there were serious potential 
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miscarriage of justice in the practice of capital punishment due to weak defence and 
disparities at the provincial level.
198 
However, it was believed that an explicit focus on 
abolishing capital punishment, or even moratoria, would be too sensitive to get the project 
started in China, therefore the GBCC decided to focus its efforts on improving legal 
defence for those facing capital charges. 
199 
 
 
In order to avoid antagonising the Chinese authorities, the GBCC was reported to have 
assured the Chinese government that this project would not be used as a means to gather 
information for other purposes. However, it was later revealed that some empirical data 
from this project has been referred to in one of the HR dialogues under the UK presidency. 
Nevertheless, the GBCC had enjoyed good relations with the Chinese government 
throughout this project which was the key to its overall success.
200
 
 
Project 3: ‘moving the debate forward: China’s use of the Death Penalty’ 
In the second half of the UK presidency in 2006, another project entitled ‘Moving the 
Debate Forward: China’s Use of the Death Penalty 2007-2009’ was a follow-up of the 
previous project which was also implemented by the GBCC.
201
 Given that one of the 
essential barriers cited by the Chinese authorities against the use of that death penalty is 
public opinion, this EIDHR project (Jan. 2007 – Oct. 2009) thus seeks better understanding 
of the Chinese public opinion, meanwhile, influencing or shaping the Chinese public 
debates. The project included 30 activities with more than 4000 individual Chinese 
participants in a two-year partnership with Beijing Normal University and Wuhan 
University.
202
 The research survey on Chinese criminal justice professionals and public 
opinion was led by Dietrich Oberwittler of Max Planck Institute and Qi Shenghui of 
Wuhan University with Professor Rodger Hood as the project consultant. Contrary to the 
Chinese authorities’ argument, the findings from these surveys suggest that the public and 
the legal professionals do not seem to have profound and rigid commitment to the use of 
capital punishment in China (Hood 2009: 2). Moreover, many legal academics believe that 
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capital punishment for non-violent crimes should be abolished. The surveys also revealed 
that most members of the public knew very little about international norms and treaties 
(Hood 2009: 3).  
 
Following this survey, an International Research Centre on the Death Penalty in China was 
set up, and a new website designed to provide educational material on the death penalty 
was set up at the end of the project in 2009.
203 
 Moreover, the research data gathered by 
these two successive projects not only contributes to the ongoing debates in the EU-China 
human rights dialogue, but also provides an original contribution to the study of capital 
punishment on Chinese public opinion, feeding into the global discourse on abolition.
204 
Especially the second project, in one of the leading academics’ own words, is ‘the first 
scientifically reliable and valid evidence of the state of opinion on the death penalty in 
China’ (Hood 2009: 2).  
 
Crucial to the smooth if not successful implementation of the last two projects is the 
indirect approach in which the GBCC avoided all mentioning of abolition or moratorium, 
and instead, pragmatically focused on enhancing the knowledge and capability of defence 
lawyers or lobbying through legal research as the ‘way in’ when direct lobbying was not 
appropriate in the Chinese context. 
205  
 
 4.3.2.4   Living by Example/Emulation 
As the only norm diffusion model that works without policy action, ‘living by example’ is 
considered one of the most important elements of normative power, given that NPE is 
about what the EU is, rather than what it does (Manners 2002, 2006c, 2008). Forsberg 
(2009: 18) suggests that the attraction of normative power implies a positive sense of 
learning. In this section, I briefly look at the extent to which the Chinese criminal law 
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system has emulated from the European experience, and what the current perceptions are 
in the mind of the Chinese thinkers.    
 
At the official level, the Chinese authorities rarely openly admitted their admiration 
towards European legal models, although the People’s Republic had adopted much of the 
European experience in law-making during its modernisation process. Following the death 
of Mao, the Criminal Procedure Law of 1979, which was considered the first attempt to 
end the arbitrary punishment and widespread abuse, drew largely on the European civil law 
inquisitorial system which also influenced earlier Chinese Republic lawmaking between 
1917 and 1949 (Chu 2000). According to Chu (2000), this Criminal Procedure Law was 
essentially a mixture the civil law inquisitorial system of continental Europe incorporated 
with elements of Marxism and Leninism to be used as ‘a tool of the proletarian dictatorship 
designed to protect the people from enemies of the Communist Party’.  
 
Even with regard to the death penalty on which the European position has been widely 
seen as unequivocal and transparent, it still became the target of Chinese criticism of 
hypocrisy or double standards during the dialogue approach on European public opinions 
in some part of the continent and the danger of reintroduction of death penalty in some 
Member States’ democratic processes, notably during the French presidential election in 
2002 (Svensson 2001, Yorke 2008).
 206
 Kjaerum (2000:6) recalls a few sessions of human 
rights dialogue and legal seminars in which China’s death penalty practice had been 
scrutinised, not just with regard to the prospective abolishment in China, but also how to 
avoid the reintroduction of the death penalty in European legislation in an equal manner.  
 
Among Chinese academic debate, the first abolitionist voice openly emerged in 2000 
during a conference held at Beijing University entitled ‘the morality of the death penalty’. 
Qiu Xinglong, a prominent law professor, drew from European discourse on capital 
punishment and humanistic tradition, and argued that ‘China is still waiting for its 
Beccaria’.207 Despite being considered a radical thinker, Qiu was pessimistic about China’s 
prospect of following the footsteps of Europe towards abolition. In his view, abolishing the 
death penalty in Europe would not have been possible without the ‘Christian undercurrent’ 
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in the past
208
. Qiu further drew on European Enlightenment thinkers who had developed 
Christian beliefs into Western philosophical system on the relationship between the 
individual and the state, which inspired the ideal of abolishing capital punishment.
 209
 
While a humanistic tradition is yet to flourish in contemporary China, the legacy of Mao 
and the five decades of Communist rule left a ‘vacuum’ in Chinese belief system following 
the defeat of communist ideology in 1989.
 210
  
 
In contrast with Qiu, Chen Xingliang, a professor at Peking University questioned whether 
Europe in Beccaria’s time was necessarily more civilised than China today (Zhang 2005a, 
2005b). While standing by the principle of the abolitionist ideal, Chen considered it 
impracticable in China’s current situation. Chen mentioned that Europe had abolished 
inhuman treatment such as torture long before the death penalty had been outlawed (Chen 
2002, cited in Zhang 2005a), whereas contemporary China remained a developing country 
in which capital punishment is still regarded as an economical and efficient means to rule 
by the leadership. Therefore, what is at stake now is the restraint of its practice rather than 
abolition. For Chen, there will be a progressive humanisation of the law for China to 
realise the abolitionist ideal, however long it should take.
211
 
 
It is not clear the extent to which these views of Chinese leading law experts are driven by 
the ‘power of attraction’ of Europe. One of central premises of the NPE is that the EU’s 
principles are sufficiently attractive that others would emulate them (Manners 2009a: 3; 
Aggestam 2009: 49). However, due to the particular sensitivity surrounding this topic in 
China, it is not only intellectually painful but often physically dangerous for Chinese 
thinkers to openly comment on foreign thinkers whose names were not included in the 
CCP’s official discourse. Svensson’s work (2002) looks into Chinese discourse on human 
rights throughout the twentieth century. She concludes that Chinese thinkers were driven to 
foreign thinkers for wisdom by the urgent need of their own society, and for guidance on 
how to face some of the most difficult problems of modern politics. Therefore, she believes 
that those who translated and studied Western thinkers’ had developed their own ideas 
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based on issues they perceived in China. Hence, she opposes the ‘diffusion’ model, and 
instead, argues that human rights arguments are generated from within China by the 
intrinsic need of its own people. Therefore, ‘the power of attraction’ argument as applied to 
this case is not well supported.   
 
4.3.2.5 Shaming 
Manners (2009a:12) broadly defines shaming as public condemnation or the use of 
symbolic sanctioning. Foot (2001:9) suggests that shaming is bound up in a sense of 
belonging to a normative community of states, thus, it is a matter of being an insider or 
outsider. In the case of China, raising the issue at international fora by the EU is a classic 
example of shaming.  
 
Before 1998, China had not entered any international agreement regarding human rights; 
the UN’s Geneva Human Rights Commission became the only international platform in 
which the situation in China could be raised (Kent 1995: 18). One of the most 
embarrassing experiences for Beijing was in 1997 when it was criticised at the UNCHR for 
selling executed prisoner’s organs without their consent, and even timing their executions 
to accommodate the need for organs (Copper and Lee 1997: 182, quoted in Wachman 2001: 
267). The Chinese People’s Liberation Army had been allegedly involved in supplying 
organs to meet the foreign demand.
212  
 
 
Since mid-1990s, China had started to urge Western countries to engage in bilateral 
monitoring mechanisms on the issue of human rights (Kent 1995, 1999; HRIC 1998). By 
the late 1990s, China had managed ‘to divert the international community into an 
increasing number of bilateral channels’ so as to avoid ‘potentially humiliating experience 
of a resolution critical of China in the UNCHR’ (Kent 2001: 583-584).  
 
Between 1989 and 1996, Member States of the EU co-sponsored a resolution each year 
deploring the human rights situation in China, including the issue of the death penalty. 
Despite a strong objection from the European Parliament, the General Council announced 
its abandonment of the resolution and listed a number of improvements to justify its 
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change of strategy, one of which was China’s commitment not to introduce the death 
penalty in Hong Kong and would report on the implementation of UN Covenants in Hong 
Kong. As a result, only Denmark and the Netherlands maintained a strong position on 
China at the UNCHR in 1997. However, apart from some diplomatic arrangements being 
postponed, both countries did not suffer from commercial retaliation from Beijing (HRIC 
1998: 29-30). This bilateral dialogue ‘coupled with specific cooperation projects’ was 
subsequently described by the Commission as ‘the most appropriate means of contributing 
to human rights in China.’213   
 
According to Foot (2001: 10), ‘in the absence of direct material costs, disapproval matters 
only to states that are concerned about reputation, [and] are capable of being shamed’. For 
Risse and Sikkink (1998: 15), evoking a sense of shame depends on the norm-violating 
state’s ‘moral consciousness’ and the need to belong to the ‘civilised community’. 
However, Chinese authorities openly denounced that the abolition is a global trend by 
citing the U.S as the lead example of retentionist states, and justified its practice based on 
cultural relativists and ‘stage of development’ arguments. As Wachman (2001: 260) argues, 
although China had suffered from loss of reputation on human rights ever since the 1989 
Tiananmen events, the international efforts to shame China resulted mainly in resentment 
and defiance.  
 
4.3.2.6 Deontological Ethics 
Deontological ethicists argue that the character of action itself should be subjected to moral 
judgement (O’Neil 2000, in Manners 2008:57). Drawn from the Kantian view of public 
reasoning, it is believed that good values are established through practice of reasoning and 
law-making. Therefore, for deontological ethics, it is the action, not the outcome, that 
matters in terms of making moral judgements. Furthermore, deontological ethics has the 
advantage of cross-cultural moral intuitions and reasoning compared to consequentialist 
and virtue ethics (Alexander and Moore 2008). Linking the concept of NPE to normative 
ethics, Manners (2008: 57) suggests that the EU should focus on the rationalisation of 
responsibilities and rules which guide its external actions. For Lerch and Schwellnus (2006: 
317), the EU’s abolitionist policy is vested with great legitimacy, because it ‘was adopted 
for normative reasons, pursued with argumentative means and justified coherently’. 
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However, Laïdi (2008b: 3) reminds us that how EU norms are diffused is linked to the 
degree of Europe’s engagement in promoting them, the coherence of European preferences 
and the challenges the EU faces. 
 
The central hypothesis in this section is that the EU’s policy in China on the use of the 
death penalty is based on reasoning of legitimated human rights standards enshrined in 
international law, which are diffused through the process of persuasion and engagement. 
This empirical investigation suggests that persuasion and shaping discourse are most 
readily associated with deontological ethics. In both cases, the legitimated principles were 
established before or during the process of reasoning. However, rather than promoting 
abolition, both cases ended up using minimum standards embedded in international human 
rights law which do not prohibit the death penalty, but only strive to enhance justice in the 
actual trial process, with its basic concepts subjected to national interpretations. The 
dilemma thus lies between engagement and persuasion. While the EU standing by its 
principle would provoke defiance from the Chinese side and risk undermining the 
engagement; allowing both sides to exchange their views – especially between liberal 
universalists and cultural relativists - might jeopardize the legitimacy of universal human 
rights norms.  Furthermore, although invoking norms and shaming are essentially forms of 
persuasion, the legitimated principles upon which EU action is based were not established 
bilaterally between the two sides, hence, they are less normative according to deontological 
ethics. Finally, living by example is least associated with deontological ethics, due the 
absence of EU action or reasoning process.    
 
4.3.3 Normative Impact 
The January 2001 Council Conclusion defines the detailed benchmarks on the dialogue 
process through which the EU would be seeking to make progress with China. The one that 
concerns the death penalty reads:  
‘Compliance with ECOSOC guarantees for the protection of those sentenced to 
death and restriction of the cases in which the death penalty can be imposed; 
provision of statistics on the use of the death penalty’214 
Moreover, the EU’s Annual Reports on Human Rights set out a separate section 
                                                          
214
 General Affairs Council, 2327
th
 Council meeting, 22-23 January 2001, Brussels. 
Chapter Four 
 
130 
 
documenting the death sentences and execution worldwide every year. The source of data 
is exclusively relying on Amnesty International’s death penalty logs215, which indicates 
that China’s execution rate has consistently gone down since 2001 when the last national 
‘Strike Hard’ campaign took place. In 2003, the Council welcomed China's announcement 
of a series of legal reforms relating to capital punishment.
216
   
 
From a positivist/legal perspective, China’s compliance with ECOSOC guarantees, 
statistical evidence on the use of death penalty and legal reforms are considered by EU 
policy makers and NGOs as barometers to assess the impact of EU foreign policy (HRIC 
2004:4). However, there are a number of problems with these standards. First of all, Hood 
and Hoyle (2008: 98) argue that the Chinese penal system, which is not transparent and 
openly accountable, is difficult to assess or to change. Therefore, it is impossible to judge 
objectively how EU policy is affecting the number of death sentences and executions 
carried out, as no official data have been published or obtained by the EU through its 
repeated requests during the human rights dialogue.
217
 Furthermore, Kent (2001:143) 
suggests that bilateral monitoring of human rights produced at most ‘temporary, superficial 
and instrumental change’, it did not lead to deep-rooted internalisation of human rights 
norms, evidenced by China’s ‘continued excessive use of the death penalty’ and other 
human rights violations.  
 
From an interpretivist perspective, ‘Europe’s attainment is normative rather than empirical’ 
(Rosecrance 1998, cited in Manners 2002: 238). To further this interpretive and normative 
understanding of effectiveness, I aim to identify the ideational impact of NPE on China’s 
perception of normality on the death penalty as indicated in its legal reforms and rhetoric 
change, and evaluate such impact through a consequentialist understanding of effectiveness. 
While asking how and why we ought to judge the EU’s impact through NPE, I explore the 
causality between normative action and impact in an attempt to identify the net impact of 
EU action. This analysis draws on a combination of official sources, media accounts, NGO 
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perspectives and secondary literature.   
 
4.3.3.1 Legal and judicial reform 
In order to ensure more uniformity in the imposition of the death penalty, and to reduce its 
scope of application only to the most serious crimes, the Supreme People’s Court decided 
in 2004 that it would in future review all death penalty cases itself.
218
 This policy change 
implies that China returned to its legal position prior to 1983, when the power of the 
Supreme People’s Court was devolved to the provincial High Courts (Hood and Hoyle 
2008: 101). The new review system came into effect on 1 January 2007, with an order that 
execution should only apply for ‘an extremely small number of serious offenders’ and that 
the death penalty should not be imposed in certain cases of crimes of passion, associated 
with family disputes, and economic crimes.
219
 Chief Justice Xiao Yang, President of the 
Supreme People’s Court, added that: as ‘few executions as possible should be carried out 
and as cautiously as possible, in order to avoid wrongful executions’. 220  The former 
president of the Supreme People’s Court, Xiao Yang221 who lobbied for the 2007 review, 
suggested that the death penalty should only be used on ‘extremely vile criminals’ and the 
review would contribute to preventing wrongful convictions.
222 
 
 
The EU regarded this reform as a concrete improvement, and issued a statement on 17
th
 
October at the end of the 24
th
 round of human rights dialogue that:  
‘The EU welcomed the reduction in the number of executions in China following the 
review of death sentences by the People’s Supreme Court’223.  
European Commissioner for External Relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldner also recognised 
this progress and stated that: 
                                                          
218 
China Daily, ‘Revision of death penalty system urged’, Xinhua News Agency, 26 December 2004. 
219 
BBC News, ‘China to reduce death penalty use’, 14 September 2007.  
220 
Ibid.  
221 A different person who shares the same name as the aforementioned ‘Chief Justice’. 
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 The Washington Post, ‘China’s Capital Cases still Secret, Arbitrary’, 24 December 2008 
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 Presidency-in-Office of the Council of the European Union, Portugal (2007), Press release of the 24
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‘We understand that the result is a reduction in the number of effective death 
sentences and executions. This is particularly gratifying for the EU, as it has 
long been a priority area of intervention’.224 
In the absence of public statistics from before and after the 1
st
 of January 2007, it was 
impossible to verify whether death penalty verdicts and executions had actually dropped. 
As long as there is no access to transparent statistics, the EU should refrain from 
welcoming a drop of executions. Such statements are not only short in clarity on the extent 
of the assumed policy achievement, but also self-contradictory given that the Chinese 
delegation has repeatedly rejected EU requests for the publication of statistics during the 
human rights dialogue sessions. 
225 
 
 
This is not to say that the absence of credible statistics means that the EU has had no 
impact on China’s legal reform. According to an EIDHR evaluation on the impact of the 
Human Rights Network, the results from a focus group discussion showed that the 
participants of the Network, who represented the leading expertise in human rights in 
China, believed their participation in the Network has had significant direct and indirect 
impact on legislative reform for the protection of human rights. They specifically linked 
their participation in the Network with their experience in drafting legal reforms regarding 
the expansion of the judiciary, reforms which gave the state’s Supreme Court the right to 
review death penalty cases to ensure that the ultimate punishment law is well 
implemented.
226 
 
 
In recent years, Chinese media, including Chinese official media Xinhua, have increasingly 
exposed cases of errors in administering the death penalty, and criticised provincial courts 
for the lack of carefulness in processing capital punishment. In a news report in 2006, 
Xinhua started to ‘hint at death penalty reform’.227 Information revealed by the Supreme 
People’s Court (SPC) to Xinhua indicated that the SPC had been considering withdrawing 
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Benita Ferroro-Waldner’s speech on ‘The EU-China Human Rights Dialogue’ in European Parliament,  
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226 
Result of Focus Group Discussion and CSO Roundtable, included as annex 8 in Evaluation of EC 
Cooperation and Partnership with China, Final Synthesis Report, Vol.2, p.60 
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provincial courts the right to ratify the death penalty since the late 1990s.
228
 This was also 
the time when the EU pressed China to ensure that all appeals are heard by the SPC at the 
start of its first human rights dialogue session. 
229
  
 
Professor Zhou Guangquan at Tsinghua University, member of the Legal Committee of the 
National People’s Congress, recently revealed a proposal to reduce execution numbers for 
non-violent crimes. Responding to this sensitive topic, Zhou indicated the impact of 
abolitionist norm on China’s death penalty reform, and implicitly acknowledged the 
authorities’ awareness of the global significance of the abolitionist movement: 230 
“This is to a certain degree a response to foreign concerns about the issue of 
capital punishment in China. […] In a nutshell, only a minority of countries 
retain the death penalty and an extremely small minority actually carry out 
executions.”  
An overseas Chinese dissident and prominent academic Zhang Lijia commented on the 
2007 reform reflected that:  
‘Top Chinese leaders feel uncomfortable with the accusation that China 
applies capital punishment too readily, partly because the international 
community has pressured China persistently, reforming capital punishment 
has been made a priority within the Party-run judiciary system.’ 231 
Moreover, following many years of exposure to international pressure, including that of the 
EU both bilaterally and multilaterally
232
, the Chinese authorities had finally acknowledged 
in August 2009 that around 65 per cent of transplant organs were taken from executed 
prisoners. The Vice-Health Minister allegedly said in the Chinese official media that: 
“Condemned prisoners were definitely not a morally appropriate source for 
                                                          
228 ‘China changes law to limit death penalty’, Xinhua News Agency, 31 October 2006. 
229
 See EU Annual Report on Human Rights (1998/9), p. 20 
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 The Southern Weekend interview with Zhou Guangquan, member of the legal Committee of the National 
People’s Congress and Tsinghua University professor, in ‘Translation&Commentary: “Greater Steps Can be 
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2010. 
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Chapter Four 
 
134 
 
organ transplants”. 233 
Nevertheless, the execution of Wo Weihan underlines the state secrecy, lack of 
transparency and uneven application of the law that continue to prevail in China’s death 
penalty practice since it had embarked on a seemingly drastic reform in criminal justice in 
2007. 
 
While demonstrating that Western criticisms do seem to play a significant role in shaping 
China’s rhetoric and policy action on the issue of the death penalty, the extent to which 
these changes are the direct result of the external pressure is hard to gauge, so is the power 
of the abolitionist norm in influencing the mindset of the Chinese authorities. In the 
broader Chinese domestic context, cognitive impact resulted from self-reflection upon 
China’s contemporary history, especially concerning the Cultural Revolution on behalf of 
the Chinese officials, is considered an important internal driving force behind the Chinese 
domestic change in attitude toward rule of law since the early 1980s (Peerenboom 2007: 
201).  
 
As opposed to an NPE diffusion model, one might ask to what extent this increasing 
awareness and consciousness by the Chinese officials shown in these reforms actually are 
generated from within the Party or indeed the Chinese society. The GBCC noticed the 
coincidence between the timing of the 2003-6 EIDHR project and an increasing disquiet 
within China that there were serious problems of miscarriages of justice in the practice of 
the death penalty.
234
 Thus, Godement (2008: 74) argues that the 2007 review has been ‘a 
largely domestic process resulting from mounting criticism of capital punishment by the 
educated elite’.  If this is the case, the EU’s direct impact on China’s change of death 
penalty stance and penal system is weaker than previously expected. However, such 
domestic incentives could eventually evolve into a major public discourse for abolition 
within China. To that end, it could potentially prove the validity of an abolitionist stance as 
a universal norm, in the sense that it has sprung up virtually everywhere because of its 
widespread application to the modern condition. Either way, cooperation with the EU on 
the death penalty has provided expertise, experience, normative and rights arguments 
which had pushed for a change of policy preferences by the Chinese government. 
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4.3.3.2 Chinese rhetoric change  
Both the Chinese officials and academics have made considerable rhetorical changes 
concerning death penalty practice. Before the late 1990s, Chinese discourse on human 
rights was still unanimously against abolition based on cultural, deterrence and 
developmentalist arguments. Today, these arguments are still prominent in both official and 
academic discussions, however the balance has shifted over the years as there is an 
emerging rights consciousness and maturity in understanding legal principles and ideas 
increasingly evolving into domestic pressure for reform and even abolition (Macbean 2008: 
206-207).   
 
To prove the causal connections between China’s rhetoric change and a relatively small 
number of Chinese scholars and academics receiving lectures, attending conferences or 
participating in training and academic exchanges between 1998 and 2009 is impossible. 
Even tangible results such as legal reforms as discussed in the previous section are 
products of a complex dynamics of international and domestic dimensions with various 
variables involved amongst various institutions.   
 
Thus, I intend to identify normative/moral and human rights arguments embedded in 
Chinese official and academic discourse since the late 1990s. As I demonstrate earlier in 
section one, China remains under no international legal obligation to comment on its use of 
death penalty and the vague formulation of basic concepts in international human rights 
instruments allows China to adopt alternative interpretations. Hence, the EU’s prominent 
normative position, although set within the framework of international law, is most likely 
to facilitate the emergence of normative/moral arguments for the abolition in China. 
Furthermore, the influence of the US as another norm entrepreneur in this case is virtually 
non-existence, given its own record in the death penalty practice which is often cited by the 
Chinese authorities to denounce the legitimacy of the abolitionist norm. 
 
Although in both academic and official discourse, advocating abolition is still considered 
the voice of the minority, the majority of arguments against abolition are based on cultural 
relativist, developmentalist and crime deterrence views. At the fourth session in March 
2007, the most recent abolitionist statement on China’s official position was made by Mr 
La Yifan at the UN Human Rights Council. Mr La stated that: 
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‘China was a country with a rule of law, where the death penalty only applied 
to the worst crimes, and this was in agreement with the ICCPR. The death 
penalty’s scope of application was to be reviewed shortly, and it was expected 
that this scope would be reduced, with the final aim of abolishment.’235 
The first part of this statement justifies China’s current practice of the death penalty by 
reference to rule of law and international human rights law. Although the second half does 
not explain why the ‘final aim’ is abolition, this potential move towards abandoning the 
practice can either be driven by ‘moral consciousness’ or influenced by the global 
abolitionist trend.  
 
Hood and Hoyle (2008: 100) notice that there had been a visible change in the discourse, 
evidenced by the willingness of the Chinese authorities to discuss the death penalty in 
human rights seminars and dialogues with the EU. One of the major progresses in terms of 
shaping Chinese discourse is reflected in the publication of The Road to Abolition, in 
which former retentionist scholars such as Zhao Bingzhi, a regular participant in the EU-
China human rights dialogue and legal seminars, edited this book of essays on abolition of 
the death penalty for economic crimes (Zhao 2004).
 
  
 
In academic discussion, the first openly abolitionist voice came from Professor Qiu 
Xinglong who argued that: 
‘As long as the law recognised that criminals were humans, the criminals were 
entitled to live and the state and the law could not deprive them of their right to 
life.’236 
Qiu also found that most countries appear to support abolition because in this respect they 
see themselves sharing many of the European Enlightenment values including human rights. 
Furthermore, the positive influence of Catholicism is felt across the region in the sense of a 
respect for human life. 
237
  European stance on the death penalty has certainly captured the 
imagination of Chinese legal scholars like Qiu who seek to understand the cultural and 
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historical lessons that the success of the European abolitionist movement holds for China. 
However, Qiu did not call for an immediate abolition, as he believed that:  
 ‘Judging by the specific state of affairs of today’s China, it is impossible to 
have capital punishment abolished in China in the near future … What China at 
this moment can do is to adopt a policy of “limiting [the kinds of crime to be 
punishable by the] death penalty”; this is a totally feasible target’. (Qiu 2001: 
97) 
Chinese scholars’ views, particularly those of social scientists, are generally not 
transformed directly and immediately into public policies. They nevertheless provide an 
important source of knowledge for the general public and may serve as a catalyst for social 
and policy changes in the long run (Lu and Miethe 2007: 21). In eighteenth-century Europe, 
when public opinion was overwhelmingly in favour of the death penalty, Italian scholar 
Beccaria in his 1764 publication ‘on Crimes and Punishment’, similarly, the European 
influence can at best be identified in debates among a very small number of Chinese 
academics.  
 
4.3.3.3 Consequentialist Ethics 
Consequentialist ethics drawn on the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart 
Mill suggests that normative ethics should be based on the outcomes of actions. Thus, the 
right consequences are measured according to the principles found in the target society, 
rather than the merits of those who deliver the action (Manners 2008: 58). In this sense, the 
impact of EU human rights policy on the death penalty should be judged by the general 
rules and principles found in Chinese society, rather than EU’s own principles. One of the 
prime justifications I establish in section two for not abolishing the death penalty in China, 
according to the authorities, is the belief that it enjoys wide support from the general public. 
If its scope of application is reduced or the practice is abolished, it would be against the 
Chinese public opinion and cultural values, and provoke the fear for the lack of public 
security. 
 
The first and foremost problem associated with this normative theorising lies in the myth 
of whether the Chinese public does have a deep seated belief in the morality and utility of 
death penalty practice. Since there has been little academic research studying the 
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deterrence effect of the death penalty in Chinese society due to its political sensitivity, the 
European Commission funded a legal research project to mount an empirical account to 
verify the claim of the overwhelming public support for the death penalty. The results show 
that the public did not have strong moral opinions on the for-and-against debate on the 
death penalty, nor were the public aware of the international trend of abolition (Hood 2009: 
2). Therefore, it seems that we are left without a basis for judging the NPE through 
normative ethics.  
 
Secondly, if an informed public opinion is not possible to identify, in theory the statistics 
regarding the death sentences and executions should be an indicator based on the general 
welfare of the society. This option is automatically ruled out, given that credible statistics 
are not available in China.  
 
Nevertheless, I argue that the impact of the project ‘strengthening the defence capability of 
lawyers’ could be both normatively effective and also meet the requirement of 
consequentialist ethics. This project started when there was an unprecedented and growing 
amount of criticism, first from academic and legal circles and then even the official media, 
towards the cases of the death penalty being wrongly administered at provincial level, 
which eventually led to the legal reform in 1997. The target group of this project were 
defence lawyers involved in the death penalty cases, training these lawyers would 
presumably improve their defence skills, thus reducing the risks of miscarriage of justice 
which was perceived in the interests of the Chinese society.   
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter applies a NPE framework as an alternative view in understanding the EU’s 
foreign policy on the death penalty. It implements this framework by analysing the Chinese 
case through the three stages of norms formulation, normative action and normative impact. 
Through cultural immersion and exploring the legal background of the subject, I seek to 
understand the origins of the EU’s ambition to abolish the death penalty internationally in 
relation to the whole set of moral, philosophical and legal concepts, and foreign policy 
practice in which this global ambition is embedded. With regard to China, I intend to 
present summaries of cultural, historical and legal context within which China as a special 
case in both the world of capital punishment and EU foreign policy agenda can be 
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comprehended and interpreted.  
 
With this interpretivist epistemology in mind, I first present a review of major arguments 
and perspectives in the current study of international law with regard to the death penalty. 
Through this summary, I establish that an NPE perspective implies the adoption of a 
human rights approach against the death penalty with its legitimate basis found in 
international law, as well as a normative view as to why it should be abolished by rejecting 
the validity of a utilitarian view against the abolition stance. I then conclude that although 
abolition of the death penalty has yet to become a binding norm in international law, its 
legitimacy lies in its normative justification. 
 
I then proceed to analyse the contradictions in Chinese official justifications of its death 
penalty practice in order to establish a normative basis for the application of NPE in a 
cross-cultural context. Although norm contestation is much anticipated in the Chinese case 
due to the divergence in legal and political culture between the two sides, I indicate that 
normative arguments could potentially become more persuasive than rights arguments. 
 
In the first stage of the tri-partite analysis, I argue that that the EU position is unequivocal 
and transparent, therefore unlikely to be subject to accusation of hypocrisy or double 
standards. The EU’s response to and dealing with the human rights violations in China thus 
shed light on its own self-perception, and it sustained itself through consolidating the EU’s 
normative identity. Manners proclaims (2002: 239) that normative power is ‘power of an 
ideational nature characterised by common principles and a willingness to disregard 
Westphalian conventions.’ On that note, the willingness of EU member states to achieve 
abolition at the cost of their sovereignty makes this case of capital punishment a prime 
example of NPE. At this stage, virtue ethics sits well with NPE in ways in which we 
understand the dynamics between internal and external practices, and the universalist 
disposition of the norm it stands for.  
 
In the second stage of analysis, I present a set of procedures for describing and explaining 
five different forms of norm diffusion mechanisms. Each model of diffusion contains 
descriptions, causal questions and alternative explanations to evaluate the hypothesis for 
normative action. Although almost all empirical evidence on normative action in this case 
Chapter Four 
 
140 
 
study belongs to certain norm diffusion models, the evaluation through deontological 
ethics revealed  significant discrepancies between the requirements of normative action 
through NPE perspective, and standards for morally acceptable action based on 
deontological ethics. 
 
In the final section, I demonstrate the ontological difference between the conception of 
impact from a positivist and a normative perspective. However, I am not able to establish 
causal links between EU action and China’s tangible legal reform, nor could I define 
ideational impact among diverse views held by Chinese officials from different institutions 
talking to different audiences. Nevertheless, the EU influence on intellectual enlightenment 
in China on the death penalty seems easy to identify, yet it remains difficult to demonstrate 
the impact of individual intellectuals’ views on the official agenda. Similarly, 
consequentialist ethics seems to invoke questions that cannot be answered. Moreover, even 
the universalist premise of minimum standards in international law is challenged through 
this way of ethical thinking, in circumstances where the principles of the Chinese society 
seem remotely related with the international law.  
 
In this chapter, I conclude that the EU’s normative power depends on whether it has 
successfully persuaded China of the universality of the abolitionist norm. To that end, I 
argue there is a considerable degree of contestation in perceiving the abolition of the death 
penalty as an international human rights norm by the Chinese. Therefore, this investigation 
is unable to establish a legitimate basis for assessing normative power and normative 
justification in case of China within the given analytical timeframe (1989-2009). However, 
it does not mean a cultural relativist view is considered valid, either. Although this chapter 
demonstrates the European origin of the death penalty norm, it also recognises its 
universality based on well-established literature. Therefore, my point of departure in the 
chapter is to adopt a human rights approach to the death penalty which is often considered 
invalid outside the European dominion, as in this case, China. However, despite Chinese 
peculiarities in its history and culture, I have found evidence and emerging arguments in 
academic and public discussion that indicate the future of introducing an abolitionist policy 
in China is not entirely impossible, albeit a long way to go. To that end, European states 
arrived at a universally applicable standard first, but that does not make this norm 
‘Eurocentric’. 
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Chapter Five 
 
The Tibet Question 
 
 
 
Introduction 
In the past two decades, the human rights situation in Tibet
238
 has gained widespread 
currency within the international community. In this context, the EU is either seen as a 
sympathetic outsider who at times reflects popular moral sentiment in the West, or an 
imperialist intruder in the eyes of the Chinese.
239 
A cursory glance at EU-China relations 
would reveal that periods of tension tend to correspond with the publicity of human rights 
abuses in Tibet or the 14
th
 Dalai Lama’s European tours.  
 
Amongst those who have studied EU-China relations, there seems to be little unanimity on 
the influence of the Tibet issue on the EU’s China policy (Balme 2008b; Cabestan 2010). 
However, surprisingly few have engaged with the Tibet question at breadth, which poses a 
stark contrast with the attention given by the Western media and civil societies. This 
neglect in the literature, according to Anand (2002:4), reflects the strategic interests of 
major Western powers, IR’s focus on relations between states and ethnocentrism of the IR 
discipline. So far, legal and historical scholarship within which the Tibet question is widely 
studied has established little consensus on the nature of the Tibet question in relation to 
international norms. Nevertheless, it constitutes an important source which can be used to 
demystify the frustration and discrepancy between the EU and China in understanding this 
issue.    
                                                          
238
 Depending on the actual context, the term ‘Tibet’ in this chapter refers to either Tibetan Autonomous 
Region (TAR) - a view from the People’s Republic of China, or ‘Greater Tibet’ which includes TAR, 
Qinghai province, Tibetans areas of Sichuan and Yunnan province – a view adopted by Tibetan 
Government in Exile (TGIE) and international Tibet support group. 
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 For instance, see ‘Tell you a true Tibet – Origins of so-called “Tibetan Independence”’, Xinhua News 
Agency, 26 April 2008. 
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The scope of this chapter is about the normative power of the EU on the issue of Tibet. 
Following on from the previous case-study on the death penalty, the theoretical claim of 
NPE is further extended with an empirical analysis of Tibet as a sticking point reflecting 
upon the uneasy relationship between the EU’s human rights concerns on Tibet and the 
implementation of CFSP towards China; between the EU’s normative and materialistic 
concerns; and between norms of international law and the political reality of China’s 
powerful presence, all of which touch fundamental questions about the organising 
principles of international society.  
 
Unlike the previous case study, the first section is devoted to examining the relevant 
historical and political issues rather than international legal perspective. This is justified 
two-fold. Firstly, it is to enable the later discussion of international law to be based on 
factual position summarised in section one. Secondly, it highlights the complexity of this 
issue in historical and political aspects with a particular reference to the role played by the 
West. In section two, I identify the scope of norms involved in the paradigms to which the 
EU and China have subscribed. In so doing, I ask why the international mechanism as part 
of the UN has failed to address the Tibet question; and to what extent it was influenced by 
China’s relations with the West, and how the West’s policy, and the EU in particular, is 
expected to be empowered and constrained by adopting international human rights 
discourse and legal standards to the issue of Tibet. In section three as the centrepiece of the 
chapter, I apply the NPE framework to the Tibetan case. I first look at the principles and 
issues surrounding minority rights and the right of self-determination in framing EU 
foreign policy regarding Tibet, and how they had been applied by the EU in its own back 
garden. I then move on to illustrate the ways in which EU normative power is diffused and 
how impacts should be judged.  
5.1 The Tibet Question: issues and controversies   
In international politics, the Tibet question is regarded as the question of what should be 
the historical and political status of Tibet vis-à-vis China (Goldstein 2004: 186, Anand 
2006: 287). For the Chinese government, the ‘so-called “Tibet question”’ is provoked only 
by forces external to China, and it manifests continuing support by Western countries for 
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Tibetan separatists.
240 
For the Dalai Lama, on the other hand, “it is an issue of colonial rule: 
the repression of Tibet by the PRC and the resistance to that rule by the people of Tibet.”241   
 
On the official level, all European governments acknowledge that Tibet is part of China 
and no country has formally recognised the Tibet Government in Exile (TGIE). And yet the 
Europeans sustain the exile cause in many other non-official ways, evidenced by thousands 
of ‘Tibet supporters’ rallying to it, including individual parliaments, rights activists, 
celebrities, artists and ordinary converts to Tibetan Buddhism.  
 
The purpose of this section is to contextualise the Tibet question with implications on how 
the European views relate to the historical status of Tibet and political expressions such as 
human rights and sovereignty adopted by actors connected with the debate. It does so by 
looking at the ways in which different views of Tibet’s political status and internal situation 
have come about. The following themes are drawn from the historical background of the 
Tibet question as often framed in international debates, whilst no attempt is made to deal 
copiously with the complex history of the Tibet question itself. The reason why this 
constitutes a point of departure is that it helps us understand the state of the controversy to 
shed light on why the EU and China tend to talk past each other on the issue of Tibet. 
Furthermore, it sets out factual conclusions for assessing the legitimacy claims of 
European foreign policy.   
 
5.1.1 The Chinese “Occupation” of Tibet 
At the core of the China-Tibet 
242
 dispute is the historical status of Tibet, with regard to 
which the main controversy as to whether Tibet had been independent or part of China in 
recent history (Sautman and Dreyer 2006, Goldstein 2004). The PRC’s political claims on 
Tibet are, first and foremost, based on historical control. As unequivocally stated in the 
1992 White Paper on Tibet and the official documents on its ‘ownership of Tibet’, China 
                                                          
240 ‘Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Remarks on British Prime Minister Brown’s Meeting with 
Dalai’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Beijing, 26 May 2008. 
241 ‘Address by His Holiness the Dalai Lama at the Palace of Westminster’, London, 16 July 1996, available 
at http://hhdl.dharmakara.net/westministewr.html., [accessed 12 Apr. 2011] 
242 The term ‘China-Tibet’ is only used outside of the People’s Republic of China; the Chinese official 
discourse applies ‘China’s Tibet’ in international debates on Tibet.  
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maintains that: 
243
 
‘In the mid-13th century, Tibet was official incorporated into the domain of 
China’s Yuan dynasty [1271-1368]. Since then, although China experienced 
several dynastic changes, Tibet has remained under the jurisdiction of the 
central government of China.’    
In the mind of the PRC government, the fact that the China had not effectively ruled over 
Tibet between 1912 and 1951 does not suggest that Tibet was once independent. From the 
collapse of Qing Dynasty in 1912 until the Communist Party took power in 1949, China 
was tattered by warlordism, invaded by the Japanese, and then marred by the civil war 
between the Nationalists and the Communists (Grunfeld 1996: 256). Therefore, the 
Chinese government claims that Tibet is part of China, which they ‘peacefully liberated’ in 
1951, and have since subsidized and developed economically under the terms of the 
Seventeen- Point Agreement. 
244
     
 
Tibetan exiles on the other hand maintain that Tibet has always been an independent 
political entity for the past 2,000 years. Some exiled leaders hold that the consequence of 
asserting the past independence of Tibet is not only that Tibet is an occupied state, but also 
that its independence must be regained.
245
 The Dalai Lama also holds that Tibet had been 
independent when China invaded and began China’s “illegal occupation” of the country 
(Goldstein 1997: 77). However, in what he called “middle way” as preconditions to talk 
with China, he accepted Tibet as part of the PRC, but insisted a Greater Tibet should 
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 China’s White Paper on Tibet, Beijing, 24 September 1992; Tibet-Its Ownership and Human Rights 
Situation, Beijing, September 1992. The two documents are almost identical, although some small 
important textual amendments were made to the later. 
244
 The Agreement of Central People’s Government and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the 
Peaceful Liberation of Tibet (The 17-Point Agreement), was signed between the 14
th
 Dalai Lama and the 
PRC on affirming Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. While the Chinese authorities consider the document as 
legally binding and mutually welcomed by both governments and by the Tibetan people; the Tibetan exiles, 
on the other hand, international governments and Tibet support groups generally consider the document 
lacking authority as it was signed by the Dalai Lama under duress.  According to the report by the ICJ in 
1997, the ICJ recognised that ‘Tibet signed at pistol-point’ (1997: 95), and ‘the 17-Point Agreement was a 
contradictory document, guaranteeing on the one hand no alteration of Tibetan political and religious 
systems, while on the other hand providing for Tibet to be governed by the system of “national regional 
autonomy”. The system of national regional autonomy, while promising much in generalities, was vague as 
to specifics, and was to become entirely dependent upon Chinese interpretation and implementation’ (ICJ 
1997: 47).  
245
 Such as the Tibetan Youth Committee or senior political leaders such as the Dalai Lama’s brother, Takster 
Rinpoche. 
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become a self-governing political entity founded on a constitution that granted Tibet 
Western-style democratic rights.
246 
The PRC dismissed this public offer as an indirect form 
of independence.
247 
 
 
Since the Dalai Lama fled China in 1959, the two sides have quarrelled over this historical 
issue more than any other matter, with the debate aiming at mobilizing support, rather than 
arriving at a common ground. As Goldstein (2004: 188) points out: 
“Not only there has been relatively little first-hand scientific research in the 
Tibetan areas in China but there has also been a tidal wave of misleading and 
often dissembling partisan writing and rhetoric generated by the combatants 
and their supporters. Both sides [of the PRC and the TGIE] have expended an 
enormous amount of time and effort to spread their representations of past 
history and contemporary politics, the result being diametrically opposed 
constructions of reality make it difficult for any but specialists to assess.”   
In the past two decades, the EU’s position on the Tibet question has generally been 
ambiguous and accommodating, but its major concern has never been Tibetan 
independence. Despite British attempts to control the area in the late 19
th
 century and early 
20
th
 century, Britain and other European countries do not stand out in the Tibet question in 
contemporary history as external powers, unlike India which is the exile’s primary host, or 
the United States which had financially and militarily supported the Tibetan cause back in 
the 1950s and 1960s. Thus, for all of the efforts on behalf of the Tibetans to have helped 
the Tibet cause gain enormous international visibility, the EU policymakers have not 
committed themselves to more than autonomy for Tibet under China. Instead, they insisted 
that the Tibetans focus their publicity on China’s violations of human rights rather than on 
the core political issues the Tibetans wanted to raise – that is, Chinese invasion and 
occupation of their country.  
 
5.1.2 “Violation of Human Rights” of Tibetans 
International concerns of human rights abuses in Tibet focus on cultural genocide, political 
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imprisonment and torture, the illegitimacy of China’s sovereignty in the region, and the 
Chinese (PRC) government’s reluctance to fully embrace universal human rights.248 Other 
areas of human rights violations, according to Human Rights Watch (HRW), centre around 
religious freedom being reportedly violated by the Chinese government’s policies through 
manipulating Tibetans’ religious practices and sentiments for political purposes (Sperling 
2000a: 2). Particularly prominent in this case has been the “patriotic education” campaign 
which is allegedly aiming at diminishing the influence of the Dalai Lama’s on Tibetans in 
Tibet (Sperling 2000a: 3). Furthermore, certain monasteries and temples are put under 
secular, heavy-handed governmental management by the Chinese authorities in order to 
implement greater control over the Tibet region (ibid.). Another well-known case is 
Gedhun Choekyi Nyima - the incarnation of the 10
th
 Panchen Lama recognised by the 14
th
 
Dalai Lama, who has been under house arrest in an unknown location since 1995 at the age 
of six. Moreover, there have been contentious reports on torture of political prisoners in 
Tibet.
249  
 
In general, the Chinese government neglects the international criticisms on the alleged 
rights violations in Tibet, and insists that it is an issue of Chinese territorial integrity and 
national unity. 
250
 The Chinese official’s standardised statement at the regular sessions of 
the UN Human Rights Council argues: 
‘The Tibet issue is entirely an internal issue of China which concerns the 
country’s sovereignty……[it] is not an ethnic issue, not a religious issue, nor a 
human rights issue, but an issue either to safeguard national unification or to 
split the motherland.’251 
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 As one example of such human rights abuses, ten monks from Drepung monastery were imprisoned for 5 
to 19 years for ‘crimes’ such as producing a Tibetan translation of the UDHR. See Defying the Dragon – 
China and Human Rights in Tibet, jointly issued by LAWASIA and the Tibet Information Network, March 
1991, p.118 
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Evidence on these violations of human rights has been documented by the renowned Tibetologist Elliot 
Sperlling who collaborated with Human Rights Watch on the book, Tibet Since 1950: Silence, prison, or 
Exile, (2000b), Robert Hale: London. 
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 In general, Chinese scholarly accounts do acknowledge that human rights in Tibet during the Cultural 
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U.S government‘s neglect on rights violations during that period. See Xu Mingxu and Yuan Feng (2006: 
308) and Zhang Zhirong (1994: 145-170) 
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The Chinese diplomat Qian Bo, Counsellor of the Chinese Mission to the UN Office in Geneva was 
addressing a regular session of the UN Human Rights Council, see ‘Tibet issue not about human rights, 
says diplomat’, Xinhua News Agency, 6 June 2008. 
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In addition, the PRC argues that the Dalai Lama institution in feudal Tibet itself had 
severely undermined Tibetans’ human rights: 
‘Before the Democratic Reform of 1959, Tibet had long been a society of feudal 
serfdom under the despotic religio-political rule of lamas and nobles; a society 
which was darker and more cruel than the European serfdom of the Middle 
Ages.’252 
With the American rapprochement with China in the 1970s, little was indeed said in the 
West about the destruction of traditional life within Tibet, which peaked during the 
Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). Zhang (1994: 170-171) acknowledges that ‘the Chinese 
government had made mistakes in its Tibet policy, particularly the destruction of Tibetan 
monasteries and religious practice in Tibet during the Cultural Revolution (1976-1977); 
however, the Cultural Revolution was not directed to Tibet, it was a nation-wide disaster’. 
When other communist regimes fell in Eastern Europe, international attention was paid to 
the Tibetan question again while the discourse of international human rights emerged 
(Anand 2002: 168). In the mid-1980s, as tensions rose in Tibet due to the influx of Chinese 
population, failure of the dialogue with the Chinese government and renewed political 
repression, the Dalai Lama decided to ‘internationalise’ the Tibet question as a human 
rights problem and seek governmental support in the West (Goldstein 1997: 75-78; 
Grunfeld 1996: 231-233; Mountcastle 2006: 90). As rights issues enjoy a growing profile 
in international politics after the end of the Cold War, the Tibet question has continued to 
gather wide support in the West, and provided the Tibetan exiles and their supporters with a 
participation in global politics they would not otherwise have (Adams 1998: 76).  
 
On the other hand, the Chinese struggled to make sense as to why the Dalai Lama’s 
international initiative suddenly garnered so much sympathy and support across political 
spectrum. For the Chinese, the 1980s was the start of China’s economic ‘miracle’ after the 
mistakes of the Cultural Revolution had just been vindicated by the Communist Party. 
Meanwhile, Tibetans also enjoyed an unprecedented level of prosperity in economy, health 
and infrastructure, thanks to the CCP’s economic reform. In addition, the Chinese recalled 
the silence of the West over Tibet in the 1970s, and believed the ‘so-called Tibetan human 
rights problem’ was manipulated and fabricated by those with ‘ulterior motives’ (Zhang 
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1994: 172).  
 
For many Europeans, their concern and support for the Tibetan cause are mainly framed in 
human rights discourse, in which China’s infringement of rights in Tibet mainly refers to 
cultural rights, religious freedom and minority rights.
253 
In the Joint Statement with the U.S 
regarding to the unrest in Tibet in 2008, the EU reiterated its human rights perspective 
towards the issue of Tibet.
254 
The British government in its latest statement represents a 
watershed in its Tibetan policy – that is, one that concerns human rights not its political 
status: 
‘No government which is committed to promoting international respect for 
human rights can remain silent on the issue of Tibet, or disinterested in a 
solution to its problems. […]Our interest is not in restoring an order which 
existed 60 years ago and which the Dalai Lama himself has said he does not 
seek to restore.’255 
For Mountcastle (2006: 89), not only human rights become a political strategy of particular 
efficacy from a realist perspective, it is also an ideological tool to broaden the spectrum of 
participation of the Tibet question as an international moral concern. Barnett (2001: 291) 
notices that, the concept of human rights offers a language that can respond to the Western 
domestic audience as criticising China, meanwhile, Chinese officials would consider such 
criticisms on human rights violations as sufficiently mild so as not to threaten China’s 
fundamental interests in Tibet.   
 
5.1.3 The Historical Legacy of European Imperialism  
Chinese official account argues that the Tibet question emerged as a direct result of the 
British expansion in Asia and its aggression into Tibet, and accuses the Tibetan 
independence movement as being launched by pro-British clique founded by British 
invasion and bribery in the early 20
th
 century (Zhang 1994: 47-49; Xu and Yuan 2006: 307-
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311).
256
 According to Goldstein (1997), Britain and Russia had formally acknowledged 
Chinese suzerainty over Tibet in treaties signed in 1906 and 1907; and the British invasion 
of Tibet had encouraged the Qing Empire to integrate Tibet with the rest of its territory. For  
Goldstein (1997: 37), the double standard of British policy
257 
of being willing to deal 
directly with Tibetans without recognizing their independence revealed the ambiguous and 
hypocritical attitude of the Western world towards Tibet for its strategic location as a buffer 
state in Central Asia and commercial interests in the Chinese empire. As a result of these 
agreements, claimed by Chinese scholars, British India annexed 90,000 square kilometres 
of the ‘Chinese territory’, and had the privilege of exemption from customs duty and other 
taxation in Tibet, with many trading ports and stationed troops under the British control 
(Zhang 1994: 55-59; Xu and Yuan 2006: 308).  
 
For all its practical purposes, the official line of the PRC government considers all pro-
independence campaigns as driven and backed by “Western imperialism” with the aim to 
destabilise China and eventually destroy its territorial integrity and sovereignty.
258
 
Therefore, with imperial Britain and contemporary U.S who had supported the Tibetan 
uprising in the 1950s and 1960s in mind, the Chinese official account from the White 
Paper concludes that: 
“Historical facts over more than a century clearly demonstrated that so-called 
‘Tibetan independence’ was, in reality, cooked up by old and new imperialists 
out of their crave to wrest Tibet from China.”259 
In contemporary Tibetan studies, there is a consensus that the West has played a crucial 
role in framing the Tibet question in terms of, not only the historical legacy of British 
imperialism, but also the vocabulary of political expressions, particularly ‘sovereignty’ and 
later ‘human rights’ (Anand 2006, Goldstein 1997). The failure of the British to understand 
the complex relation between Tibet and China led to an anachronistic understanding of the 
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See White Paper: Origins of So-Called “Tibetan Independence”, (1992), and “Tibet issue”, evolution and 
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pre-modern Tibet’s relationship with China in modern political and legal standards (Wang 
2006, Anand 2006). To that end, the genesis of the Tibet question is not the historical 
conflict between the Chinese and the Tibetans, but British imperialist endeavour in the 
name of ‘Chinese suzerainty’ and ‘British protectorate’ which inevitably made China gain 
control over Tibet in 1951 in absolute rule (Anand 2006: 293). On the other hand, Anand 
(2006:285) points out that:  
‘Ironically, the Chinese state, which defies the West politically, does so without 
questioning its wholesale adoption of Western conceptions of statehood, 
sovereignty, and realpolitik. Similarly, the Tibetans, exoticized as products of 
uniquely non-Western culture, argue for their independence using the same 
Western ideas that they considered as alien until mid-twentieth century.’  
In view of the European imperialistic legacy, how do we know that ‘normative power’ 
Europe should not be perceived as a mere expression of Eurocentric imperialism in the 
Tibetan case?  On the one hand, the normative legitimacy of European foreign policy is 
clouded by the imperialist legacy of Britain in the eyes of the Chinese. On the other hand, 
the EU has a significant role to play in the eyes of the externally based Tibet support 
groups concerning human rights violations inside Tibet. That the legacy of British 
imperialism in Tibet has invoked a European identity perceived by the Other - China, is an 
interesting question to be asked, reflecting upon some fundamental questions regarding 
what Europe is. In this case, EU member states’ colonial past clearly have implications in 
the European Union’s relations with the rest of the world today (Bhambra 2009: 72). Diez 
(2004: 321) suggests that ‘the most important other in the construction of a European 
identity has been Europe’s own past’, thus calling for ‘a greater degree of reflexivity’. In 
this empirical investigation, linking the normative power of the EU with the early twentieth 
century British imperialism, simply because they share the same logic of self/other identity 
is a ‘neo-colonial’ approach to NPE Manners has effectively denied (Manners 2006). 
Drawing from the patterns in Euro-Med relations, Nicolaïdis and Nicolaïdis (2006) suggest 
that the EU’s ‘wisdom’ and ‘guilt’ in the eyes of the non-European other can be reconciled 
through ‘collective post-colonial atonement’. In this vein, the source of legitimacy of 
European universalism has to rely on ‘the universalism of others’ through transcending 
conventional political boundaries and frameworks. However, the problem with such 
reconciliation lies in the resistance to accepting European universalism. From a post-
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colonial perspective, China cannot view the values the EU promotes as ‘universal’ simply 
because it had disastrous experience as a result of Western imperialism which justified 
itself by reason of the same value system (Golden 2006: 268) Moreover, the reason the 
Tibet issue does not meet the precondition of ‘universality of others’ for such reconciliation 
can be understood in two-fold: 1) the international debate on Tibet’s political status is 
framed in sovereignty and statehood, whereas the EU subscribes itself to a post-
Westphalism model; 2) international human rights standards are contested by the Chinese 
cultural relativist attitude and justification of its policy based on other sets of international 
norms. 
 
In order to justify the post-modern image of the EU has of itself as a normative power 
instead of an imperialistic power, it is thereby necessary to look into the body of 
international human rights law literature on Tibet in order to identify the normative basis 
which serves as ‘external reference point’ (Manners 2006a: 170) and constitutes the source 
of normative justification for NPE.  
5.2 Tibet and International Human Rights Norms  
After the initial appeal to the UN regarding Chinese aggression in 1950, the 14
th
 Dalai 
Lama made a second appeal on 9 September 1959 upon his exile in India. Subsequently, 
three UN resolutions were passed in 1959, 1961 and 1965, all of which were ‘gravely 
concerned’ at the ‘violation of fundamental human rights of the Tibetan people’.260 The 
attitude of the UN General Assembly, as indicated in the resolutions, pointed to only one 
direction that Tibet’s demand was justifiable. With the PRC’s entry into the UN in 1971 
following the Sino-Soviet split and the rapprochement with the US, Tibet was not 
discussed in the UN until 1985 at the 41
st
 session of the Commission on Human Rights 
(ICJ 1997; Cao and Seymour 1998). However, the award of the Nobel Peace Prize of 1989 
to the Dalai Lama was a major boost to the morale of Tibetan exiles, and had symbolically 
taken the international support for the Tibetan cause to an unprecedented level.   
 
This section looks at the extent to which international human rights law is relevant to the 
Tibet question, and the implications of international human rights law for the normative 
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justification of the EU’s policy on Tibet. The purpose of this section is two-fold. Firstly, it 
defines normativity in terms of the international efforts to solve Tibet’s political, human 
and legal problems. To that end, the normative basis for NPE analysis is established 
through discussing the legitimacy and validity of the international norms that the issue 
entails. Although a complete, neutral and detailed analysis on legal relevance of the 
Tibetan question is likely an impossible one, a legal definition based on the highest level of 
international law, such as those found in the UN resolutions on Tibet, or the most widely 
recognised legal interpretation will form the basis for normative justification. Secondly, 
after clarifying the relationship between international human rights standards and NPE, it 
demonstrates strengths and weaknesses of international legal remedies to solve the Tibet 
question, which are particularly salient for the EU to come up with a policy strategy that 
deals with the reality that China has become the EU’s ‘indispensible partner’, and also has 
a ‘legitimate influence to exert on China’. 261  
 
5.2.1 Right to Self-determination 
The right of self-determination is recognised as a human right in the first article of the UN 
Charter and both International Covenants on Human Rights. The very first articles in both 
Covenants identically assert that: 
262  
 
‘All peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they 
freely determine, without external interference, their own political status and to 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development’. 
The question, therefore, is whether the Tibetan people have this right.  According to all 
three UN resolutions, the General Assembly had referred to the Tibetans clearly as the 
“Tibetan people”. The second UN resolution on Tibet passed on 20 December 1961 
specifically called for the ‘cessation of practices which deprive the Tibetan people of their 
fundamental human rights and freedoms, including their right to self-determination’, which 
was reiterated in the third UN resolution in 1965.
263
 Moreover, the General Assembly 
debates at the time as well-documented in the ICJ reports show that the Tibet question was 
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considered by a majority of its member states ‘in the context of a distinct people under 
alien subjugation and domination entitled to exercise its legitimate right to self-
determination’.264   
 
In 1990, a UNESCO ‘Meeting of Experts on Further Study of the Rights of People’ 
produced a working definition that describes the characteristics of a ‘people’ in the context 
of the rights of people under international law, including the right of self-determination.
265
 
This is a formulation that has found favour with many international lawyers, and was 
adopted by many international organisations, including the European Parliament. 
266
 Based 
on this very definition, there have been two important unofficial investigations into the 
question of self-determination for the Tibetan people held in the early 1990s. The first, in 
November 1992, consisted of hearings by the Permanent People’s Tribunal meeting in 
Strasbourg. The second was through the 1994 Conference of International Lawyers (CIL) 
on issues relating to self-determination and independence for Tibet, with contributions 
from both leading legal experts and historians. Both conferences concluded that, by each of 
these criteria, the Tibetans are a people and their right to self-determination was denied. 
Moreover, in the latest authoritative report (1997) by the International Commission of 
Jurists (ICJ) on Tibetans as ‘a people’, it suggested a ‘minimalist conception’ which 
follows that the right of self-determination as a norm of general international law applies, 
as a minimum, to “peoples”.267  Therefore, even though the right of self-determination is a 
contentious matter in international law, and is the subject of divisive debate, there is no 
serious dispute among international lawyers, historians and Western Tibetologists that 
Tibetans as a people have a right to self-determination, regardless the extent to which its 
various conceptions apply.
268
 
 
                                                          
264 
Tibet – Human Rights and the Rule of Law, the ICJ, December 1997, p.333 
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 Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security on the Situation in Tibet, by Rapporteur Mr 
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 Kamenka (1994: 54) suggested  that ‘the Tibetans are a people and have been so for longer than most 
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International Lawyers on Issues relating to Self-Determination and Independence for Tibet’. 
Chapter Five 
 
154 
 
In the White Paper, China calls Tibet ‘China’s Tibet’, evidencing its ‘ownership’.269 For 
China, the claim on Tibet is simply based on historical arguments intended to establish the 
territorial integrity of China, which inevitably come into conflict with the competing 
principle of the right to self-determination. While Chinese official lines have made no 
mention of the issue of the right to self-determination regarding Tibet, Chinese scholarship 
recalled that the principle of self-determination was initially developed by the UN in the 
decolonisation context. The inclusion of this right into the most important UN human 
rights treaties in 1966 was initiated by Socialist and Third World Countries, and the 
European colonial powers opposed it (Zhang 1994: 9).
270
 Therefore, it does not apply to 
‘China’s Tibet’ as one of China’s fifty-sixty ‘national minorities’271. Ironically, as for the 
UN resolutions (1959, 1961 and 1965), Chinese scholars also believed that they were 
essentially product of Western manipulation
272
, and yet understandably so, given no UN 
resolution on Tibet was passed since the Sino-US rapprochement in the early 1970s (Zhang 
1994; Xu and Yuan 2006).  
 
So far, the PRC has been successful in preventing the UNCHR deciding on the Tibet issue, 
claiming that behind all the human rights arguments was really the claim of independence 
for Tibet. One such resolution in 1992, proposed mainly by the EU, was successfully 
opposed by the United States and China with its Third World supporters, because the 
opposing view that the integrity of the state took precedence over the rights of self-
determination prevailed (Seymour 1998: 21).  
 
Strictly speaking, if Tibet had been an independent state before the Chinese invasion as a 
case for external self-determination, then in principle, the remedy under UN Charter lies in 
the restoration of Tibet’s sovereignty and exclusive control over its territory and people 
(Erasmus 1994: 43). However, the fact that China is a permanent member of the Security 
Council wielding a veto power is unfortunately a political reality. Thus, for politically 
convenience, it is only possibly for Western legal and political practitioners to address the 
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Tibet question if they focus on Tibetans as minority or as individuals without challenging 
the legality or illegality of the Chinese invasion and occupation.  
 
5.2.2 Minority Rights  
For the reasons above, Tibet began to be seen by many Western governments since early 
1990s as an ethnic or minority question which echoed the Chinese official position. 
International standards that codify minority rights can be found in the ICCPR (Article 27), 
which stipulates:
 273
 
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons 
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with 
the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and 
practise their own religion, or to use their own language.     
In 1959 the United Nations General Assembly called “for respect for the fundamental 
human rights of the Tibetan people and for their distinctive cultural and religious life”.274 
In 1961 it spoke of the “suppression of the distinctive cultural and religious life which [the 
Tibetan people] have traditionally enjoyed.” 275This concern was reiterated in 1965.276 
Given at the time Tibet’s political status was still central to the UN’s concern as a case for 
self-determination, the Tibetan question was not framed as a problem of minority rights 
during a period when there was virtually no law of minority rights at all. Not until 1991, 
the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities of the 
UNCHR adopted the first resolution reacting to the international criticism of the human 
rights situation in China after 1989 in general and in Tibet in particular, concerned “at the 
continuing reports of violations of fundamental rights and freedoms which threaten the 
distinct cultural, religious and national identity of the Tibetan people”.277  
 
For international legal perspective, the concept of minority rights intentionally leads away 
from the notion of the right of a people, and therefore, away from the right of self-
determination, whereas the content of minority rights covers the right of persons belonging 
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to a minority category, thus to equal protection of the national law without discrimination 
(Berman 1994: 55). Article 1 of the PRC Constitution (1982) stipulates that: “it is 
necessary to combat big-nation chauvinism, mainly Han chauvinism”. 278  While 
acknowledging the role of Han chauvinism in ethnic tensions in China and having 
developed an “ethnic law” that ensures rights of the minorities, the CCP have rarely come 
up with measures against chauvinistic Han Chinese (Sautman 1999). Sautman (1999: 289) 
thus concludes that much legislation for minority rights in China is “vague and abstract”, 
and ‘the degree to which these rights are guaranteed by specific, mandatory provisions 
varies from measure to measure’. Keller (1994: 65) points out, in Tibet, with its recent 
history of anti-China rebellion and unrest; the Communist Party’s policies are framed by “a 
perceived imperative of national unity”, and Beijing’s instructions remain largely unknown.   
 
To address the Tibet issue as a question of minority rights, the international community is 
now able to focus on Tibetans as individuals, regardless they are a people or a minority. In 
this vein, the ultimate question is to what extent Tibetans as individuals and as an ethnic 
group has genuine freedom to use and develop their language and culture under the 
Chinese law (Sautman 1999; Keller 1994). However, international law, despite being 
relevant to the situation in Tibet, can hardly offer an objective standard by which to 
measure the degree of minority rights enjoyed in the Tibetan areas of China, not to mention 
the lack of access to credible source of evidence.   
 
5.2.3 Other Human Rights 
Freedom of expression, freedom of religious belief and freedom from torture, the rights to 
fair trial, to education and political rights, are all part of the vocabulary articulating 
breaches of individual human rights in Tibet under the UNDHR by international lawyers. 
279
 In response to these criticisms, the Chinese government has produced an abundance of 
materials including ‘white papers’ on ‘Human Rights in China’, ‘Criminal Reform in 
China’ and ‘Tibet – Its Ownership and Human Rights Situation’, all of which, according to 
international legal experts, have left many questions unanswered and are in contradiction 
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with the findings of independent international organisations and experts (Benedek 1994: 
132). 
 
Regarding its international obligations, China has ratified the ICECSR in 2001 but only 
signed the ICCPR in 1998 under international diplomatic pressure, notably from the 
Clinton administration. Wherever China’s compliance is under scrutiny in these matters 
regarding Tibetan’s human rights, the principle of domestic jurisdiction or non-interference 
in internal affairs will be invoked by the Chinese government. 
280
 Moreover, even before 
the process of compliance to obligation of two Covenants took place, China had already 
consider the ‘White papers on Human Rights in China’, issued in 1992, as a proof of 
China’s accountability. 281 Therefore, in any case, China does not refuse to recognise the 
rights guaranteed under the International bill of Rights; but rather, it argues that these 
rights are already well guaranteed by its national standards which are consistent with the 
universal standards (Benedek 1994: 134; He 2006: 79-80).  
   
5.2.4 Norm Contestation and Beyond  
For international lawyers, there is hardly any right in the UNDHR which is not infringed in 
the Tibetan case, even though there is no impartial historical “truth” that  determines 
whether Tibet was an independent nation or always being part of China (Anand 2006: 287). 
General Assembly resolutions, although indicative of a worldview, are not binding on 
Member States. Compared to the complexity in defining the Tibet issue in Western 
scholarship, the Chinese view is a relatively simple and straightforward one. For China, it 
is an issue of territory integrity and Chinese sovereignty, and that, as the late leader Deng 
Xiaoping once said about sovereignty issues, “is not open to negotiation [with any foreign 
country]” (Jian 2009b: 2).  
 
In this context, for NPE to address the Tibet question, the attempt to situate the issue in 
international human rights law has demonstrated a considerable level of norm contestation. 
First of all, in theory, it is not that the Tibetans’ demand for human rights, including the 
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right to external self-determination, lacks legal justification according to international 
human rights standards, but rather, there is an inherent contradiction underpinning the 
double relationship between a collective right and individual rights. As Benedek (1994: 
135) points out, ‘on the one hand, the right to self-determination is considered to be a 
precondition for the full enjoyment of human rights. One the other hand, the denial of 
individual human rights may justify the exercise of the right to self-determination’.  
 
Secondly, on the empirical level, if the Tibetan question is an issue of the right to self-
determination, China calls Tibet one of their many ‘national minorities’, whereas the 
international Tibet support groups generally consider ‘Tibetans’ as ‘a people’ whose right 
of self-determination has been denied. On the other hand, if it is an issue of minority rights, 
the Chinese believe that it has its own idea of autonomy, as different from liberal theories 
of autonomy. The Chinese state conception of “ethnic regional autonomy” (shaoshuminzu 
quyu zizhi, 少数民族区域自治) is derived from Marxism, which stipulates “a unitary, 
centralised political system and the multi-ethnic solidarity of workers and peasants, as well 
as from a pragmatic assessment of what sort of system facilitates stability and economic 
development” (He 2006: 11). Either way, this sets NPE and the Chinese perspectives in 
completely separate paradigms.  
 
To establish the source of legitimacy for NPE, Sjursen (2006b: 246) suggests a rights-
based normative justification that is founded upon a cosmopolitan legal system which aims 
to protect rights of individuals, not the sovereignty rights of states.  To that end, a human 
rights perspective to the Tibet question allows the EU to adopt a language so that the 
Tibetan cause can enjoy global attention as a moral concern. It also legitimises scrutiny of 
the way in which China treats its own inhabitants by other States.  
 
Moreover, given the weak machinery of international human rights law, the best remedy 
for breaches of these human rights is international opinion in the Chinese case (Wan 2001: 
69). To that end, it is important to base the legitimacy of NPE on international human 
rights standards. If China is simply reacting to international opinion, it is thereby reacting 
to its legal obligations, regardless of whether China is legally or morally bound to 
guarantee certain rights or not (Benedek 1994: 134). 
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5.3 EU Normative Power on the Issue of Tibet 
This section applies the tripartite framework, as developed in Chapter Two, to the issue of 
Tibet against the backdrop of the EU-China relations between 1989 and 2009. To do so, I 
follow the example of the previous chapter, and address similar questions. Guided by the 
main hypothesis that the EU has been a normative power towards China on the issue of 
Tibet, each section of the tripartite framework looks at the way in which EU normative 
principle applied to the Tibetan case is constructed, the mechanisms through which norms 
are diffused, as well as the way in which normative impacts are evaluated. Throughout this 
analysis, the EU is approached as one normative entity with complex internal dynamics; 
therefore, whichever EU actor and/or individual member states took the lead in the policy 
process or defined the EU’s action, would represent EU normative power at work.   
 
5.3.1 Normative Principle 
The legal formula that has provided guidance in framing the EU’s response to the situation 
in Tibet had been ambiguous and varied significantly over time among different EU bodies 
and member states. In the early and mid 1990s, The European Parliament had been the 
only EU institution which was willing to recognise Tibet’s right to self-determination and 
considered Tibet as illegally occupied citing the principles laid down by international law 
and three resolutions of the UN. 
282
 With regard to Tibet, the legal basis was defined by the 
Parliament as:  
‘…self-determination, a fundamental principle enshrined in Articles 1(2) and 
55 of the United Nations Charter, is affirmed as a right of peoples in Article 1 
of the United Nations Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights.’ 283 
Although the Parliament regarded the autonomy granted to the Tibet Autonomous Region 
(TAR) by the PRC as insufficient, it did not explain precisely the extent to which Tibetans 
can legitimately exercise the right to self-determination.    
 
Since late 1990s, a more defined approach that focused on violations of human and 
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minority rights and religious freedom can be identified in EU official documents on Tibet, 
however, which of these rights were to be prioritized was never openly discussed or 
articulated. When the basis for EU action in the field of the common foreign and security 
policy was strengthened as The Treaty of Amsterdam which brought several new 
provisions relating to human rights, the Tibet issue was held to a different standard in the 
Commission’s first Communication on China in 1998 compared to previous Parliament 
resolutions:  
‘As it attaches great importance to the respect for the cultural, linguistic and 
religious identity of ethnic minorities, the EU will continue to raise issues 
relating to these matters in Tibet within the bilateral dialogue on human 
rights.’284  
To that end, the legal bases that framed the EU’s response to China’s human rights 
violations, including the situation in Tibet, became the EU Treaty and its provision on 
human rights, namely Article 11(1) of the Treaty on European Union and Article 177 of the 
EC Treaty.
285 
Since then, it seemed the EU members had shared an implicit consensus that 
the EU recognised China’s sovereignty over Tibet, and only the respect for human rights 
and religious freedom would frame the EU’s responses to the issue of Tibet.286  
 
The following sub-sections look at whether and how the EU had developed its approach to 
Tibet, and ask the extent to which Tibet’s human rights problem has become aims and 
objectives in EU foreign policy. I use constructivist insights to EU normative principle to 
analyse how the EU’s positions on Tibet were formulated, and then virtue ethics to provide 
assessment criteria to judge the policy consistency and coherence.  
 
5.3.1.1 Normative Identity 
Unlike China who stresses the primacy and absoluteness of the principle of state 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, the EU on the other hand, has developed its own 
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approach to the fundamental issue of statehood and sovereignty based on the principles of 
international law with the willingness to discard the Westphalian system of sovereignty 
(Foot 2001: 2; Manners 2002: 239).   
 
Reflecting upon the Tibet issue, its political status has never been an openly contentious 
component among EU institutions and member states or in relations with China, due to the 
sensitive nature of the issue and China’s power status. However, it would be too simplistic 
to assume that they all attach the same level of importance to human rights norms when it 
comes to the issue of Tibet. 
 
The European Commission has established the most frequent exchange and extensive 
linkage with its Chinese counterparts, but the normative/legal framework through which 
the Commission address the issue of Tibet has been ambiguous. Understandably, this 
relationship has been complicated by the desire to strengthen business ties with China. 
Within these limits, the Commission wants to build a working relationship with China that 
can “insist on [EU] values”, and address Tibet “without coming off the tracks”287. When 
the President of the European Commission took the first chance among Western states to 
meet with a Chinese leader after the Chinese crackdown on the Tibetan protest in 2008, 
Jose Manuel Barroso’s articulation on the EU’s position was subtle and moderate: 
“I have confirmed that the EU is attached to the territorial integrity and unity 
of China, and that naturally applies to Tibet.” 288 
By contrast, the European Parliament remains the only EU institution that voices its 
concerns on the political status of Tibet through consistently passing resolutions 
condemning China’s occupation, largely responding to domestic concerns and Tibet 
support groups in Europe. In the early 1990s, there were resolutions passed in which the 
EP supported the Tibetans’ right to self-determination based on UN resolutions. On 
occasions, contrary to the overall EU-China ‘honey-moon’ period leading up to 2003, the 
Parliament went as far as recalling Tibet’s illegal invasion by China, and calling on the 
governments of the Member States: 
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‘…to give serious consideration to the possibility of recognising the Tibetan 
Government in Exile as the legitimate representative of the Tibetan people if, 
within three years, the Beijing authorities and the Tibetan government in exile 
have not, through negotiations organised under the aegis of the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, signed an agreement of a new Statue for 
Tibet.’289  
However, EP resolutions did not seem to be reflected in the positions adopted by other EU 
bodies and its member states.   
 
In bilateral relations, although all member states formally insisted upon a clear-cut one-
China policy, largely beholden to China’s economic influence and political pressure, the 
assertiveness in pressing and prioritizing Tibet on human rights agenda in their relations 
with China had far from been the same.  Regarding the Big Three, although the official 
German position is committed to a one-China policy that rejected any separatist aims, 
Germany remains the most committed to what it views as ‘religions and cultural autonomy’ 
for Tibet. In 2007, German Chancellor Angela Merkel became the first German chancellor 
to meet with the Dalai Lama, even though Germany has long been the largest European 
trading partner with China. 
290
  France also sticks to ‘the One China policy and her position 
that Tibet is an integral part of Chinese territory’ ever since General de Gaulle took upon 
the decision to object to ‘all support for Tibet’s independence in any form whatsoever’. 291 
However, French President Nicolas Sarkozy struggled to deal with China without 
renouncing “European values”, especially when French ties with China were severely 
strained by Sarkozy’s meeting with the Dalai Lama in 2008.292  The UK holds a special 
place amongst the big three, not just because its preference to deal with China bilaterally, 
rather than through European channels. Since 1914, Britain had been the only country who 
did not fully recognise China’s sovereignty over Tibet; instead it defined the idea of 
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autonomy for Tibet within the context of ‘suzerainty’. 293 In October 2008 the British 
government changed this long-standing formal position: 
 ‘Our ability to get our points across has sometimes been clouded by the 
position the UK took at the start of the 20
th
 century on the status of Tibet, a 
position based on the geopolitics of the time. Our recognition of China’s 
“special position” in Tibet developed from the outdated concept of suzerainty. 
[…] We have made clear to the Chinese Government, and publicly, that we do 
not support Tibetan independence. Like every other EU member state, and the 
United States, we regard Tibet as part of the People’s Republic of China.’294  
Overall, Member States might have subscribed to similar position on Tibet insofar as they 
recognise China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity yet differ in their willingness to meet 
the Dalai Lama and under what terms the meeting will take place, sometimes varying 
according to the particular national government.  Thus, in the absence of an EU policy to 
address Tibet’s human rights problem, there has been no clear articulation of which 
international human rights norms underpin the EU’s concerns on the Tibet issue. From an 
NPE perspective, it seems impossible to identify a set of specific EU legal references that 
can be justified either as being European or universal.  
 
5.3.1.2 Normative Interest 
Reflecting on NPE, Manners looks into normative theory and suggests that interest can be 
distinguished between self and selfless interest (Manners 2009: 10). For Forsberg, if a state 
adopts normative rhetoric, and acts according to normative principles, then it has 
normative interests (2009: 5). When it comes to practical reality, it is argued that the EU’s 
foreign policy could not be exclusively based on normative concern, but is often 
intertwined with interest (Youngs 2004, Forsberg 2009, Aggestam 2009). In this chapter, I 
aim to demonstrate that the EU’s China policy regarding the Tibet issue is particularly 
pertinent to our understanding the inevitable but uneasy coexistence between normative 
                                                          
293 According to the Simla Convention, Britain recognised that “Tibet is under the suzerainty of China, and 
recognising also the autonomy of Outer Tibet”, and guaranteeing non-interference in the administration of 
Outer Tibet “which shall remain in the hands of the Tibetan Government at Lhasa”. However, despite 
initialling the draft, China did not sign or ratify the convention. See Tibet: Human Rights and the Rule of 
Law, International Commission of Jurists, December 1997, p.334 
294 
Written Ministerial Statement, David Miliband,  the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs, 29 October 2008 
Chapter Five 
 
164 
 
and material interest.   
 
In late 1990s, the EU began to realise the magnitude and speed of China’s economic 
development as China was becoming one of Europe’s major trading partners. 295 Alongside 
this development is the tendency to publicly avoid the issue of Tibet as a priority on the 
EU’s China policy agenda. When the EU unveiled its 2001 Strategy Paper on China, it 
stated that the EU should: 
‘…promote its key interests in engaging China as a growing power by seeking 
positive and constructive solutions to major global issues, by contributing to 
improve the human rights situation in China, and by pursing mutual 
commercial interests. […] A comprehensive partnership between the EU and 
China, both bilaterally and globally, will serve both EU and Chinese interests, 
politically and economically, and help improve the lives of citizens in Europe 
and China.’296 
In the Commission’s 2003 China Policy Paper on ‘A maturing partnership –shared interests 
and challenges in EU-China relations’, one of the priorities for the EU is “supporting 
China’s transition to an open society based upon the rule of law and respect for human 
rights”, however, the religious and cultural rights of ‘ethnic minorities, notably in Tibet and 
Xinjiang’ was mentioned as the last concern following the death penalty, freedom of 
expression, religion and association. 
297 
On 25 April 2008, European Commission chief 
Jose Manuel Barroso, as the first Western high-level politician to visit China after the Tibet 
unrest, was under pressure from the European Parliament to press China to engage in a 
dialogue with the Dalai Lama. In fact, the two sides had other priorities on the agenda to 
divert attention from Tibet, such as trade friction, and exchange rates. 
298 
 For the EU Trade 
Commissioner, Peter Mandelson, modern China presents the EU with a real dilemma 
between EU material and normative interests. On Tibet, he believed that a direct 
confrontation with China:  
‘…would hurt the interests of ordinary Europeans and China, it is not possible 
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to see how they would help. What we know for absolutely certain is that if we 
really want to shape the twenty-first century, we have to shape it with, not 
against, China.’299  
A government-owned paper in China, the International Herald Leader, has attributed the 
EU’s reluctance to boycott the Beijing Olympics in connection with Tibet in 2008 down to 
the global financial crisis: 
‘[…] the financial crisis has made it impossible for them not to consider the 
“cost problem” in continuing to “aid Tibetan independence” and anger China. 
After all, compared to the Dalai, to as quickly as possible pull China onto 
Europe’s rescue boat is even more important and urgent.’300 
Thus, it becomes increasingly clear that, regarding relations with China, the EU’s interests 
can be both materialistic and normative. When it comes to mutual interest with China, they 
are mostly materialistic. On the issue of Tibet, the best way to define EU normative interest 
should be the interest of Tibetan people. However, these conflicting interests of EU dictate 
its ambiguous policy on Tibet in which concerns for Tibetans’ interests are often reduced to 
paying lip service to human rights problems in general to their own domestic audiences.     
 
5.3.1.3 Self-Binding Behaviour 
Based on Manners’ original idea (2002), Diez (2005: 636) suggests that ‘self-binding’ 
which refers to the EU’s formal commitment to international, is a distinguishing feature of 
normative power. For Sjursen (2006b: 246), the EU can be considered as a normative 
power because of its ‘strong emphasis on international law and multilateralism’. However, 
the complexity and controversial nature of the Tibetan case in relations to international law 
indicate that the EU’s own back garden, at least in the eyes of the Chinese, would be 
subject to intense scrutiny in numerous normative grounds that China could use one set of 
norms to attack the EU over its commitment to others.  
 
On issues mainly to do with state sovereignty and statehood, the EU’s commitment to 
territorial integrity was tested in the case of former Yugoslavia.  The right of Serbia-
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Montenegro to protect its territorial integrity and prevent ethnic Albanians from declaring 
the independence of Kosovo was not supported by the EU member states, nor did the EU 
support the Bosnian Serbs’ exercising of self-determination. For the EU, the NATO 
bombing of Yugoslavia was an action based on NATO allies’ commitment to respond to a 
human rights disaster due to Serbia’s arbitrary use of state violence by police forces against 
ethnic Albanians including ethnic cleansing. For the Chinese, having failed to report the 
ethnic cleansing in Kosovo to China’s domestic audience, the NATO bombing was 
described as a human rights disaster. 
301 
Especially given three cruise missiles that hit the 
Chinese Embassy on May 6 1999, killing three Chinese embassy staff; Chinese official 
media portrayed Milosevic as a beleaguered hero and NATO as an evil imperialist giant, 
indicating Beijing’s determination to keep its own minority issues away from any potential 
external interference.
302
  Moreover, Chinese scholarship has drawn parallels in European 
experiences. For instance, in the cases of Turkish Cypriots, Northern Ireland of the UK, 
Corsica of France, the Basques of Spain, the Chinese scholars believe that the EU states 
have applied double standards on issues of sovereignty (Xu and Yuan 2006: 306-7). 
Furthermore, the EU also faces criticism over the its poor record on ethnic minorities’ 
rights, despite its legal commitment and advocacy of the UN Covenants and related law 
regarding these rights. In particular, that the EU limits rights of political asylum or turns 
back refugees has been increasingly subject to China’s criticism when the issue of Tibet 
was raised by the EU during recently rounds of the EU-China human rights dialogue.
303 
  
 
Not only had China challenged the EU’s commitment to international human rights norms, 
the Dalai Lama also expressed disappointment that Western leaders who defended 
sovereignty of Kuwait in 1991 – a challenge to international norms concerning the use of 
force, territorial integrity as well as human rights, but refused to support Tibet, in which 
according to the Dalai Lama, China was trampling on similar norms through invasion and 
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occupation:  
“At least Iraq and Kuwait had many similarities in culture and in religion, 
whether Saddam Hussein practised it or not. The Iraqis didn’t attack Kuwait’s 
religion. We Tibetans have more cause to complain – our culture is completely 
different from China’s and our invaders were Communists and therefore anti-
religious. President Bush and Prime Minister Major express serious feelings 
about human rights violations and atrocities in Kuwait. I welcome that. But the 
occupation there lasted only a few months. What the Chinese have done in Tibet, 
for 35 years in one place or another, is also an atrocity.” 304  
In addition, the Dalai Lama often referred to the Baltic States as a real similarity with Tibet 
– both being different cultures from the invaders and a long occupation, for which Tibet 
deserved the same response in the West in principle.
305 
    
 
5.3.1.4 Virtue Ethics 
The first part of the tripartite analysis on the Tibetan case examines the relevant principles 
of the EU, and how they are related to the aims and objectives of the EU’s positions on 
Tibet. As discussed above, there have been several principles, either directly from EU law 
or embedded in international law, which are being subscribed to by different EU bodies 
over time in framing their responses to the situation in Tibet. In discussing normative 
power, Manners (2008: 54) suggests that in their pursuit of external actions, the EU and its 
member states are guided by their moral characters or traits, according to virtue ethics. 
Therefore, it is a question of whether the EU’s positions on Tibet had reflected the 
principles it constituted and applied in other cases. In other words, this path to judging the 
EU is to ask whether the EU is “living by virtuous example” (Manners 2008: 56).   
 
First of all, in the internal dimension, the EU institutions and its member states did not 
uphold the same normative agenda in pressing for and prioritising Tibet’s human rights 
problem in its relations with China. The ambiguity and disunity derived from 1) the kind of 
human rights norms that they chose to frame the Tibet question without an EU-level 
strategy to articulate their European or international legal bases; 2) the weight that different 
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EU institutions and Member States placed on human rights in their China policies, due to 
the conflicts between self-interest and promoting human rights, and between materialistic 
and normative considerations; 3) promoting human rights sits uneasily with other EU 
foreign policy principles: multilateralism and international cooperation with China as in 
this case; 4) failure to recognise China’s sensitivity to Tibet, and to realise the complexity 
of the Tibet question in its historical, political and legal aspects in the early 1990s. 
Therefore, that the EU’s adherence to human rights principles are laid down in 
international law is not enough to conclude that the EU has demonstrated a normative 
identity or moral character in the case of Tibet. The lack of policy coherence in this case 
has severely undermined normative power of the EU in which a shared EU normative basis 
could have been better articulated with assertiveness and clarity.  
 
Secondly, in the external dimension, the EU’s credibility in promoting norms in the case of 
Tibet has been criticised from both China and the TGIE. In the clear absence of an EU 
special representative for China/Tibet, no EU body had the mandate to speak with one 
voice to the Chinese or the Tibetan exiles on behalf of the EU. With their respective 
positions on Tibet, neither China nor the TGIE considered that the principles of the EU’s 
approach on Tibet had provided a basis for its foreign policy elsewhere. Meanwhile, the 
EU was not prepared to prioritise the Tibet issue in EU-China relations at all cost, nor 
could it ignore the verdict established by international lawyers and NGOs reports that 
Tibet’s right to self-determination was denied and human rights were grossly violated by 
the Chinese. As the mutual interests grow between the EU and China, the EU’s ability to 
sustain a consistent policy towards Tibet is further undermined by the need to seek 
partnership and cooperation with China for greater economic and strategic interests. 
 
5.3.2 Normative Action 
The events in Tiananmen Square in the spring of 1989 provided the world with powerful 
images that severely undermined Beijing’s reputation, and in a way enhanced the Dalai 
Lama’s profile, especially in the West. The most immediate consequence was the awarding 
of the Nobel Peace Prize. It was felt in West as well as in China that the choice of the Dalai 
Lama was an attempt to both influence events in China and to recognise the efforts of the 
student leaders of the democracy movement (Grunfeld 2006: 337, Zhang 1994: 145).  In 
the early 1990s, the EC/EU had toughened its rhetoric and explored means that could be 
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effectively used to address the issue of Tibet. Such instruments include raising concerns in 
the high-level contacts with the Chinese counterparts in international forums (e.g. the UN 
General Assembly and the Commission on Human Rights), issuing statements, 
parliamentary hearings, and the resolutions concerning individual cases and sending EC 
delegations of the Troika ambassadors to visit Tibet.  
 
In the case of Tibet, as I conclude in the previous section, the specific human rights norms 
the EU stands for have varied over time and remain ambiguous. Therefore, instead of 
emphasising the independent power of norms, the selection criteria of normative action 
will be focusing on the nature of normative power projection, in other words, whether it is 
done in the absence of physical force or coercion. As with the previous chapter, I illustrate 
how five diffusion mechanisms drawn from Manners (2008) and Forsberg (2009) can be 
used to help us understand how NPE works in the case of Tibet. With the EU’s internal 
divisions in mind, I ask a number of questions: 1) how consistent the EU was in pursuing 
certain policies; 2) whether the different EU institutions and member states seek for a 
common approach or pursue their own agenda; 3) what does deontological ethics tell us 
about persuasion instead of coercion, or engagement instead of confrontation, when these 
normative actions are often associated with political weakness?     
 
5.3.2.1 Persuasion and Argumentation 
The way NPE promotes principles through persuasion and argumentation can be translated 
into policy actions such as constructive engagement, institutionalisation of relations, 
encouragement of dialogue between participants, and the use of eloquent rhetoric (Manners 
2009a: 12; Forsberg 2009: 16). In this case study, EU Troika visits in Tibet, inter-
parliamentary dialogue/delegation visits, and EU-China human rights dialogue sit well 
within this group.  
 
 EU Troika Visits to Tibet 
Responding to the military crackdown in Lhasa in March 1989, the first delegation of 
Troika ambassadors and European Commissioner Martin Bangemann expressed the 
Twelve’s concern to the Chinese government over the situation in Tibet, but no further 
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action was taken.
306
 Since then, Troika visits had been part of the negotiation package on 
the human rights dialogue since it was first launched in 1995. For instance, in 1996, the 
Italian Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini undertook a visit to China with a group of Italian 
businessmen. When he met with the Chinese leaders, he reportedly asked for China’s 
permission to allow an EU Troika delegation to visit Tibet. Without speaking in EU official 
capacity during the Irish Presidency, he indicated the Chinese authorities that if this 
proposed visit identified progress in human rights in Tibet, it might alter the EU member 
states collective position on the annual resolution at the UNCHR. As a result, this Toika 
mission did take place (Lim 2003: 303, quoted by Kinzelbach 2010: 43). Although the 
report that resulted from this visit was not available in the public domain, the EU did 
abandon its annual support of a resolution at the UN in 1998.  Meanwhile, allowing future 
Troika visits to Tibet was one of the concessions negotiated as part of the political deal 
when it was formally undertaken as part of the EU-China human rights dialogue which was 
resumed in 1998 (Kinzelbach 2010: 72). To this end, conducting an assessment on human 
rights based on fact-finding was the primary purpose of the mission in Tibet in May 
1998.
307 
 
 
However, given its confidentiality and China’s close supervision throughout the visit 
including all interviews, the actual process of the fact-finding can hardly be independent. 
308
  Moreover, it does not provide an open system for effectively engaging China on Tibet. 
Especially during the negotiation period leading up to the EU’s decision to abandon co-
sponsoring a resolution critical of China’s human rights record at UNCHR in 1998, a 
permit for the EU Troika to visit Tibet was no more than a symbolic political gain to cover 
its concession over a more assertive form of pressure. 
 
 Inter - Parliamentary Dialogue and Delegation Visits 
Unlike other EU institutions, the European Parliament was most readily taking up a leading 
role in discussing a peaceful solution to the Tibet question, and condemning the 
deterioration of the human rights situation in Tibet. For this reason, Li Peng, Chairman of 
the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) had invited the EP 
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Delegation to conduct a few ‘on-the-spot observations’ between 2000 and 2002, in the 
spirit of ‘seeking common ground in areas of contention through better understanding and 
more dialogue as equal partners’. 309  
 
The results of such visits often led to no concrete policy actions being extended, and the 
reporting of these events had been carefully orchestrated by Chinese officialdom to ensure 
a sophisticated display of propaganda. For instance, when Chairman of the EU Group for 
Relations with PRC, Per Gahrton, headed the EP Delegation to visit Beijing on 29 October 
2000, he was reported to have said to the Chinese counterparts, according to Chinese State 
Media, that: 
 “The EU and the EP adhere to a one-China policy. […] The European people 
are very interested in the situation in Tibet. Meanwhile, we also know that Tibet 
was an extremely dark slave society before the democratic reform, and such 
history should not be repeated. It is also a fact that enormous changes have 
taken place in Tibet, and we hope to know more about the current situation in 
Tibet and the Chinese government’s policies towards Dalai Lama.” 310   
Just one year later, acting in accordance with a 2000 EP resolution
311
, Per Gahrton
312 
issued 
an open letter to the European Council and the Commission on 7 September 2001 during 
the EU-China Summit, in which he called on these two institutions to communicate to 
Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji that: 
313
 
“If no solution to the Tibet issue has been implemented by June 2004 at the latest, 
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the EU countries will consider recognising the Tibet government in exile!”314 
Events as such would inevitably lead to deeper mistrust and obstacles for future 
cooperation between both sides. As the EP continued to respond to human rights problems 
in Tibet through passing strong-worded resolutions, inter-parliamentary dialogue had not 
been resumed until 2008, the year when the Tibet issue was brought back to the forefront 
of world’s attention due to the unrest in March and the Beijing Olympics. This time, under 
the invitation of Li Changchun, member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau 
of the CCP Central Committee, the EP Delegation was made up of the European People’s 
Party and European Democrats (EPP-ED) led by chairman Joseph Daul. During the 
meeting, Li briefed the members of delegation with “facts and figures elaborating Chinese 
governments’ great efforts on promoting economic and social development in Tibet, 
preserving its culture and tradition, as well as improving education and living conditions 
for Tibetan people.” Thus, it was impossible for EU delegation members to conduct any 
independent research, as information was selectively presented and the itinerary planned 
by their Chinese hosts. And unsurprisingly, it again finished with Joseph Daul praising 
China’s achievements and suggesting the EU and China would continue to engage in such 
exchanges and cooperation in the future. 
315 
  
  
When China cancelled its regular summit with the EU in December 2008 in protest at the 
decision of the French President Nicolas Sarkozy to meet the Dalai Lama, there had been 
limited high-level contacts between the EU and China. In September 2009, the European 
Economic and Social Committee (EESC) become the first EU institution that sent an EU 
delegation to visit Tibet since the unrest of March 2008. According to the EESC President 
Mario Sepi, the purpose of the visit was “to increase our knowledge of the social and 
economic conditions of the TAR, in order to develop possible fields of cooperation 
between our civil societies, and to deepen the activities of the EU-China Round Table”.316 
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Since the EESC had no political remit, central to its agenda was economic development. 
President Mario Sepi was reported to have found that: “China is experiencing a 
Mezzogiorno, with Tibet, like Southern Italy, struggling to achieve economic autonomy.” 
317
 As a result, China’s ambassador to the EU praised this mission as a ‘success”.318The 
Human Rights Group ICT welcomed it as an “important indication of a commitment to 
engage seriously with the situation in Tibet”. 319An additional official mission of the EESC 
represented by Mr Peter Clever was sent to Dharamsala one month later, and received by 
the Dalai Lama.
320 
  
 
The EU delegation sent by the EESC appeared to demonstrate that it was possible for the 
EU to find a way to address its concern over Tibet and be welcomed by China, NGOs and 
Tibetans in exile at the same time. In fact, sending a low-profile body with only a 
consultative brief to be the first to visit the most politically sensitive area of China at a time 
of crisis, demonstrated that the EU can be skilful in balancing conflicting interests in 
relations with China.   
 
 Human Rights Dialogue 
Besides parliamentary exchange and troika visits, the EU-China human rights dialogue 
constitutes a long-term and regular forum for the EU to raise its concerns regarding Tibet. 
Since 1998, the human rights problems in Tibet had been mentioned in numerous sessions 
of the EU in human rights dialogue under various terms and categories, from ‘the situation 
in Tibet, including the “patriotic education campaign”’ 321 , ‘the rights of minorities, 
including in Tibet’, 322 ‘treatment of refugees and minority rights, including in Tibet and 
Xinjiang’, 323 to ‘respect for cultural rights and religious freedom’. 324 While establishing 
aims and objectives for the dialogue approach, Tibet was situated alongside Xinjiang, 
within ‘respect for cultural rights and religious freedoms’ as one of the eight benchmarks 
                                                          
317
 Ibid. 
318
 ‘Assessments and recommendations on Tibet, Sub-Committee on Human Rights’, International 
Campaign for Tibet, 1 December 2009 
319
 Ibid. 
320
 ‘Tibet’s problems similar to southern Italy: EU delegate’, Agence France Presse, 18 September 2009 
321
 EU Human Rights Report 1998/9, p.29;  ibid.,2000, p.29;  
322
 EU Annual Human Rights Report 2001,p.42; ibid., 2006,p.36; ibid., 2007,p.21 
323
 EU Annual Human Rights Report 2002, 2003  
324 
EU Annual Human Rights Report 2004, p. 44; ibid., 2005, p.120; ibid., 2008, p.30 
Chapter Five 
 
174 
 
agreed with China.
325
  
 
On 15 May 2008, during the 25
th
 dialogue meeting in Brdo, Slovenia, special attention was 
given to questions related to freedom expression, the rights of person belonging to 
minorities, in particular in Tibet. While the EU voiced ‘grave concern’ regarding the 
situation in Tibet following the 14 March event, China simply reiterated its customary 
position on the situation in Tibet as it did before, including the role of the Dalai Lama, and 
China’s position on further talks.326  China’s reluctance to change its rhetoric and policy on 
Tibet led to the Parliament’s Report on Human Rights 2008 to call for “the need for a 
radical intensification and rethinking of the European Union-China human rights 
dialogue”.327 
 
Considering the lack of progress and the intensification of political repression and 
crackdowns on dissidents and minority groups since late the 1990s, human rights groups 
such as Amnesty International and International Campaign for Tibet, and TGIE had 
repeatedly called upon the EU to reclaim the initiative to sponsor a resolution against 
China at the forthcoming UNCHR, fearing the effectiveness of the dialogue approach 
would be compromised if other forms of pressure were abandoned.
328  
  
 
5.3.2.2 Invoking Norms 
Invoking norms is about the EU activating commitments to which the target country 
subscribed itself (Forsberg 2009: 17).  In the Tibetan case, when China failed to adhere to 
international agreements to which it is a party, the NPE worked as it invoked the 
contravention of commitments to Tibet under international law. Policy instruments at the 
EU’s disposal in this case were most readily associated with the EP resolutions, 
declarations or démarches.   
 
In the early EP resolutions in the 1990s, the Tibet problem was considered by the 
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Parliament as an issue of violations of individual human rights as well as denial of the right 
to self-determination. However, China at the time was subject to only a very limited body 
of international law, and those which could have been considered as legal ‘contravention of 
commitments to Tibet under UN conventions’ only included two second-generation human 
rights instruments: 1) The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination; 2) The Convention against Torture and other Cruel and Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment and Punishment.
329
 On the other hand, the International Bill of 
Rights which provides legal provisions for fundamental human rights and the right to self-
determination was not legally binding to China, even though it enjoys the stature of 
‘customary international’.330 Similar legal effect applies to the three UN resolutions passed 
in 1959, 1961 and 1965 which acknowledge Tibet’s right to self-determination and were 
often cited in EP resolutions during the 1990s. 
 
Until China had finally signed the ICCPR in 1998 and ratified the ICESCR in 2003, self-
determination as a fundamental principle enshrined in these two Covenants was no longer 
on the EP’s normative agenda regarding the situation in Tibet. Instead, the human rights 
problem of Tibet was framed in several categories, most often religious freedom and rights 
of ethnic minorities.  As a result, the EU had to rely on invoking individual legal provisions, 
for instance Article 18 of freedom of religion under the UNDHR,
331 
rather than several UN 
Conventions that would all be relevant to the same issue. Ironically, while a large number 
of legal instruments became irrelevant to the EP’s position on Tibet, the political status of 
Tibet and human rights problems had unabatedly persisted over the years if not become 
worse. 
 
Besides international law, ‘invoking norms’ as a type of norms diffusion also applies to 
other EU institutions who had signed up agreements with China. In its report on “the 
implementation of the Communications: Building a comprehensive partnership with 
China”, which was endorsed by the General Affairs Council in its conclusions on 22 
January 2001, the Commission concluded that China’s human rights situation, as far as the 
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‘comprehensive partnership’ is concerned, had worsened with regard to respect for civil, 
political and religious rights.
332 
 
 
Finally, there was a tendency in deploying démarches and declarations for the EU to 
prioritise individual cases, which violated norms that were deemed fundamental to the EU 
moral order. This is certainly the case when it comes to the death penalty. Almost all the 
individual cases that involved death sentences or execution of Tibetans had been issued 
with démarches, declarations or/and resolutions.
333 
On 27 October 2009, China executed 
two Tibetans for their role in the ethnic unrest in March 2008. The European Union had 
previously called for death sentences to be commuted on several Tibetans allegedly 
involved in this violent event through issuing démarches and adopting EP resolutions. 
Eventually, in the statement issued by the Swedish EU presidency: 
‘The European Union condemns the recent executions of two Tibetans, Mr 
Lobsang Gyaltsen and Mr Loyak. The EU respects China’s rights to bring those 
responsible for the violence to justice but reaffirms its longstanding opposition 
to the use of the death penalty under all circumstances. The EU reiterates its 
concerns about the conditions under which the trials were conducted, 
especially with regard to whether due process and other safeguards for a fair 
trial were respected.’334 
The Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Ma Zhaoxu expressed strong dissatisfaction 
with the EU statement and replied: 
China strongly opposes the practice of interfering in other’s internal affairs 
under the pretext of the death penalty issue. We urge the EU to earnestly abide 
by the principle of equality and mutual respect and refrain from sending wrong 
signals to the separatist forces for “Tibetan Independence”, with a view to 
promoting the healthy and stable development of China-EU relations.’335 
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Therefore, whenever the EU tried to activate commitments China subscribed to, either 
referring to international law or its domestic laws, China would not recognise or 
reciprocate when it came to Tibet, let alone making concessions or compromise. As I 
illustrate in Section Two, international legal remedies had failed to address the Tibet 
question since China based its positions on norms such as absolute sovereignty. The norms 
that underpin the EU’s discourse on Tibet, however, hold no normative power over China, 
simply because China perceives no legitimacy of the Union’s action.  
 
5.3.2.3 Shaping discourse 
For Manners (2002: 239), normative power has the ability to shape discourses through 
learning, adaption or rejection of norms as a result of international norms and political 
learning by third countries. In the case of Tibet, this type of norm diffusion did occur in the 
early twentieth century, as the Chinese learnt the modern European diplomatic language to 
assert their relationship with Tibet in terms of sovereignty (Anand 2002: 8). Since the late 
1980s, the West learned quickly to adopt human rights discourse to publicise the Tibetan 
cause. To that end, China’s response to EP resolutions has always been assertive and 
consistent over the years, as China both resolutely and customarily rejects anything that 
might suggest the Tibet issue is more than a domestic issue, thus leaving no space for any 
external attempts to shape China’s response.  
 
In view of EP resolutions from 1987 to 2009, at least two trends can be identified in its 
discourse on Tibet. First of all, the range of issues that were initially under the EP’s radar 
has been reduced mostly to individual cases in recent years. In the early 1990s, the 
Parliament had passed resolutions addressing both Tibet’s situation in general and 
individual cases. It detailed the Parliament’s concerns on human rights abuses, including 
self-determination, population transfer and birth control policy, culture and religion, 
language, history, ecology, economy and health and hygiene. Regarding status of Tibet, the 
Parliament both looked into China’s violations of international law and inadequacy of 
Tibet’s legal autonomy. 336 Individual cases, in which the Parliament was ‘deeply disturbed’ 
by the heavy sentencing of Tibetans for ‘counter-revolutionary activities’337 and ‘appalled’ 
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at the disappearing of the six-year old Panchen Lama
338
, were condemned  in strident 
language. Whereas from 1998 to 2009, seven out of all nine Parliament resolutions were 
devoted to individual cases, five of which addressed just one extremely grave case 
regarding the death sentence of a Buddhist Lama, Tenzin Deleg Rinpoche.
339 
Moreover, 
since late 1990s, the situation in Tibet no longer stood alone as an issue of concern in EP 
resolutions. Instead, it had been incorporated either as part of the human rights situation in 
China, particularly alongside Xinjiang, as China’s repression of ethnic minorities and 
religious freedom
340
; or the use of the death penalty on ethnic Tibetans for political 
crimes.
341  
 
 
On 15 May 1998, Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao responded to the two 
emergency resolutions adopted by the EU on 14 May, in which the European Parliament 
called on the EC to appoint a special representative on Tibet:
 342
 
Tibet issues are purely China’s internal affairs, and no foreign government, 
organization, or individual has the right to interfere with them. The above EU 
resolutions are serious encroachment on China’s sovereignty and gross 
interference in China’s internal affairs. The Chinese government and people 
will resolutely oppose them. […] The EU moves have poisoned the atmosphere 
of Sino-European ties and completely run counter to trends of times and 
development. We hope that the EU will truly take a responsible stance and will 
not obstruct the development of Sino-European ties.”343   
Reacting to EP resolutions, Chinese official media preferred to criticise ‘some 
parliamentarians’ than the EU or the EP, for ‘amnesia concerning Europe’s history and 
their ignorance of the Chinese autonomous region’s current situation’. While considering 
certain unnamed parliamentarians should be blamed for their ‘anti-China’ attitude which 
‘severely harmed the interests of the Chinese people’, those who were willing to challenge 
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the prevailing views against China on Tibet, according to an official Chinese source, were 
sufficiently represented, too.
344 
Nevertheless, majority of Chinese sources on ‘pro-China’ 
parliamentarians cannot be verified with EU official documents or European media 
reporting.  
 
The Commission initiated the Panam project - the first and only EU project directly 
delivered in Tibet in 1995. The Chinese government agreed to engage with this aid project 
for its very nature as a non-political aid programme. Initially designed to serve the 
economic interests of Tibetan population in rural Tibet, it was later suspended as the EP 
and human rights groups had concerns over its implementation problems, such as an 
increasing number of new Chinese settlers were among the beneficiaries through this 
project and delays to do with China’s strict control over human rights NGO’s 
participation.
345  
 
 
 According to the Commission’s first Communication in 1998 on ‘Building a 
Comprehensive Partnership with China’, the EU ‘attaches great importance to the respect 
for the cultural, linguistic and religious identity of ethnic minorities’ on issues relating to 
Tibet.
346 
At the time, this EU position was manifested by raising the Tibet issue within the 
newly-established bilateral dialogue on human rights. In its updated version in 2003, the 
question of Tibet was only mentioned once in the context of ensuring a genuine autonomy 
for this region through encouraging China and the Dalai Lama to engage in dialogue.
347 
 
Since then, Tibet has not been mentioned in the Commission’s policy papers. In April 2008, 
the Commission’s President Jose Manuel Barroso led a large EU delegation on a visit to 
Beijing amid tension over China’s crackdown in Tibet and the calls for boycotting the 
Beijing Olympics. As much as he wanted ‘positive development soon’ on Tibet after talks 
with China’s Premier Wen to whom he reiterated the EU position on Tibet, Barroso 
deflected calls for a boycott of the opening ceremony of the Games by some other 
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European leaders.
348 
While political analysts believed that they would eventually agree to 
disagree, Chinese state media reported that the purpose of Barroso’s visit was to mend the 
fissure after the EU-China relationship had “soured” over Tibet.349   
 
The abovementioned patterns of development in the EU’s response to Tibet can be 
understood as accommodation and adjustment to its relations with China, in view of its 
normative agenda regarding which international standards to be upheld. However, the 
balance between open criticism and private diplomacy is not always easy to strike. As 
China’s economy grew, so did the mutual interests between China and the EU. An 
ambiguous human rights language might be easy for the EU to pay lip service to, as the 
European domestic audience would see EU criticisms on China in both words and deeds. 
However, when China firmly insisted upon the principle of non-interference over its 
domestic affairs with regard to Tibet, the EU’s criticisms of gross human rights violations 
in Tibet, however strong or mild, have been proven ineffective. Therefore, with a reduced 
scope of norms under concern and a focus on individual cases, one can argue that the EU’s 
human rights discourse on Tibet has become a more defined but overall weaker position. 
Therefore, instead of shaping China’s discourse, the EU’s discourse on Tibet ended up 
being shaped by China’s non-negotiable position, the need to encourage the process of 
engagement and dialogue with China, and the dilemma between the EU’s sympathy 
towards the Tibetans and its economic interests with a strategic partner. 
 
5.3.2.4 Living by Example 
According to Manners (2002, 2006c, 2008), since the notion of NPE is essentially about 
what the EU is, rather than what it does, ‘living by example’ might be the most important 
element of normative power. To that end, the source of normative power comes from the 
independent power of the norms itself, without the EU engaging in policy action. Forsberg 
(2009: 18) adds that the power of attraction implies a positive sense of learning, which is 
another form of norm diffusion mechanism. In this section, I briefly look into the 
implications of Kosovo’s domino effects on Tibet’s political status and the Baltic analogy 
for a peaceful resolution for Tibet. The former is perceived as an example by the 
international legal community for the future of Tibet’s political status, and by the Chinese 
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government as a negative example of the West trampling state sovereignty in the name of 
humanitarian operation. The latter represents what the Tibetan exile leader, the 14
th
 Dalai 
Lama have anticipated where the future of Tibet is held, and the kind of support he 
expected from Western governments. 
 
 Kosovo’s domino effects 
The military intervention in Kosovo by the NATO forces made China extremely 
uncomfortable in 1999, as it too has regions - Tibet and Xinjiang – where ethnic groups 
have been seeking independence from Chinese rule. Fearing Tibet would become an Asian 
Kosovo, the Chinese foreign ministry’s response to the NATO intervention was predictable, 
as China ‘opposed interference in other nations’ internal affairs no matter what the excuse 
or by what means and particularly opposed any random actions that circumvents the 
UN’.350 Chinese President Jiang Zemin reportedly blamed Western power for escalating the 
ethnic tensions by encouraging “terrorist” Albanians.351 Domestically, China kept its media 
from reporting on ethnic cleansing of Albanians, and painted Milosevic as a patriot and 
hero, whilst ‘the US-led NATO’ an imperialist hegemon.352 In 2008, Tibet’s political status 
was given renewed attention by the independence of Kosovo. As demonstrated in Section 
Two, the right of Tibetans to self-determination is strong, and arguably stronger than 
Kosovo.
353 
 
 
For Dickinson (2009: 15), ‘if the Kosovan example is applicable to Tibet, Tibet should find 
support in the international community for a claim to similar independence; […] Law has 
the potential to create the reality of an independent Kosovo and, consequently Tibet’. 
Chinese scholars, on the other hand, defended China’s official position by accusing the 
Western powers of holding self-contradictory double standards on the issue of human 
rights, self-determination and sovereignty in international affairs. And they too, like 
Western scholars, point out the tension between the competing rights of territorial integrity 
of the state and the rights of peoples to self-determination which is also guaranteed under 
international law (Xu and Yuan 2006: 306).  
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 The Baltic analogy 
In Eastern Europe, especially among countries such as Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, who 
recognise their own struggles for self-determination as mirroring that of the Tibetans, it is 
not surprising that after the Dalai Lama won the 1989 Nobel Peace Prize, he had been 
formally received by many Eastern European countries for years.
354 
 According to the 
TGIE’s Foreign Minister, Mr Lodi Gyari:  
‘The response has been unexpected. People in the West do not know what 
freedom and democracy is because they never lost it but in East Europe they 
understand our language, they know what it is when we talk of persecution. 
They know the colonialism is not something committed only by Western 
countries.’355 
As for the Baltic analogy, the former UN Secretary-General, Mr Boutros Boutros-Ghali felt 
that the Tibet case is also stronger than the Baltic Republics’ case. He argues that Tibet has 
a more credible leadership that has effectively communicated the moral and political 
foundation of its claims to self-determination (Falk 1994: 94). In addition, since the Dalai 
Lama is the only leader of a self-determination movement and recipient of the Nobel Peace 
Prize, he had already gathered wide support from the international community. Chinese 
scholarship, on the other hand, carefully studied the implications of the collapse of Soviet 
Union in relation to the independence of the Baltic States, and believed that they could 
potentially have impact on Tibet’s independence movement (Zhang 1994).  Unlike the 
Soviet Union, the reason why the Chinese Communist Party did not fall to the wave of 
democratisation orchestrated by the West, lies in the government’s successful economic 
reform and China’s ethnic minority problems being sufficiently mild. Therefore, in case 
Tibet followed in the footsteps of the Baltic States, the Chinese government was advised: 1) 
to consolidate the CCP’s leadership; 2) to ensure equality and solidarity among all 
nationalities; 3) to stimulate  faster economic growth in ethnic autonomous regions; 4) to 
facilitate patriotic education in ethnic autonomous regions; 5) to crackdown splitist 
movement; 6) to unveil the historical truth to the world; 7) to stay alert against the threat of 
external anti-China forces (Zhang 1994: 224-254).  
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In the early 1990s, the Dalai Lama frequently made optimistic statements about Tibet’s 
future following the independence of the Baltic States, appealing to the Western 
governments to treat Tibet as they did with the Baltic States. 
356 
According to the Dalai 
Lama: 
‘Here there is a real similarity with Tibet – different cultures from the invaders 
and a long occupation. And in the West they have taken a good stand on this. 
Doesn’t Tibet deserve at least the same response? […] The fear of China is 
unnecessary. Western nations are far from China; there is no physical threat – 
yet they are over-cautious. What the Chinese respect is firmness.’357 
Speaking to the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee on 31 May 2006, the 
Dalai Lama pointed to Scotland and the Canadian province of Quebec for examples of 
regions where the degree of autonomy was desired over independence.
358   
 
5.3.2.5 Shaming 
For Foot (2001: 10), states are capable of being shamed when they concern about 
reputation as a non-material cost, to that end, disapproval from other members of the 
normative community matters. Manners (2009a:12) broadly defines shaming as public 
condemnation in multilateral fora or the use of symbolic sanctioning. Traditionally, raising 
China’s human rights problem through sponsoring a resolution at the UNCHR is the major 
form of shaming in the case of China. On Tibet, by increasingly resorting to public 
criticisms in recent years, the European governments have found a less costly way to 
address Tibet’s human rights problem, both politically and economically.  
 
For the supporters of the Tibetan cause in the West, the event of 2008 Beijing Olympic 
Games was used as a platform to give more publicity to the Tibetan question. It was 
described by Thomas Mann, Chairman of the EP’s Tibet Inter-Group, as a strategy to ‘keep 
our eye on the ball’.359  For China, the Beijing Games would allow China to symbolically 
declare an end to 150 years of national humiliation, that began with the Opium War, the 
subsequent collapse of the Sino-centric world, and the brutal exploitation of China by 
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imperialist powers (Xu 2008: 4). Thus, the CCP would hope to use the Games to promote a 
story that focuses on three decades of high economic growth, the success of pulling 
millions out of poverty, and expectations in future to be proudly recognised and integrated 
in the global community (Askew 2009: 111). Amid a strong nationalistic desire on behalf 
of majority of Han Chinese for China to gain due recognition from the rest of the world, 
the Tibet protest in  Lhasa in early March was already considered embarrassing for the 
Chinese regime. Sheridan (2008: 6) notices that ‘with the Olympic Games due to start in 
just a few months, and with the global media poised to descend en masse on its national 
capital, Beijing found itself caught in a dilemma when protesters in Tibet took to the 
streets’. 
 
When the Tibetan protest turned violent on 14 March 2008, the EU issued a statement 
urging China to show restraint towards demonstrations in Tibet, however the criticism by 
EU leaders of China’s response to demonstrations in Tibet did not go as far as to threaten a 
boycott of the Beijing Games on human rights grounds.
360
 In early April, European 
lawmakers urged EU leaders to boycott the Olympic Games opening ceremony in Beijing 
on August 8 unless China resumes talks with Tibetan exiled spiritual leader the Dalai 
Lama.
361
 The President of the Commission, Mr Barroso said during his official trip to 
China that he was against the boycott of the Olympics which “must be a celebration of the 
youth of the world and it must be a success.” 362 EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson, 
who was part of the Barroso’s delegation to visit China, added that: 
‘….some appear to assume that a course of direct confrontation in connection 
with the Olympics and Tibet serves Europe’s interests, and indeed Tibet’s. […]It 
is to be expected that some on both sides of an issue like Tibet will call for 
boycotts of one kind or another. I do not support these because, while it is easy 
to see how they would hurt the interests of ordinary Europeans and China, it is 
not possible to see how they would help.’ 363 
While the EU statement stayed clear of any mentioning of the Beijing Olympics and the 
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EU officials, including Javier Solana and Jose Manuel Barroso “intended to be at the 
Olympics”,364 some Member States were contemplating their own approaches. However, 
for Member States, the balance between open criticism and private diplomacy is always 
hard to strike. When the 27 foreign ministers met in Slovenia on 1 April 2008 to decide on 
whether to attend the Beijing Games and at what level in relation to China’s crackdown on 
Tibet, the outcome of the meeting was that Member States would decide on this 
individually. Germany and Poland would have no ministerial-level participants there. The 
Netherlands, Sweden and other nations ruled that out, whereas the French and UK head of 
States were undecided at the time.
365 
 
 
In the following, I elaborate on the major member states’ Tibet policy and their responses 
during 2008. Although Manners (2008, 2009) is very explicit in his later writings that the 
NPE concept seeks to think ‘outside the box’ beyond the agency of states, the differences 
amongst member states’ normative behaviour, despite subscribing to similar normative 
commitment, highlight the inevitable conflicts between norms and interests which help us 
think about whether normative power can have economic interests, and why the Tibetan 
case has called the EU’s actorness into question.  
 
 France 
According to Fox and Godement (2009: 27), France has a strong inclination to switch 
between criticising China on human rights and cultivating good political relations with 
China. Likewise, France tends to be unpredictable on the issue of Tibet, both for the 
Chinese as well as for other Member States on the receiving end.  On 14 March 2008 when 
the Tibetan protest caught the world’s attention, even reminiscences of 1989, French 
Foreign Ministers Bernard Kouchner said France wanted to keep its options open on 
whether to take further measures. He insisted that his government would not boycott the 
Olympics, “but France can draw the attention to the link between the Olympic Games and 
this Tibetan aspiration, which China has to take into account”. 366 Nevertheless, President 
Nicolas Sarkozy was the first European leader to have reportedly suggested that the 
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opening ceremony provided an opportunity to expose the human rights problems in Tibet, 
and to protest China’s recent crackdown on the Tibetan unrests. 367 On this occasion, the 
French president appeared to have adopted a new approach in which he publicly took a 
critical stance, while using his threat to boycott the Olympic Opening Ceremony to 
influence China over Tibet (Fox and Godement 2009: 27). As a consequence, France was 
targeted by China for condemnation and diplomatic retribution.  
 
 Germany 
For Germany, to risk sacrificing its trade relations with China for the sake of taking a stand 
on human rights was, without a doubt, a big political decision. In 1995, Germany had 
already antagonised China by holding hearings on Tibet. Despite the Chinese government’s 
furious protests at the time, German trade did not suffer. 
368
 When Chancellor Angela 
Merkel met with the Dalai Lama in September 2007 in Beijing, China suspended all 
political contact, but there was no sign of dramatic decline in German trade, thanks to the 
economic relation with China that was dominated by small and medium-sized business 
(Weske 2007: 5). On 28 March 2008, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier 
had diplomatically rescued himself and Chancellor Angela Merkel from attending the 
Beijing Olympic opening ceremony, but implied that it had nothing to do with the situation 
in Tibet.
369
 As a result, Germany’s position on Tibet and human rights did not result in trade 
retaliations by China, which makes Germany a unique case, due to the sound reputation of 
its manufacturing equipment and automobile industry (Fox and Godement 2009: 48). 
 
 UK 
Because of its special affiliation with the history of the Tibet question, the UK has always 
been willing to meet the 14
th
 Dalai Lama in non-official settings (Fox and Godement 2009: 
25). On the days of rioting and demonstrations in the streets of Tibet’s capital Lhasa, British 
Foreign Secretary David Miliband insisted that “all European countries will be seeking 
clarification,” to protest Chinese rule. “There are two messages, one is the need for restraint, 
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the other is that substantive dialogue is the only way forward.”370 On 26 May 2008, the 
Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qing Gang commented on British Prime Minister 
Gordon Brown’s meeting with the Dalai Lama that: 
‘This not only interferes in China’s internal affairs, but severely hurts Chinese 
people’s feelings. China expresses its strong dissatisfaction and resolute 
opposition. […] The UK government has reiterated its non-support of “Tibet 
Independence” on many occasions. We urge the UK side to translate its 
commitment into concrete actions, contribute to the long-term development of 
the bilateral relations and safeguard the overall interest of China-UK 
relations.’371 
Five months later, the UK changed its formal position from recognising the Chinese 
suzerainty to fully acknowledging China’s sovereignty over Tibet. 372 However, China did 
not reciprocate with any positive move.  
 
On the Chinese side, the ongoing crackdown in Tibet has led to public protests that have 
disrupted the international legs of the 2008 Beijing Olympics torch relay, particularly in 
London, Paris, and San Francisco. The backlash against China’s policy in Tibet generated 
anti-Western demonstrations in China to boycott the French retailer Carrefour.
373 
For China, 
the decision of postponing the EU-China summit in December 2008 was taken in protest at 
French President Sarkozy’s plan to meet the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader while France 
was holding the rotating EU Presidency. The Foreign Ministry spokesman Qing Gang 
stated that: 
“[…] The Tibet issue is related to China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity 
and it touches China’s interests at the core. We firmly oppose the Dalai Lama’s 
separatist activities in foreign countries with any capacity, and firmly oppose 
the contact between foreign leaders with him in any form. To maintain good 
relations with France and the European Union, China has been patiently 
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working on France time and again, hoping that it would properly handle the 
Tibet issue, so as to create necessary conditions for the China-EU Summit 
Meeting. Regrettably, the French side does not actively respond to China’s 
efforts of maintaining relations with France and the European Union. Therefore 
the summit cannot be held in a sound atmosphere, nor can it achieve the 
expected goals. Under such circumstances, China has no choice but to 
postpone the China-EU Summit Meeting.”374 
The cancellation of a high-level summit with the EU over Tibet is an unprecedented and 
unusual move by China to send the EU a strong signal which carries multiple implications. 
For Robbie Barnett (2008), “there are internal divisions among the EU powers, and this is 
a squeeze to try and see who will stick to their principles and who believes they mustn’t 
upset China … it’s a high-stakes game.” It also shows China’s increasing willingness to 
flex its strengthening global muscle.
375
 A Chinese political commentator simply suggested 
that “China thinks the Tibet issue is more important than its relation with Europe”.376  
 
Overall, China’s concern to protect its international image does provide the EU leverage 
over China. Massive public protests in Europe during the Olympic torch reply had 
sufficiently embarrassed China. However, the process of ‘shaming’ China on the 
international stage had provoked nationalistic resentments against Western governments 
and media. Within the country, the official Chinese view of Tibet is universally accepted as 
Chinese have been subjected to decades of Chinese propaganda as the only source of 
information. Shaming might be successful in pressuring China into sharpening its 
propaganda language overseas or hiring more international public relations firms, it does 
not threaten China’s fundamental concerns over its domestic legitimacy, or regarding Tibet 
– that is, China’s territorial integrity (Grunfeld 2006: 340).   
 
5.3.2.6 Deontological Ethics 
In this case study, the second part of the tripartite analysis looks at how the EU promotes 
the principles it stands for through actions and policies on the situation in Tibet.  According 
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to Manners (2008), virtue ethics look at what kind of moral character the EU has, whereas 
deontological ethics ask what the EU ought to do. Therefore, a deontological approach to 
normative power emphasizes “the rationalisation of duties and rules which guide the EU in 
its external actions” (Manners 2008: 57). To that end, deontological ethics guide and assess 
the ways in which the EU addresses the Tibet question, and criteria it offers to NPE are 
based on ‘being reasonable’ (Manners 2008: 58). 
 
Hypothetically, ‘being reasonable’ means that the ways in which the EU addresses human 
rights problems in Tibet should be based on legitimated human rights principles which are 
promoted through normative power mechanisms, namely, persuasion, invoking norms, 
shaping discourse, living by example and shaming. Therefore, in order to be ‘reasonable’, 
the principles that underpin the EU’s policies should be established through the process of 
reasoning and rationalisation, otherwise it risks becoming an imperialistic endeavour 
which would presume European norms are universal. In the Tibetan case, I argue that the 
right to self-determination, as laid down in UN Charter, UNDHR, ICCPR and IESCR and 
concluded in UN Resolutions constitute the legal and normative justification for the EU to 
recognise this right and invoke this principle when it comes to the Tibet question. The 
same should apply to individual human rights, including rights of ethnic minorities and 
religious freedom. In this respect, the EU’s normative positions on Tibet, despite being 
ambiguous and accommodating over the years, all fall squarely within international human 
rights law. 
 
As for the process of diffusing legitimated human rights principles, deontonlogical ethics 
look at how it has been done, rather than what has been done. To that end, the mechanism 
of persuasion and argumentation sits well with the nature of normative diffusion. On the 
surface, the case study demonstrates that the process of ‘persuasion and argumentation’ 
was materialised by the EU through initiating and institutionalising regular dialogues on 
human rights, Troika visits and exchange of delegations. However, in the actual processes, 
China has maintained that its Tibet policy was completely in compliance with its national 
law, and its absolute sovereignty over Tibet as guaranteed by international law is not 
subject to negotiation. Therefore, the motivation for China to agree upon engaging in the 
process of dialogues and cooperation was out of political concessions to avoid being 
subject to UN resolution sponsored by the EU member states. The EU, on the other hand, 
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had to abandon a confrontational approach as its normative concerns tend to be overridden 
by materialistic interests.  
 
Invoking norms in the case of Tibet has been translated as activating China’s legal 
commitment mainly through passing EP resolutions. When China failed to adhere to 
international agreements to which it is a party, one can argue that the EP has been 
sufficiently ‘reasonable’  to invoke China’s contravention of commitments to Tibet under 
international law. However, as for shaping discourse, since the EU’s rhetoric and positions 
on Tibet had to accommodate the need to engage China, at the cost of Tibetan’s interests 
and its own initial normative commitment, it should be considered the least ‘reasonable’ 
compared to other forms of norm diffusion. Shaming of the Chinese government when it 
violates human rights in Tibet had become a popular tool adopted by European 
governments. In 2008, the policy practice of this sort was to (threaten to) boycott the 
Beijing Olympics so as to influence China’s handling of the delicate situation in Tibet. 
However, in the absence of credible sources to have confirmed the scale of human rights 
violation in Tibet at the time, the calls for boycotts could be a reasonable practice, not only 
it had resulted in  reputation loss for China, but also corresponded with the intensive public 
attention to the Tibet issue in Europe. Nevertheless, the normative power of this policy 
practice in view of deontological ethics was severely weakened when member states’ 
decisions ended up in deep division without reaching a common position.  
 
5.3.3 Normative Impact  
Until the EU had embarked on a policy based on cooperation and persuasion in 1998, the 
majority of the EU’s concerns on the situation in Tibet had been mostly channelled through 
the Parliament’s resolutions. Often being belligerent and strident, these concerns had 
neither been sufficiently considered by other EU bodies and member states, nor produced 
many tangible results.
377
 The benchmarks of the dialogue approach on human rights, as 
agreed by China in 2001, set out the EU’s policy objective for Tibet as “respect for cultural 
rights and religious freedoms” 378 The last time Tibet was mentioned in the Commission’s 
Communication in 2003, the EU was aiming to prioritise Tibet in its bilateral political 
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dialogue with China to ‘encourage China and the Dalai Lama to further strengthen ongoing 
direct contacts with a view to finding a mutually acceptable solution to the question of 
Tibet in the context of ensuring a genuine autonomy for this region’.379 However, Goldstein 
(2004: 212) suggests that, ‘despite rhetoric in the West asserting that if China would only 
agree to sit down with the Dalai Lama, both sides could solve the conflict to their mutual 
satisfaction, […] there are actually enormous hurdles that will have to be overcome before 
a settlement of this conflict can occur, or even before meaningful talks can be held.’  
 
Although China has made no compromise on Tibet, either in rhetoric or in policy action, 
the impact of the EU’s efforts cannot be simply judged by specific policy means and ends. 
With abovementioned concerns in mind, this section attempts to identify the impact of the 
EU’s normative agenda on the issue of Tibet from an NPE perspective, and evaluate such 
impact through a consequentialist understanding of effectiveness.    
 
5.3.3.1 Chinese official discourse and EU-China relations 
In China’s first and only 2003 EU policy paper, ‘Promote the EU’s understanding of Tibet’ 
stands alone as one of China’s eight policy priorities towards the EU in the political 
aspect.
380
  On the one hand, China welcomed ‘the support of the EU and its members to 
Tibet’s economic, cultural, educational and social development and their cooperation with 
the autonomous region subject to full respect of China’s laws and regulations’, on the other 
hand, it requested the EU ‘not to have any contact with the “Tibetan government in exile” 
or provide facilities to the separatist activities of the Dalai clique”’.381 While dealing with 
the Tibetan exiles, China has adopted “a position of no recognition, no reciprocity, no 
commitment and no concession and no compromise”.382 In the current EU framework of 
China policy based on the 2006 Communication paper, the EU previous concerns on 
‘protection of ethnic minority rights in Tibet and Xinjiang’, ‘respect for cultural and 
religious freedoms in Tibet’ in the 1998 and 2001 versions have been replaced by policy 
initiatives to ‘encourage full respect of fundamental rights and freedoms in all regions in 
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China’.383  
 
Responding to the EU’s concerns over the situation in Tibet, China officials always 
insisted that “Tibetans are already enjoying complete religious freedom and Tibetan 
people’s lives have been improved to a greater extent, attributing to China’s central 
government’s financial support”. 384  The Foreign Ministry’s responses are standardised, 
reiterating and emphasising that China opposes any country’s interference in the Tibet 
issue as it perceives it to be China’s internal affair. It reads as if the Chinese government 
are convinced that the criticisms based on human rights arguments were too mild to appear 
to be threatening China’s fundamental interests over sovereignty and domestic stability.   
 
In the eyes of Chinese political commentators, the Tibet issue has put a formidable strain 
on EU-China relations within the last decade. Some argue that it was in the EU’s long-
term interests to be seen as ‘normative power’ or ‘soft power’ if the EU keeps up with its 
criticisms on Tibet as a human rights problem, especially at the time of global economic 
crisis (Jian 2009a). Furthermore, narratives associated with ‘China’s rise’ have also been 
referred to by the Chinese thinkers to make sense of the West’s support for the Tibetan 
case, as ‘some European politicians have ulterior motives and the vicious intention of 
containing and checking the emergence of China as a global power’.385 
 
5.3.3.2 China’s International Image 
That the European governments still frequently meet with the Dalai Lama has contributed 
to keeping up the international visibility of the Tibet issue over the last two decades. In this 
way, China had suffered a reputation loss as a result of European government’s 
increasingly resorting to public criticism through shaming as a less costly way to 
demonstrate their concerns over human rights in Tibet (Wan 2001).  
 
In April 2008, the Chinese were said to be highly concerned about how the tide of 
European opinion had turned. Beijing was disappointed ‘to see the disappearance of a 
European stance whose principal merit was opposing the United States by taking up 
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positions more favourable to Chinese interests’. 386 A few months before the Beijing 
Olympic Games, European public opinion was becoming much more critical towards 
China. For China’s domestic audience however, the Chinese propaganda machine argued 
that the European public opinion was manipulated by the Dalai Lama ‘clique’ and some 
international anti-China forces who have moved to build new ties with Tibet-related non-
government organisations in the US and the EU.
387
 Given that ‘there are some two hundred 
Tibet-related NGOs operating in Europe with about 200,000 members’, the Chinese 
believe that NGOs frequent engagement with the European politicians have not only 
contributed to ‘anti-China activities’ overseas, but also added tensions in Sino-EU 
relations.
388   
 
5.3.3.3 Release of Tibetan political prisoners 
For the vast majority of Tibetans– those in China – a confrontational approach by the West 
in 1990s had done very little, if not the opposite of what was intended, which was to 
protect the Tibetan identity (Grunfeld 2006: 341). Nevertheless, there have been individual 
cases in which the EU had exerted crucial pressure on China and produced positive results. 
In 1993, two Tibetans were arrested in May 1992 for passing human rights information to a 
group of visiting EU Troika ambassadors. The Commission issued a statement calling for 
their release, and the Parliament passed two similar resolutions. The two were released ten 
months later, which was hailed by the NGOs as an unprecedented development of China’s 
human rights policy in Tibet.
389  
 Then the famous case of Tenzin Deleg Rinpoche, a 
Buddhist lama who was initially sentenced to death with a two-year execution reprieve, 
was later reduced to life imprisonment, thanks to the international pressure led by the 
EU.
390 However, compared to the NGO reporting on violation of Tibetans’ human rights in 
China, these two cases were rare:  it was either to do with the EU’s direct link to their 
arrests or the EU’s prioritised issue area – the death penalty. In fact, rather than a proof of 
EU normative power, these cases have shown that the EU did have a range of policy 
options at its disposal to address the situation in Tibet when it showed serious concerns.  
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5.3.3.4 Consequentialist Ethics 
Consequentialist ethics argues that normative action depends on the consequences of the 
action.
391
As it is applied to NPE, the right consequences are measured according to the 
principles found in the target society, rather than the merits of those who deliver the action 
(Manners 2008: 58). In this sense, the impact of EU human rights policy should be judged 
by the general rules and principles found in the Tibetan community, rather than the EU’s 
own principles.  
 
In the case of Tibet, the EU implicitly acknowledged but did not formally recognise the 
Tibetan exiles, or indeed the Dalai Lama, as the legitimate representative of the Tibetan 
community, including those in China.  However, when the Tibet issue is framed either in 
terms of sovereignty or international human rights, the major audience is the international 
community, often Western societies, not Chinese citizens or Tibetans in China. The former 
are exposed to and have only recognised the Chinese official version of history, while the 
latter are simply silenced.  
 
No longer focusing on the human rights situation in Tibet per se, the EU has adopted an 
implicit approach to promote reconciliation between the Chinese leadership and the Dalai 
Lama in recent years, which according to the EU External Affairs Commissioner Chris 
Patten, ‘would not be altogether bad for China’s image internationally.’ 392 In view of 
consequentialist ethics, the EU has been deviating itself from its normative commitment to 
the Tibetan cause, and leaving the Tibetans to establish dialogues with the Chinese who 
have adopted a non-negotiable position on Tibet and yet still proclaimed ‘the door to 
dialogue is open’.393 Speaking to the European Parliament’s foreign affairs committee on 
31 May 2006, the Dalai Lama shared his observation and vision that:  
“Last year we renewed direct contact with the representatives of China; five 
round-table discussions took place. However, the government has not 
acknowledged that. Inside Tibet there is no sign of improvement. […] 
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Democratic China is the only medicine for Tibet.”394 
To that end, despite all the efforts the EU has done to address the Tibetan cause, the EU has 
not made any normative impact on the situation in Tibet if normative power only depends 
on, in view of consequentialism, the consequences on the Tibetan community in China. 
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter follows the ‘the theoretical replication logic’ (Yin 1984, 1994) as I elaborate 
in Chapter Two, to treat the Tibetan case as an analogous case-study which is initially 
anticipated to disconfirm the NPE hypothesis. In so doing, I first look into the key areas 
and state of controversy regarding the Tibet question, and the ways in which different 
views of Tibet’s political status and internal situation are formulated. With a particular 
focus on how the EU related to Tibet’s historical and political context, both in terms of 
direct  historical involvement or influence on political debates, I establish a certain level of 
factual evidence in view of assessing the legitimacy basis for the EU foreign policy in the 
second section. After reviewing literature on how the Tibet question has been discussed in 
international law, I evaluate the relevance and validity of international norms and clarified 
the legal basis for a possible solution for the Tibet question, for the reference of the 
international community, including the EU. 
 
Following the guidance of the tripartite NPE framework, I first look at how EU institutions 
and member states had developed their approaches and ask the extent to which Tibet as a 
human rights issue became aims and objectives in EU foreign policy. Through the insights 
of constructivism, I explore these questions by asking how Tibet is related to the EU’s 
external identity, normative interests and internal experience. Through virtue ethics, I 
establish that the EU is not a normative power as the Tibetan case has not been addressed 
by the EU coherently and consistently.  
 
In the second part of the framework, I discuss how the EU has pursued its policy objectives 
in relation to Tibet by translating the five norms diffusion mechanisms into actual policy 
procedures that had been carried out. Through deontological ethics, I conclude that there 
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has been evidence to suggest that EU normative power had been exercised through the 
process of ‘reasoning and rationalisation’. However, without a unified front, the internal 
division between EU member states and institutions had severely undermined NPE by 
conflicting interests and different level of commitment to human rights norms in their 
external policies.  
 
In the last stage of the tri-partite framework, I seek to identify the normative impact of the 
EU on the situation in Tibet by tracing any changes its policy might have led to. Given that 
China has made no compromise in the discourse and policy on Tibet, and lack of access to 
information regarding the real situation in Tibet, the results do not match the efforts the EU 
has made in terms of words and deeds. Following a strict interpretation of consequentialist 
ethics, I further establish that the EU’s normative agenda has not resulted in credible 
changes in Tibet, confirmed by the Dalai Lama on behalf of the Tibetan community.  
 
Overall, the Tibetan case captures both strong and weak normative power among different 
EU institutions and Member States. An analysis of the EU’s rhetorical and substantive 
responses to human rights abuses in Tibet reveals the limitations of human rights as a 
central organizing principle within the CFSP when it is applied to its external relations with 
an important trade and strategic partner. Furthermore, although the Chinese regime has 
been under constant pressure from international community over Tibet, this pressure never 
emerged as an independent variable such as sovereignty and domestic stability in 
determining China’s Tibet policy. In essence, the EU lacks a collective voice and means to 
shape China’s Tibet policy and this ultimately accounts for the failure of the EU’s 
normative agenda on Tibet. Had the EU demonstrated greater unity and consistency in 
pressing for and prioritising this normative agenda with China, the EU at least could have 
put up a strong defence against China’s ‘diplomatic bullying’ (Metten 2009). 
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Chapter Six 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
As a non-European ‘interested’ observer, my choice of NPE as a theoretical approach does 
not mean a wholesale adoption of a European self-perception and discourse of political 
rhetoric. Rather, taking on this perspective, at least for me, involves targeting the type of 
norms that bear the highest level of universality, and learning to think both ‘inside’ and 
‘outside the box’ before all too quickly rejecting this European foreign policy interpretation 
as a ‘Eurocentric or imperialist endeavour’. From a perspective that is embedded in IR 
Constructivism within the study of European foreign policy, the learning process in this 
thesis has involved delving into debates on universal human rights norms/cultural 
relativism, international politics of EU-China relations, Chinese and European legal studies, 
Tibetology and so on. This is a journey characterised by revisiting and redefining my 
positions on a series of theoretical and empirical issues that are highly contentious between 
the two competing normative systems. To that end, I have made no conscious attempt to 
disguise my personal stance. This thesis is thus a reflection of my theoretical and empirical 
journey over the years past. 
 
In this thesis, I seek to achieve two central objectives. First, I attempt to add to the 
empirical richness of NPE literature by analysing one of the most complicated and 
important, country-based case studies; and second, I intend to apply NPE as a conceptual 
framework to the complex normative dimension of the EU’s relations with China in the 
field of human rights. To address the first goal, I analyse the case of China through two 
sub-cases – the death penalty and the Tibet question, which have been both high on the 
EU’s human rights agenda and yet are predicted to produce contrasting findings on NPE.  
The second aim is met by reflecting upon a multi-dimensional understanding of power and 
effectiveness, through which I normatively theorise the EU’s promotion of human rights in 
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China. To that end, I endeavour to show that the NPE as an approach provides us some 
alternative ways of understanding and judging the EU’s normative influence on China.  
 
This chapter therefore synthesises these two contributions by: 1) assessing the hypotheses 
posed in Chapter Two by comparing the two issue areas; 2) drawing substantive 
conclusions within the structure of the NPE framework; 3) revisiting methodological issues, 
including the value and deficiency of using normative ethics.    
6.1 Findings and Implications 
Adopting the NPE as an interpretive approach does not necessarily prevent me from 
framing hypotheses to test its empirical relevance. In other words, I seek to both explain 
and understand the EU’s normative power through the Chinese case. In this thesis, the 
main hypothesis is that the EU has been and should be a normative power to China in the 
field of human rights. To verify this assumption, I apply this perspective to two case-
studies, each in line with the main hypothesis and three sub-hypotheses that have been 
evaluated by data on normative principle, normative action and normative impact 
respectively. This section thus incorporates empirical findings from both case-studies, and 
evaluates the significance of the independent variables.   
 
6.1.1 Substantive Conclusions 
The rise of China has meant increasing competition with the EU on the global stage, not 
just as an economic power but also as a self-proclaimed normative power according to its 
own standards (Womack 2008). In this context, China as a case study is a curious amalgam 
of EU selfish and selfless interests, and human rights dichotomy between the universalist-
versus-relativist paradigms, all of which sets to provide a litmus test for the empirical 
validity of NPE. 
 
Chapter One sets out three core research questions, as guided by the aforementioned main 
hypothesis:  
 How and why do human rights become aims and objectives in EU foreign policy? 
 How does the EU act to change normality? 
 How should the impacts of EU normative power to be evaluated? 
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The logic of these questions corresponds with the NPE framework elaborated in Chapter 
Two, with each question revealing one part of the theoretical arguments, and related sub-
hypothesis in order to guide the collection and analysis of empirical data. Chapter Three 
contextualise the case-studies against the backdrop of contemporary EU-China relations, 
with its findings feeding back to the wider debate about the extent to which the notion of 
NPE captures the EU’s international role in the case of China on human rights.  
 
In Chapter Four and Chapter Five, each individual case study is treated as an independent 
study, following the tri-partite structural sequence. Striving for a ‘structured, focused 
comparison’ (George and McKeown, 1985: 43), I collect data using standardised 
requirements based on defined NPE hypotheses, and analyse data on the same variables. In 
the following, I further reflect upon the relationship between these two issue areas as well 
as the general pattern of the Chinese case, by comparing their empirical findings and 
drawing cross-case conclusions.  
   
 On Principle 
In the first part of the tri-partite framework, I hypothesise that the human rights norms 
under investigation are constitutive principles of the EU in its internal practice, which 
serve to facilitate the EU’s human rights agenda towards China. In establishing criteria for 
normativity, I look into the UDHR and its related UN documents which constitute the most 
important normative justification for NPE. To that end, if EU principles derive from or 
invoke these international legal standards, they are not Eurocentric. On the other hand, by 
elaborating on Chinese perspectives as contesting norm interpretations to those of the EU, 
an acute awareness of any imperialist or Eurocentric endeavour shall lead to greater self-
reflexivity and sensitivity for China’s historical, legal and cultural traditions and 
perceptions.  
 
Identity 
In the death penalty case, I trace the cultural/moral, political and legal origins that have 
shaped the abolitionist movement in Europe. Based on primary and secondary data, these 
findings confirm the EU’s normative difference, giving a clear exposition of a European 
penal identity.  The Tibetan case, on the other hand, exhibits a far more complicated pattern. 
Since the late 1990s, EU institutions and member states developed an implicit consensus 
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that they recognised China’s sovereignty, and respect for human rights and religious 
freedom, which has increasingly framed its response to the situation in Tibet. However, EU 
normative identity as a sympathetic outsider with an important role to play in the eyes of 
international Tibet support groups has been undermined by intra-EU divisions and 
contested by the colonial history of Britain, at least in the eyes of the Chinese.   
 
In order to understand these contrasting findings, we need to revisit the basic claim put 
forward by Manners (2002: 241-244) about NPE that the EU is a normative power because 
it has a normative identity. An objective understanding of identity would sit well with the 
‘easy’ case of the death penalty, in which the nature of the EU as a hybrid polity with 
treaty-based legal order and willingness to discard the Westphalian model has facilitated its 
formulation of a distinctive penal identity as a ‘death penalty-free zone’. To that end, the 
EU’s normative identity in the international abolitionist movement is self-evident. In the 
Tibet case, due to the lack of a clear and consistent articulation of which international 
norms underpin the EU’s concerns, or what internal values ‘predispose’ the EU to respond, 
the EU’s normative identity is not well established and is particularly challenged by 
Chinese perceptions. Hence, it is subjective if not insignificant.  
 
Interest 
Although the normative identity of the EU lays the basis for its normative interests from a 
constructivist perspective, such interest has not been the only force of influence in shaping 
EU human rights policy. In the death penalty case, I seek to identify an instrumental or 
strategic dimension by asking why this issue area has become a primary human rights 
concern of EU foreign policy. The findings suggest that the EU does have a strong 
propensity in demonstrating its normative interest for the common good to abolish the 
death penalty globally; and it also combines an instrumental purpose to achieve its milieu 
goal in order to establish the distinctiveness of EU external identity. In the case of Tibet, 
the EU’s normative interests ought to be concerns for Tibetans’ human rights, however, 
other concerns, such as the need to engage China in both human rights and beyond have 
been far more pronounced. Therefore, while the EU normative interest goes hand in hand 
with its milieu goal to reinforce a distinctive European identity in the former case, it is at 
odds with its materialist interest in the latter, in which EU internal division of interests has 
eventually led to the prioritisation of material over normative interests.  
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The key to understanding these different findings thus lies in the relationship between 
material and normative interests in NPE theorising. The death penalty case is a classic 
example of the EU pursuing a norm, without aiming at defending or increasing its material 
interest, but instead shaping the international environment in order to promote a value to 
which it attaches great importance. However, the EU did not have a clear and independent 
human rights agenda towards Tibet; instead it was incorporated in the general framework 
of China policy in which EU normative interest is constrained by economic and strategic 
objectives. Moreover, as an effort to bridge the gap between normative and materialist 
interest, the assumption by some EU policy makers that deepened economic and trade 
relations with China can translate into progress in human rights or political liberalisation 
(Pattern 2002, in Panebianco 2006: 139), is not supported by the findings presented in the 
Tibetan case. In hindsight, the inevitable conflict between normative and material interests 
is one area where the idealistic component of NPE is most frequently tested in this thesis.  
 
Self-binding 
In the death penalty case, the empirical findings confirm that the EU has committed itself 
fully to the abolitionist norm internally, both in law-making and in practice. Whilst in the 
Tibetan case, the EU’s own commitment to international human rights norms and 
international law has been challenged on several normative grounds, including right to 
self-determination, and ethnic minorities’ rights, both by the Chinese and the 14th Dalai 
Lama. This discrepancy can be understood in two ways. Firstly, it reflects upon the fluidity 
in defining which specific human rights norms underpin the Tibet issue, as opposed to the 
clear-cut legal framework of the death penalty case. Secondly, it reveals that developments 
in the abolition of the death penalty have certainly reinforced an image of the EU as an 
NPE. But apart from this rather exceptional case, its actual record in other issue areas is far 
from immaculate, particularly in the area of minority rights. 
 
Virtue ethics 
The path to judging the EU, according to virtue ethics, requires an evaluation with regard 
to whether the EU’s characters or traits have provided normative guidance to act 
coherently and consistently.  The death penalty case perfectly exemplifies the EU, as a 
‘virtuous example’, to base the legitimacy of its foreign policy upon a norm which is 
embraced by international law and bound by the EU itself. By contrast, the Tibetan case is 
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a prime example of EU normative character being troubled by internal cleavages and 
external inconsistency. Thus, having signed up to international law does not necessarily 
make the EU normative in character; especially considering the problems that arise when 
the EU fails to apply its principles with rigour. On that note, the development of the EU as 
an exceptional and virtuous example in global human rights varies from one issue area to 
another. And the key to understanding this uneven performance lies in the extent to which 
EU actors have developed a clear human rights agenda based on this commonly shared 
value.  
 
 On Action/Inaction 
In the second stage of analysis, I hypothesise that the EU’s promotion of human rights is 
based on reasoning, and human rights principles are diffused through normative means. By 
‘reasoning’, I mean that the EU activates commitment or has been morally persuasive by 
referring to generally recognised international law. By normative means, I particularly look 
into five norm diffusion mechanisms which help us understand the ways in which human 
rights norms are promoted through non-coercive action or inaction.  
 
Persuasion  
Within both cases, I cite the human rights dialogue as evidence of policy process in which 
persuasion occurred. Instead of relying upon the imposition of the threat of sanctions 
which did not pay off in the early 1990s, the presumed strength of this non-confrontational 
approach lies in its discreet nature to which the Chinese appear to be more receptive. In the 
death penalty case, the dialogue approach has encountered major obstacles when it comes 
to implementation. During this reasoning process, the EU’s cosmopolitan stance on the 
abolitionist norm has been consistently challenged by China via diplomatic tactics and 
ruptures. As a result, the principle which the EU has practically extended to China is 
reduced to international ‘minimum standards’, which do not prohibit the death penalty. In 
the Tibetan case, the process of persuasion is carried out not only in the form of human 
rights dialogue, but also EU troika visits and other delegation visits, which were dedicated 
to bridge the gaps in perception from both sides. However, in either case, there seems no 
easy way out of the dilemma between seeking cooperation with China, and a hard-nosed 
position on the principles that the EU stands for. The findings from both cases suggest that, 
with a range of other measures at its disposal, the EU adopted the dialogue approach out of 
Chapter Six 
 
203 
 
necessity in seeking partnership with China. To that end, being non-coercive in nature does 
not make the dialogue approach morally persuasive, but rather, it represents the triumph of 
reapolitik over principle, interests over values.  
 
Invoking Norms 
Invoking norms refers to a type of mechanism through which norms are diffused by 
activating legal commitments that China has subscribed itself to.  In the death penalty case, 
the use of démarche, evidencing the existence of such process, was adopted by the EU to 
complement the human rights dialogue for its responsive demeanour. However, the fact 
that China is not under any international legal obligation to comment on its death penalty 
practice has left this approach with little room for rationalising the principle of abolition 
with the Chinese. In the Tibet case by contrast, through resolutions, declarations and 
démarches, the EU has in the past invoked various levels of international legal 
commitments which China has contravened. In the early 1990s, EU concerns were 
squarely focused on the violation of the right to self-determination and minority rights in 
Tibet, and were reduced to specific individual rights according to individual cases. This 
absence of a consistent human rights agenda on Tibet is not unique to the EU, but 
characteristic of the international community as a whole, largely due to the controversial 
nature of the Tibet issue in relation to international norms. However, these two cases do 
share a similarity -- that is, the EU’s initial principled positions were both called into 
question, and the EU’s softening line has been justified by the need to engage, not confront 
China.  
 
Shaping Discourses 
As a norm diffusion model, shaping discourse is intended to capture discursive changes via 
learning, adaptation or rejection of the norm under investigation. In the Chinese case, 
shaping discourse could be identified within human rights dialogue and cooperation 
programmes, especially those designed to provide China with human rights education, 
training and academic exchange. In the death penalty case, I illustrate how such 
cooperation programs were implemented on the ground. The programs that were most 
likely to have resulted in discursive change, are the ones in which the EU made creative 
efforts to gain a certain level of trust from the Chinese government by avoiding direct 
lobbying for the abolition, and focusing on enhancing the professional capacity of defence 
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lawyers.  This finding is contrasted with that of the Tibet case in which China resolutely 
rejected the EU’s principled position, consequently, the EU’s discourse on Tibet ended up 
accommodating the need to cooperate with China to avoid challenging China on its 
fundamental concern over sovereignty and domestic stability. Thus, the differences 
between the two cases lie in China’s perception of whether proper adherence to 
international standards would threaten the Communist Party’s rule. To that end, 
strengthening China’s rule of law with the help of EU funded projects is certainly more 
appealing in the eyes of the Chinese leadership, than negotiating the non-negotiable 
question of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet.   
 
Living by Example 
Contrary to all the other norm diffusion models, ‘living by example’ works without policy 
action. The rationale is that the others would emulate the EU simply for the example it sets 
and norms it stands by. Although there has been evidence that China drew extensively from 
European experience in law-making since the early twentieth century, the vision to follow 
the footsteps of Europe towards abolition of the death penalty is only a recent phenomenon 
and controversial topic discussed by law academics on a purely conceptual level. Without a 
long standing Christian humanistic tradition in law making, it is still unclear in those top 
thinkers’ minds whether the abolitionist ideal could be realised in China in the future. In 
the Tibetan case, the EU has been perceived to be setting a number of examples not only 
for the Chinese, but for the rest of the international community and the TGIE, seeking 
remedy for Tibet’s political future. Compared to the cases of Kosovo and Baltic states, the 
EU had drawn negative attention in its dealings with the Tibet issue, with its root cause 
stemming from the inherent contradictions within international law with regard to 
competing rights of territorial integrity of states and group/individual rights. Moreover, 
because the Tibetan case touches the ‘sensitive’ area of sovereignty and nationalistic 
sentiments, the EU as a model particularly runs the risk of reinforcing China’s arguments 
that attempts to “improve human rights” in China are merely a disguised form of 
imperialism and interference.  
 
Shaming  
The power of shaming takes effect when the state associates its identity with a normative 
community in which certain values are shared. In the death penalty case, China’s excessive 
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use of the death penalty and some abusive practices were raised by the EU at the UNCHR 
prior to 1998. After the EU abandoned holding China accountable at international fora in 
exchange for engaging China in the human rights dialogue, evoking a sense of shame 
became almost impossible, as public information on its process is difficult to come by. 
Moreover, Chinese authorities repeatedly denounce the legitimacy of the abolitionist norm 
or deny the global trend of abolition, thus making China unlikely to be shamed without any 
need to belong to the ‘civilised community’. Whereas in the Tibet case, public opinion 
within Europe has been vociferous enough for the EU to exercise the power of shaming 
without officially breaking away from doing business with China. Thus, the Tibetan case 
suggests that while the EU does have leverage of China through shaming with only 
occasional diplomatic backlashes, this policy strategy does not generate much materialistic 
costs on the trade and economic front. However, shaming China over Tibet has produced 
an adverse national response inside China, and stimulated popular nationalism which is 
prevailing at the domestic level. In the absence of direct material cost, these contrasting yet 
complementary findings suggest that China’s capacity of experiencing shame as evoked by 
the EU varies from issue to issue. Not only does it depend on China’s acceptance of that 
specific reputation, but also the possibility of the EU using political strategy to encourage 
its domestic responses to the issue of concern, so as to avoid further material cost in the 
long term.   
 
Deontological Ethics 
In the logic of deontological ethics, principles or good values should be established 
through practice of reasoning.  Judging the EU’s normative actions thus requires an 
evaluation of whether EU policy practices actually lead to the formulation of human rights 
standards agreed by the Chinese. By comparison, both cases confirm that the EU pursued 
its human rights agenda through persuasion and engagement in a normative fashion, whilst 
invoking norms and shaming to lesser degree. However, findings from both cases show 
that benchmarks for the dialogue approach, together with its cooperation programs, were 
set up after concessions being made to allow certain level of agreement to be established as 
a result of the practice of reasoning.  Therefore, the often highly regarded normative means, 
dialogue and engagement, have called the EU’s cosmopolitan disposition on abolition and 
its human rights approach to the Tibet into question. While contrasting the two sets of 
findings, the EU’s own reputation/record on abolition unquestionably bears more moral 
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weight against China, than that in the Tibetan case. Furthermore, the capacity of EU 
institutions and member states to act in concert and speak in one voice has made the issue 
of the death penalty a rare case, highlighting the EU’s persuasiveness without its 
engagement with China being undermined. In the case of Tibet, however, China resorted to 
other competing international norms to attack the validity of the ones raised by the EU, and 
tactically exploited the EU’s fragmented approach in such a way as to find its own 
bargaining chip.  
 
 On Impact 
In the third stage of the analysis, I hypothesise that the EU’s normative impact comprises 
the change in Chinese official discourse, increasing cooperation with the EU, domestic 
reform and local ownership. By ‘normative impact’, I refer to discursive change in Chinese 
official rhetoric, socialisation and partnership, all of which are considered as ideational 
achievements from a normative understanding of effectiveness. By ‘local ownership’, I 
imply that normative impact will be judged if it is ‘doing least harm’ and ‘other-
empowering’ -- the logic that underlies consequentialist ethics. To verify this assumption, I 
modify the criteria for collecting valid data in each sub-case study so as to fit with the 
empirical background under investigation.  
 
In terms of discursive change, there have been visible changes in official discourse, 
evidenced by the increasing willingness of the Chinese authorities to engage in 
international debates on the death penalty, and a surge in academic interest on the subject 
since the late 1990s. Given its strong and coherent normative identity in the case of the 
death penalty, is the EU more likely to be a driving force than any other international actor 
in shaping China’s domestic discourse. As for a series of legal reforms relating to the death 
penalty taking place since the late 1990s, the EU did not hesitate to praise its own efforts in 
assisting these reforms. However, the EU statements were somewhat of an exaggeration of 
the significance of positive change on the ground. Given the lack of death penalty statistics, 
it is virtually impossible to establish or assess the accountability of the EU’s direct impact.   
On the other hand, as we have seen in the Tibet case, no tangible changes - neither political 
rhetoric nor policy practice - can be identified over the years concerned. Despite fact 
finding efforts being made via EU troika and delegation visits, little is known to the outside 
world about the actual situation on the ground, thanks to the Chinese government’s 
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powerful control over the information about and access to Tibet. However, during the last 
two decades, the highly publicised Tibetan cause has left China with a huge loss of 
reputation worldwide, to which the EU and its member states have contributed by 
sustaining the international visibility of the Tibet cause, together with other Western states, 
media, NGOs and pressure groups. To that end, the Tibet issue has put much more 
formidable strains over EU-China relations than the issue of the death penalty, as the 
former touches upon China’s national interests at the core.  
 
Consequentialist ethics 
The path to judging the EU’s normative impact, according to consequentialist ethics, 
should be based on the outcomes of actions. Manners suggests that the right consequences 
are those measured according to the principles found in the target society, rather than the 
EU’s own principles (Manners 2008: 58). In this thesis, I demonstrate that the Chinese 
authorities did not recognise the legitimacy of the norms promoted by the EU, but 
habitually rejected anything that it perceived as Western values. Therefore, I intend to 
evaluate the right consequences using the principles found in the Chinese society for the 
former case, and the Tibetan society represented by the TGIE for the latter. However, due 
to the political sensitivity of the subject matter in China, in neither case was credible data 
from which to formulate such a basis for normative judgement easy to come by. In the 
death penalty case, only through primary data from a cooperation project targeting Chinese 
academic and legal expertise have I identified where the perceived interests of Chinese 
society in reducing the risks of miscarriage of justice matches the criteria for right 
consequence of the EU’s policy action. Whereas in the Tibetan case, the leader of the TGIE, 
the 14
th
 Dalai Lama confirmed that there has been no sign of improvement in Tibet, a 
verdict that is also backed by ongoing human rights abuses documented in NGO reports.  
 
 On the General Pattern of Chinese Case  
These two sub-cases are originally selected because they are among the key issues on EU 
normative agenda, and each signifies certain independent variables of NPE in a 
complementary fashion, and their findings tend to situate at opposite ends of NPE 
spectrum. 
 
Reflecting upon the cross-case conclusions, we have seen that NPE has been contested in 
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similar patterns in each stage of analysis. On principle, problems arise from debates 
between universalism and cultural relativism, and the uneasy coexistence between norm 
and interest. On action, the credibility and vitality of NPE is challenged by the stark 
dilemma it faces between engagement and conditionality/coercion. With regard to impact, 
China’s instrumental behaviour falls short of ensuring genuine progress on the ground, 
underlying its rigid political culture and the instrumental nature of Chinese law. On the 
other hand, that the EU acts and China responds differently in each issue area is intimately 
connected to the perceived legitimacy of NPE, and the fundamental difference between the 
EU and China concerning order and justice.  
 
Since the events of Tiananmen in 1989, although China has been very sensitive to the 
exposure of its human rights problems internationally, the authorities justify the state’s 
behaviour through reference to other parts of international law and its very own national 
circumstances. Through this empirical investigation, I therefore argue that the degree of 
norm contestation in both cases is too significant to establish a normative basis for which 
NPE could be perceived to be legitimate by China. The EU has demonstrated its normative 
power to some degree in view of virtue ethics, but this character has been compromised 
during the practice of reasoning, and has yet to exhibit significant normative impact. To 
that end, the main hypothesis that the EU has been a normative power towards China in the 
field of human rights between 1989 and 2009 has been mainly disproven by the empirical 
findings presented in this thesis.  
 
6.1.2  Methodological Conclusions 
To theoretically account for the EU’s role as a normative power towards China in the field 
of human rights, the concept of NPE has been modulated in order to better understand and 
explain what the EU says and does in terms of its contribution in the Chinese case. In this 
section, I discuss the methodological issues surrounding the operationalision of the NPE 
framework, and assess the values and problems of adopting NPE as an approach 
combining the use of normative ethics. 
 NPE as an Analytical Tool 
Based on an analytical definition of NPE, central to the analysis is the extent to which the 
EU shapes the definition of normality through the attraction of norms the EU stands for 
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and the acceptance by others. To apply this analytical dimension of NPE to the Chinese 
case, I develop a set of specified hypotheses which are subject to empirical evaluation. I 
also deploy standards of evaluation of NPE that are drawn from the existing NPE literature 
and formulated according to the conditions in the Chinese case.  
 
Regarding the first sub-hypothesis, the Chinese case is consistent with the understanding 
that norms such as human rights have constitutive effect on the identity formation of the 
EU and we can explain the reason for the EU’s human rights agenda on China in relation to 
the EU’s own principles and practice.  
 
With regard to the second hypothesis, the norm diffusion mechanisms embedded in this 
stage of analysis are comprehensive and consistent enough to capture the EU’s normative 
power at work in the Chinese context. Especially through my analysis on ‘living by 
example’ and ‘shaping discourse’, some interesting findings emerge, and add to our 
knowledge on how norms can be diffused through ‘inaction’ and how the EU could end up 
being shaped by China in its policy rhetoric. However, the Chinese case suggests that the 
EU’s normative power is often in conflict with not just economic interests, but also the 
need for engagement – a basic form of normative action itself. Moreover, that the NPE 
concept seeks to think beyond the agency of states makes the analysis on phase one (1989-
1997) rather problematic when norms are realistically intervening variables between 
interests and state preferences, due to the lack of EU actorness and EC/EU common policy 
on China in this period.    
 
When it comes to the third hypothesis, I come across two major adaptation problems in 
operationalising the NPE concept, while the current NPE literature has little to offer 
regarding specific assessment criteria as to how ideational impact is defined/translated and 
evaluated. First of all, the lack of causal variables accounting for norm compliance has 
made it difficult to establish the linkage between China’s domestic development and NPE. 
For instance, China’s legal reform in the area of the death penalty is suggested by the 
empirical data that it was mostly likely driven by the Party’s political reform as a result of 
a growing civil society, rather than external pressure. Secondly, since China has been 
subjected to sufficient if not excessive attention by international human rights regime, it 
has also engaged with numerous other Western countries in bilateral human rights 
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dialogues and cooperation programmes. Thus, there is a methodological problem in 
isolating the EU’s normative impact from other norm entrepreneurs.  
 
Finally, the most important operational conclusion for NPE is that the evaluation of 
hypotheses through an interprevistic approach requires good knowledge about the cultural, 
historical and legal tradition of Europe and the target country prior to designing an in-depth 
case study. For countries like China which has no prospect of EU membership and a 
different normative system, a careful study of international law as external reference also 
helps us clarify whether certain accusations of NPE as being ‘imperialistic’ or ‘Eurocentric’ 
are in fact normatively justifiable.  
 
 Epistemology 
One of the central objectives of the thesis is to contribute to the understanding of the way 
in which the EU interacts on the basis of its normative power with China. Thus, it requires 
interprevisit epistemology focusing on the human rights norms in EU foreign policy as 
reflection of its identity, the ways in which norms are diffused without coercive policy 
mechanisms and how we comprehend and interpret impact. However, before EU policy 
coherence and impact may be judged, I resort to causal relations to some degree, before 
arriving at the interpretivist understanding of ‘how’ and ‘why’ EU normative power has 
influenced China’s human rights conditions. In so doing, I adopt analytical techniques of a 
more positivist nature, which include establishing research hypotheses, ‘least-likely’ case 
study, case-by-case/cross-case analysis, and rival explanations. On the other hand, I look 
into legal, cultural and historical aspects in each issue area which give meanings and 
detailed understanding of the case. Therefore, I come to the conclusion that, as far as China 
is concerned, NPE as an analytical approach and a foreign policy interpretation is only 
methodologically practicable when built upon a co-operative view to the epistemological 
divide between pure explaining and pure understanding.   
 
 Normative Ethics 
Drawn from Manners’ (2008) avant-garde piece on ‘normative ethics of the EU’ which sets 
out a tripartite framework of analysis as applicable to NPE, this thesis is the first attempt to 
apply all three ethics within single case-studies in the existing literature. Even though, my 
tentative contribution to literature in this respect is strictly on the empirical ground without 
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further exploration in the field of ethical foreign policy or normative theory, this 
experiment and experience of applying all three normative ethics in this empirical 
investigation can be summarised in two-fold in terms of its value and deficiency.  
 
Firstly, as ‘ways in which we might judge the principles that [the EU] seeks to promote, the 
practices through which it promotes, and the impact they have’ (Manners 2008: 45), 
normative ethics fills in the theoretical gap in the NPE literature by prescribing what 
‘ought to be done’.  Fitting snugly with the three–stage NPE inquiry on principle, action 
and impact, these three types of normative ethics come up with well-established 
assessment criteria for good character, appropriate behaviour and right consequences. In 
this way, it contributes to our understanding of normativity which the NPE literature would 
not otherwise have defined, especially in a situation where the level of norm contestation is 
highly significant.  
 
However, combining all three normative ethics within one empirical investigation can be 
problematic and self-contradictory regarding which standards are the correct ones. In 
Manners’ piece (2008), these three types of normative ethics as applied to NPE are 
presented in a complementary manner, however, their theoretical incompatibility or rivalry 
is neglected. Virtue ethics focuses on the inherent character of the EU and points to 
coherency and consistency as key to being a ‘virtuous example’. To that end, the empirical 
investigation requires the application of these two criteria in the EU’s internal practice and 
external policy making, in order to guide and assess what kind of actor the EU is and 
should be. In the Chinese case, the path to judging the EU based on virtue ethics is 
consistent with the EU’s actorness in foreign policy making which varies depending on its 
willingness and other external conditions. The contrast between the death penalty case and 
the Tibet case in view of virtue ethics thus confirms its validity as applied to the EU.  
However, the major contradiction lies between deontological ethics and consequentialist 
ethics as they both prescribe guidance and assessment criteria on what the EU ought to do. 
Under deontological ethics, the EU’s action should be morally judged if it is a normative 
power, in which case, normativity is assessed based on whether the human rights norm is 
promoted through a rationalisation process with the Chinese. On the other hand, 
consequentialist ethics defines normativity only by consequences. In that case, EU 
normative power should be judged by its impact measured by values found in the recipient 
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society. As a result, deontological ethics stands in opposition to consequentialist ethics in 
terms what constitutes right actions or inaction. In both sub-cases, the Tibet issue and the 
death penalty have been addressed by the EU using normative means, thus in deontological 
ethics, the EU’s action has been normative, neglecting the fact that the EU’s principles on 
these issues were shaped by China and subject to change during the ‘reasoning’ process 
over time. Whereas according to consequentialist ethics, the EU’s normative power should 
be judged using values and principles found in the Chinese society or the Tibetan 
community in China. Besides the difficulty in obtaining data due to the nature of the 
Chinese state, the two sub-cases have so far exhibited contrasting results which contradict 
with the conclusion provided by deontological ethics. Therefore, applying a combination of 
all three normative ethics to the Chinese case is problematised by value pluralism, as it 
gives no indication of what constitutes good values.    
 
While there is no convenient answer as to how these three deeply contending ethics can 
combine, they are three different ways of evaluating the EU as an ethical actor. Although 
the use of normative ethics seems to have both strengthened and problematised the NPE 
approach, the exercise of normative theorising itself is a rewarding experience in terms of 
thinking differently and creatively about how normative foreign policy should be 
conducted and understood.   
 
6.2 Future Research 
Having applied a framework of analysis built upon a growing body of NPE literature to a 
country whose power dynamics with the EU are rapidly changing, the thesis opens the path 
for wider theoretical debates on NPE and additional areas of empirical research, which 
would not have been adequately addressed in a single thesis. Although this research project 
is largely a reflective piece, its contribution to our understanding of the subject can 
potentially influence EU decision and policymaking if it could expand in the following 
directions in the future.  
 
Firstly, due to the limited duration within which this research should have been conducted, 
the timescale of analysis dates from 1989 to 2009. However, since the Lisbon Treaty came 
into force on 1 December 2009, and the subsequent creation of the European External 
Action Service, it would be interesting to assess the role of a High Representative of the 
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EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, in the area of promoting 
human rights. Secondly, to ensure the test of NPE is more robust, it would be necessary to 
rely on a greater number of sample cases that arise within the EU-China relations in the 
field of human rights. For instance, the arms embargo would be an interesting case which 
particularly highlights the importance of ‘the US factor’ in the EU’s China policy making. 
In the same token, it would be interesting to extend the focus beyond human rights, to 
other normative areas such as good governance, consensual democracy, sustainable 
development, and global governance, especially China’s growing presence in Africa. To 
that end, the thesis only provides a starting point for a future research project(s) that can be 
both timely and original.   
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Appendix I: 
 
Table 3.1 EC/EU Funded Cooperation Programmes in China 1989-2009 
Implementation Project Duration EC/EU Grant Commitment 
1993 Ningxia Hui and Land 
Reclamation project 
5 Years 
(extended 
to 2000) 
ECU/€3.8 
million(+ECU/€0.75 
1992 
1994 Qinghai Livestock 
Development 
6 Years ECU/€3.2 million 1994 
1996 Qinghai Potato 
Development Project 
6 Years ECU/€3.1 million 1994 
1996  China-Europe 
International Business 
School (CEIBS) 
20 Years ECU/€ 14.85 
million 
1995 
1996 Water Buffalo 
Development Project 
May 1996-
July 2002 
ECU/€2.787 million 
(+€0.55 million) 
1995 
1996 EU-China 
Technical&Commercial 
Cooperation within the 
Dairy&Food 
Processing Sector 
5 Years ECU/€30 million 1996 
1997 China-EC Higher 
Education Programme 
4 Years ECU/€ 9.75 million 1996 
1997 China-EC Cooperation 
in Agriculture (CECA) 
5 Years ECU/€12.3 million 1996 
1997 EU-China Junior 
Managers Programme 
5 Years ECU/€11.645 
million 
1997 
1997 China-Europe 
Administration 
Programme 
4 Years ECU/€5.7 million  
1998 EU-China Training 
Programme on STD 
and AIDS in China, 
Phase II (1998-2001) 
3 Years ECU/€0.995 million 1998 
1998 EU-China Training 
Programme on Village 
Governance 
5 Years ECU/€ 10.668 
million 
1996 
1998 EU-China Cooperation 
in the Field of Public 
Procurement – Pilot 
Project 
Feb.1998-
Oct.2000 
ECU/€0.615 million 1997 
1998 EU-China Cooperation 
Programmes in 
Statistics 
3 Years ECU/€4.17 million 1997 
1998 Seminar on  ECU/€0.017 million 1998 
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Administration of 
Justice 
1998 EU-China Business 
Forum 
 ECU/€0.02 million 1998 
1998  EU-China Info Pack  ECU/€ 0.036 
million 
1998 
1998 Legal Seminar  ECU/€0.184 million 1998 
1998 Seminar on Women 
Rights 
 ECU/€0.193 million 1998 
1998 Telecom Management 
Training 
 ECU/€0.413 million 1998 
1998 Telecom – Health  ECU/€0.175 million 1998 
1998 Telecom – 
Interconnection 
 ECU/€0.458 million 1998 
1998 Bio-safety Workshop  ECU/€0.051 million 1998 
1998 Aids Fellowships II  ECU/€0.403 million 1998 
1998  WB-Education Sector  ECU/€0.033 million 1998 
1998 TV-Environment 
Broadcasts 
 ECU/€0.3 million 1998 
1998  Small Project Facility- 
Human Rights 
 ECU/€0.84 million 1998 
1998 Support to Disabled 
Federation 
 ECU/€0.98 million 1998 
1999 EU-China Intellectual 
Property Rights 
Cooperation 
Programme 
3 Years €4.8 million 1996 
1999 EU-China Legal and 
Judicial Cooperation 
Programme 
4 Years €13.2 million 
(Subtotal: 32.87 
million) 
1998 
1999 EU-China Civil 
Aviation 
Cooperation Project 
5 Years €12.566 million 
(plus industry input) 
 
1999 EU-China Liaoning 
Integrated 
Environmental 
Programme 
 €37 million 1998 
1999 EU-China Relations 
Inforpack-updating and 
reprinting 
 €0.04 million 1999 
1999  EU-China Legal 
Seminar in Bad 
Honnef, Germany – 
May 1999 
 €0.116 million 1999 
1999 Contribution to 
framework contract 
 €0.15 million 1999 
1999 Aeronautics – Phase II 
– Launch phase 
 €0.52 million 1999 
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1999 Second Women Rights 
Seminar 
 €0.52 million 1999 
1999 Telecom Testing and 
Certifications (EOTC) 
 €0.31 million 1999 
1999 SCIC – Training of 
Interpreters 
 €0.125 million 1999 
2000 Framework Programme 
for EU Support to 
China’s Accession to 
WTO 
3 Years €3 million 1998 
2000 EU-China Programme 
for the development of 
vocational training for 
the industry 
5 Years €15.1 million 1999 
2000 EU-China Honghe 
Environment Protection 
& Poverty Alleviation 
Project (HEPPAP), 
Pilot Phase 
18 Months €0.99 million 1998 
2001  Capacity Building for 
Municipal Solid Waste 
Management Reform in 
China 
2 Years €0.461 million (plus 
€0.143 million 
UNDP) 
 
2001 Vehicle Control 
Cooperation 
2 Years €0.838 million 1998 
2001 China-Europe 
International Business 
School (CEIBS) Phase 
II 
5 Year €10.95 million 2000 
2001 China-Europe Basic 
Education Cooperation 
Programme 
4 Years €15 million 1999 
2001 EU-China Scholarship 
2000 Programme 
5 Years €31.2 million 2000 
2001 EU-China 
Environmental 
Management 
Cooperation 
Programme 
4 Years €13 million 1998 
2001 EU-China Cooperation 
Programme Pa-Nam 
(Tibet)  Integrated 
Rural Development 
Project  
5 Years €7.6 million 1998 
2001 EU-China Financial 
Services Cooperation 
Project 
3 Years €8.5 million  
2002 EU-China Enterprise 3 Years €8.5 million  
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Reform Project 
2002 Natural Forest 
Management Project 
5 Years €16.5 million 2000 
2002 The EU-China Small 
Project Facility 
5 Years €8 million 1998 
2004 ‘China Window’ in 
Erasmus Mundus 
Programme 
2 Years € 9 million 2003 
2006 ‘China Window’ in 
Erasmus Mundus 
Programme 
2 Years €45 million 2005 
2008 Social cohesion and 
employment project in 
Tibet Autonomous 
Region 
2 Years €0.743 million 2008 
2009 Training Programme 
for Service Oriented 
Government based on 
the Rule of Law 
Nov.2009- 
Nov. 2013 
€4.4888 million 2009 
2009 Poverty Reduction 
Project for children in 
Xinjiang 
Apr.2009 – 
Mar. 2012 
€0.525 million 2009 
2009 Mid-Term Evaluation 
of the Governance for 
Equitable Development 
Programme 
Dec.2009- 
Feb.2010 
€0.054 million 2009 
 
This list includes projects financed under the following budget titles and budget lines: 
B7-3              Co-operation with Asian Developing Countries 
B7-7              European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) 
B7-6000        NGO co-financing 
B7-6212        Health, Population, Fight against HIV/AIDS 
 
Source: 
1. Commission of the European Communities (1998), ‘Building a Comprehensive Partnership 
with China’, COM (1998)181 final 
2. Commission of the European Communities (2000), ‘Report on the Implementation of the 
Communication ‘Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China’, COM(2000)552 final; 
3. European Commission Delegation in Beijing, China (2001), ‘EU-China Cooperation 
Projects: Financed on Budget-Lines B-3000 and B-3010’, 
http://delchn.cec.eu.int/co/index.htm. 
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4. Commission of the European Communities (2001), ‘EU Strategy towards China: 
Implementation of the 1998 Communication and Future Steps for a more Effective EU 
Policy’, COM(2001)265 final 
5. DG RELEX/H/2, National Indicative Programme 2005-2006: China 
6. Commission Working Documents, China Strategy Paper 2002-2006 
7. Commission Working Documents, China Strategy Paper 2007-2013 
 
